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ABSTRACT
Chapter I; The re la t io n s h ip  between inventor and the Patent 
Office i s  modelled as  a ‘pa ten t regu la t ion  game’ and i t  i s  shown 
th a t  the  conventional wisdom th a t  the P.O. always maximizes 
w elfare by playing the  Stackelberg leader i s  incorrec t.  Other 
so lu tion  concepts a re  explored and i t  is  found th a t ,  because of 
the  pa ten t l i f e  co n s tra in t ,  a re v e rs a l  of ro le s  may be 
benefic ia l .  The r e s u l t  th a t  so c ia l  w elfare can be maximized by 
the  P.O. being a S tackelberg  follower surv ives  (a lbe it  fo r  a 
narrower range of values of the key param eters) even i f  the 
P.O.-leader i s  endowed with the  add itiona l instrum ent of a 
compulsory ro y a l ty  ra te .
Chapter I I ; A new tw is t  is  added to  the debate on the 
Schumpeterian com petition hypothesis, by considering the
s t r u c tu re  o f  th e  f ina l-p ro d u c t market as  a policy instrument, 
s e t  by the  Patent Office by manipulating p a te n ta b i l i ty
standards. I t  i s  found th a t  fo r  a vast range of demand
functions and under constan t r e tu rn s  to  scale , a p a te n ta b i l i ty  
s tandard  th a t  allows fo r  more than one pa ten t to  be granted 
within a given p roduct/p rocess  c la ss  is  w elfare  su p er io r  to  the 
monopoly-generating f i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t  cu rren t system. I f  
pa ten t l i f e  i s  beyond the  P.O.’s  con tro l and/or the re  are 
increasing  r e tu rn s ,  no p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard  i s  unambiguously 
p referable .
Chapter III; When Research and Development a re  modelled as  two 
an a ly tic a l ly  d i s t i n c t  s tag es ,  the choice between p a te n ta b i l i ty  
s tandards  (whether to  g ran t p a ten ts  to  research  p ro to types  or 
to  fu lly-developed  products) is  shown to  a f fe c t  the  a l loca tion  
of resources  between Research and Development. I t  i s  shown th a t  
under a s in g le -p a te n t  regime, g ran ting  p a ten ts  to  research  
pro to types i s  unambiguously welfare-improving, whereas under a 
m u lt ip le -p a te n t  regime a change to  p a ten ts  being gran ted  to  
fu lly-developed  products  and the  a t tend ing  Increase in market 
uncerta in ty  may r a ise  welfare.
Chapter IV; The economics o f  the ‘in teg e r  c o n s t r a in t ’ i s  analysed 
and i t  is  found th a t  proper trea tm ent of the in d iv is ib i l i ty  of 
firms may reverse  the  q u a l i ta t iv e  conclusions of in te rg e r -  
unconstrained models. As an example, a product q u a l i ty  oligopoly 
model is  examined and i t  i s  shown th a t  not only the 
Chamberlinian excess en try  r e s u l t  does not apply but a lso  th a t  
a f r e e -e n t ry  oligopoly and a so c ia l ly  managed indus try  may 
produce goods o f  id e n t ic a l  quality , i r re s p e c t iv e  of the  values 
of c ro s s -d e r iv a t iv e s  deemed c ru c ia l  in the  l i t e r a tu r e .  Moreover, 
the in teg e r  c o n s tra in t  i s  shown to provide an explanation fo r  a 
p o s it iv e  c o r re la t io n  between p r o f i t a b i l i ty  and concentra tion  in a 
Cournot oligopoly model witb free entry.
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INTRODUCTION
“Is there  l i f e  a f t e r  p a ten t  l i f e ? ”
The p resen t  d i s s e r ta t io n  can be read as an a ttem pt to provide 
an a f f irm a tiv e  answer to the above question; more prec ise ly ,  i t  
is  argued th a t  fundamental dimensions of the pa ten t  system, 
o the r  than pa ten t  l i f e ,  a re  given by p a te n ta b i l i ty  standards. 
Albeit in d i f f e r e n t  g u ise s ,  the f i r s t  three q u a r te rs  of the 
d is s e r ta t io n  deal with f i r s t  defining, and then analysing the 
w elfare  e f f e c t s  of, p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandards .
Chapter I tu rns  on i t s  head the t ra d i t io n a l  technique for 
determining optimal p a te n t  l i f e ,  by framing the re la t ionsh ip  
between the Pa ten t Office and a would-be innovator as a game 
and analysing the whole range of games generated by d if fe re n t  
assumptions regard ing  the s t r a t e g i c  ro le s  played by the players 
(i.e., leader, follower) and th e i r  contro l variab les  (paten t l i fe ,  
p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandards) .  I t  tu rn s  out th a t  the so lu tion  of the 
optimal game se le c t io n  need not coincide with the game 
t r a d i t io n a l ly  deployed to compute pa ten t l i fe ,  i.e. the game in 
which the Paten t Office plays the leader and s e t s  pa ten t  l i fe .  
In p a r t i c u la r ,  i t  is shown th a t  when the process th a t  genera tes  
innovations is 'reasonably ' productive, soc ia l  w elfare is 
maximized by le t t in g  the innovator determine h is  own pa ten t l i fe  
(unsurpris ing ly , he w ill s e t  i t  a t  an in f in i te  level) and by
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s e t t in g  a ‘h ig h ’ minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  standard. The notion of 
minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tan d ard  is characterized  in the context 
of a new-product model as  a s h i f t  variab le , quan tif ied  as the 
ex ten t  by which e i th e r  the  inverse demand curve is pushed 
upwards or the marginal c o s t  curve pulled  downwards.
Chapter II adds a new tw is t  to the debate on the Schumpeterian 
t ra d e -o f f ,  by considering the ro le  of p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandards  in 
a l te r in g  the balance between s t a t i c  and dynamic eff ic iency  in a 
we If are-im proving manner. The connection between pa ten ts  and 
the Schumpeterian t r a d e -o f f  can be b es t  understood by noting 
th a t  R&D and the production of output a re  obviously two 
d i f f e re n t  s ta g e s  and th a t ,  ce te r is  paribus^ increased competition 
a t  each s tag e  is  so c ia l ly  b enefic ia l .  However, as an increase in 
competition a t  one level can only be achieved by reducing 
competition a t  the o the r  level,  a balance has to  be s truck  
between competition and p ro tec t io n  from competition. In chapter 
II the emphasis is on the t ra d e -o f f  im plicit in the fac t  th a t  
while an increase in com petition a t  the output s ta g e  engineered 
by g ran ting  p roperty  r ig h t s  to more than one innovator brings 
b en e f i ts  to the u se rs  of the innovation, the r e s u l t in g  non- 
cooperative behaviour among innovators lowers the expected 
r e tu rn s  to R&D, thereby c u r ta i l in g  competition a t  the R&D stage . 
In the model analysed in th i s  chapter, in which the re  are  many 
p o te n t ia l  innovators , the re levan t notion of p a te n ta b i l i ty
-  7  -
s tandard  is in terms of novelty . Two extreme cases are  
considered, a s t r i c t  p a te n t  regime in which only one pa ten t is 
awarded within any given p roduct/p rocess  c la ss  (i.e. the 
t r a d i t io n a l  f i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t  system), and a permissive regime 
in which a l l  genuine innovators obta in  a pa ten t on th e ir  
discovery, i r re sp e c t iv e  of p r io r i ty  and novelty considera tions (a 
lo se rs -ge t-som e  system). Of course, the l a t t e r  regime must be 
chea t-p roof ,  i.e. must no t allow p a te n ts  to be g ranted  to mere 
im ita to rs ,  bu t th is  tu rn s  o u t not to  be an unsurmountable 
problem. The genera l conclusion is  th a t  n e i th e r  pa ten t regime is 
unambiguously su p e r io r .  Conditions a re  located under which each 
regime genera te s  h igher w elfare  levels ; i f  p a ten t  l i f e  is a 
policy instrum ent and the re  a re  cons tan t r e tu rn s  to sca le  in 
production, then the perm issive regime performs b e t t e r  than the 
t r a d i t io n a l  winnei—ta k e s - a l l  scheme (provided demand is not 
'too* convex); whereas the rev e rse  holds if  e f fe c t iv e  pa ten t  l i f e  
is  beyond Patent O ff ice 's  con tro l and the p robab il i ty  of fa i lu re  
a t  the R&D s tag e  is 'high'.
Chapter III extends the dimensions of the pa ten t  system in 
another d irec tion : by ch a ra c te r iz in g  Research and Development as 
two an a ly t ic a l ly  d i s t i n c t  s ta g e s ,  i t  poses the question  whether 
p a ten ts  ought to be awarded to  the output of e i th e r  the 
research  s tag e  (i.e. to  re sea rch  pro to types)  or the development 
s tag e  (i.e. to fu l ly  developed p roducts /p rocesses) .  In terms of
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p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandards ,  the c r i t e r io n  of in d u s tr ia l  app l icab i l i ty  
is  added to the novelty  c r i t e r io n  introduced in the previous 
chapter. Research is d is t ingu ished  from Development in terms of 
both u ncer ta in ty  o f  outcomes (the former being s to ch as t ic ,  the 
l a t t e r  c e r ta in )  and of degree of (d is)continuity , in the sense 
th a t  whereas the outcome of development e f f o r t s  is assumed to 
be a continuous, and increasing, function of expenditure in 
development inputs, a s trong  threshold  e f fe c t  is assumed in the 
case of research  expenditu res ,  with a l l  investment levels  below 
(above) the th resho ld  y ie ld ing  no (no increase in the) 
p rob ab il i ty  of success  in discovery. This simple d is t in c t io n  
between R and D is s u f f ic ie n t  to  endow the pa ten t system with a 
h i th e r to  unnoticed ro le  — th a t  o f  conveying valuable information 
to  firms engaged in R&D. In fa c t ,  if  pa ten ts  a re  awarded to 
research  p ro to types,  investment in development can be undertaken 
under c e r ta in ty ,  whereas i f  a new product/process has to be 
fu lly  developed before  being pa ten tab le ,  add itional uncerta in ty  
is genera ted . Thus the Pa ten t Office, by e i th e r  reducing or 
increasing  the level of endogenous uncerta in ty , can a l t e r  the 
a l lo ca t io n  of resou rces  between research  and development. The 
main r e s u l t  of the chapter is  th a t  under a s in g le -p a te n t  regime 
g ran tin g  p a ten ts  to research  pro to types is always w elfare  
improving, whereas under a m u lt ip le -p a ten t  scheme, w elfare may 
be increased by g enera ting  add itiona l uncerta in ty  through the 
awarding of p a te n ts  to fully-developed products /processes.
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The f in a l  chap ter  is  devoted to a theme th a t  underlies  the 
previous -three, namely the importance of the in teger  c o n s tra in t  
brought about by the in d iv is ib i l i ty  of firms. In the context of 
a p ro d u c t-q u a li ty  model i t  is  shown tha t the in teger con s tra in t  
may rev e rse  the q u a l i ta t iv e  c h a ra c te r i s t ic s  of an in teger-  
unconstrained equilibrium . Moreover, i t  is  argued th a t  i t  can 
a lso  account fo r  a p o s it iv e  co rre la t ion  between p r o f i ta b i l i ty  
and concen tra tion  in an oligopoly model with f re e  entry .
As the s u b - t i t l e  of the d is s e r ta t io n  makes c lea r ,  my main aim 
has been to a t tem p t to extend the economic theory of p a ten ts  to 
new dimensions. The m otivation behind th is  choice has not been 
a lack of in t e r e s t  in the em pirical analysis  of p a ten ts  -  qu ite  
the opposite , in f a c t .  The b e l ie f  tha t good em pirical work can 
only be grounded on a foundation of economic ana ly sis  tha t 
encompasses more than pa ten t  l i f e  has prompted me to try  to 
enrich the s tan d ard  model o f  pa ten ts ,  avoiding, on the o ther  
hand, some of the more s t e r i l e  'ex tensions’ suggested  by ce r ta in  
game th e o r i s t s ,  who have used pa ten ts  and R&D as mere excuses 
to formulate ingeneous m u l t i - s ta g e  games devoid of much 
em pirically  r e le v a n t  economic content.
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C H A P T E R  I
OPTIMAL PATENT LIFE v s  
OPTIMAL PATENTABILITY STANDARDS
1.1 In troduction
All models of optimal p a ten t  life^'”  analyse the re la t io n sh ip  
between the P aten t Office and a would-be innovator as  a game in 
which the former s e t s  p a ten t  l i f e  and behaves as a Stackelberg 
leader, taking into account the c o n s tra in t  posed by the l e t t e r ’s 
prof it-maximizing behaviour. No ju s t i f ic a t io n  is  provided as to 
why the above arrangement should be optimal, presumably on the 
ground th a t  in simple duopoly games leadership  is more 
advantageous than followership  and tha t assigning  to the Patent 
Office the task  of s e t t in g  pa ten t l i f e  seems in tu i t iv e ly  
appealing. The analogy with a duopoly game, though, may be 
misleading. Unlike a duopoly game, in which both con tro l 
va r iab les  (e.g. p r ice s ,  ou tpu t levels)  and the p la y e rs '  s t r a t e g ic  
ro le s  (follower, leader) a re  exogenously determined, in the 
context of a p a ten t  game i t  is the Patent Office th a t  s e t s  the 
ru le s  of the game, i.e. how p a te n ts  are  applied fo r  and gran ted .
See Arrow (1962), Nordhaus (1969) Ch. 5, Scherer (1972), 
Stoneman (1987) Ch. 9.
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Thus, a fu lly -op tim iz ing  Paten t O fficer (P.O.) has to solve a
double assignment problem, choosing both her ro le ,  i.e. e i th e r
follower or leader, and her  con tro l variab les ,  i.e. e i th e r
minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard , cr, or pa ten t l i fe ,  T. All models 
of optimal p a ten t  l i f e  im plic itly  assume th a t  welfare is always 
maximized under the game in which the P.O. leads and optimizes 
over T. However, i t  seems obvious th a t  the so lu tion  of the
above game se lec t io n  ex erc ise  w ill in general depend on demand 
and technology conditions; and th is  is , in fac t ,  the conclusion 
reached in th is  chapter, where i t  is shown th a t  when innovations 
a re  not ‘d i f f i c u l t ’ leadersh ip  is  i r re levan t and s e t t in g  
p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandards  is more e f f ic ie n t  than s e t t in g  pa ten t 
l i fe .
1.2 P a ten t games
Given th a t  the c r i t ic ism  levelled  here against ‘optim al’ pa ten t 
l i f e  models r e f e r s  to the very way of conceiving the 
re la t io n sh ip  between the P.O. and the innovator r a th e r  than to 
the d e ta i l s  of the game, one can successfu lly  appeal to the 
Occam's razor p r inc ip le  and s e t  out the argument in i t s  s im plest 
terms.
In order to consider the w elfare  implications of the choice 
between pa ten t  l i f e  and p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandards  as policy 
instrum ents , a simple model of a new product w ill be formulated
—  13  —
th a t  allows one to quan tify  the notion of a (minimum) 
p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard .
Let P (Q) be the inverse market demand function fo r  a la te n t  
good, i.e a good which under the p r e - innovât ion technology 
cannot be produced p ro f i ta b ly  in p os itive  amounts. Let the pre­
innovation level of (constan t)  marginal cost be c  and assume 
th a t  production of Q is m arginally unprofitab le ,  i.e. P < 0 ) + e = c ,  
where £ is  ‘sm a ll’. Then the re  are  two types of innovation th a t  
can make the production of a new product p ro f i ta b le :
(i) a ‘process innovation’ th a t  s h i f t s  downwards the marginal 
cost curve over the re le v an t  ou tpu t range;
( i i )  a ‘product innovation’ th a t  s h i f t  the inverse demand curve 
to the r ig h t  over the re le v a n t  ou tpu t range.
We can define  the ex te n t  by which e i th e r  P (Q) is sh i f te d  
outwards or c  is reduced as the ex ten t  of the innovation, cr, 
and take i t  as the p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard  variab le .
The p o s t - innovât ion equilibrium  can be described by the fam ilia r  
t r ia d  of Consumer su rp lu s ,  G ross p ro f i t s ,  and deadweight Loss 
(as depicted in Fig. .1.1), each of which depends on the ex ten t  of 
the innovation cr. The ex is tence  of a pa ten t in troduces, of 
course, a time element in the form of the pa ten t  term T.
The innovator 's  ob jective  is to  maximize the p re sen t  value of 
the stream of p r o f i t s  genera ted  by the innovation, i.e.
( a , T )  = ( a )  d t - R  (or) = (o r) -R  (cr) I . lTC
o
where G (cr) is g ro ss  p r o f i t  and R Cor) is the Innovation
-  14  -
P(o)
C(o-)
P ( o ) -  c =cr
Q
Fig. I.l
P o st-Innovât Ion Consumers* surplus, 
Gross p r o f i ts ,  and Melfare Loss
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P o ss ib i l i ty  function  th a t  maps expenditure in R&D inputs, R, 
in to  the ex ten t  of the innovation, c ,  r  is the p r iv a te  (and 
soc ia l)  r a t e  of d iscount and T is pa ten t l i fe .
I t  is assumed th a t  the P a ten t O fficer is a conscientious c iv i l  
se rv an t  who re f r a in s  from pursuing her own welfare and 
maximizes ins tead  a (w ell-defined) soc ia l  w elfare function; as 
the s.w.f. is assumed to  be d is t r ib u t io n a l ly  n eu tra l ,  the P.O.’s 
ob jec tive  is to maximize the p resen t value of the sum of 
consumers’ and producer’s  su rp lu s :
W(o-,T)=J^e-^-^[C(o-)+G(cr)]dt + f  e-*-^[C(a)+G(CT)+L(a)]dt -  R(ct)
O T
i.e.
W<ct, T )  = [C<<y>+G(cr)] -  + L ( ct) -  -  -  R(cr) 1 . 2
1.2 implies th a t  a f t e r  the p a ten t  has expired the technology 
becomes f ree ly  availab le  and production of the new good 
continues under p e r fe c t ly  com petitive conditions.
I t  is more convenient to  w rite  x = 1—e " ’’’’" and, noting th a t  as 
T ranges from O to <», x ranges  from O to 1, to imagine th a t  
the re  e x i s t s  a p a ten t  l i f e  co n s tra in t ,  i.e. x ( l ,  so th a t  I.l and
1.2 can be w r i t ten  as:
TC ((T, x )  = p  G (cr) — R ( ct) 1 . 3
W ( a , x )  = -  [C (c r )+ G (c r ) ]  + L(or) -  R(cr) 1 . 4
Having spec if ied  the payoffs  of the two players, i t  is revea ling  
to c o n t ra s t  what can defined as the pa ten t  game played by the 
P.O. and the innovator with a duopoly game.
—  16  —
I n s t r u m e n t  a s s i g n m e n t
In any duopoly (indeed, oligopoly) game, the problem of which 
p layer s e t s  which v a r iab les  simply does not a r is e ,  for, in a 
sense, the con tro l va r iab les  determine the iden ti ty  of the 
dec is ion- maker. For example, in a Cournot oligopoly each firm is 
defined by i t s  a b i l i ty  to s e t  i t s  own output level. Not so in 
the p a ten t  game, in which the in terac tion  between the two 
p layers  takes place through two variab les  (extent of innovation 
cr, and p a ten t  l i f e  T), each of which could be contro lled  by 
e i th e r  p layer, depending on how the ru les  of the game are  s e t .  
The key point here is  th a t ,  unlike oligopoly games where the 
d e f in i t io n  of the con tro l var iab les  (e.g. e i th e r  p r ice s  or 
q u a n t i t ie s )  is exogenous, in the pa ten t game the assignment of 
con tro l va r iab les  is determined by one of the p layers  — by the 
P.O. h e rse lf .
R o l e  a s s i g n m e n t
Again in c o n t ra s t  with s tandard  leader-fo llow er oligopoly models 
in which the ro le  of Stackelberg leader is determined 
exogenously^^* , in the p a ten t  game no ad hoc assumptions are  
required  to id en tify  the S tackelberg leader, fo r  the decision of 
which p layer should play which ro le  is taken by the P.O.
The log ical d i f f i c u l t i e s  of embedding a leader-fo llow er 
s t r u c tu re  within a s t a t i c  oligopoly model are  well known 
(see Friedman (1983) Ch. 5) but, of course, do not apply to 
the p a ten t  game.
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What underlies  the d if fe re n ce  in instrument and role 
assignments between the p a te n t  game and a duopoly game is tha t 
the former takes place in a sp ec if ic  in s t i tu t io n a l  environment 
designed by one of the p layers .  As soon as i t  is rea l ized  tha t
the P.O. s e t s  the ru le s  under which pa ten ts  are  applied for and
granted , i t  is n a tu ra l  to explore the whole range of instrument 
and ro le  assignments, so as  to check whether the option 
considered in t r a d i t io n a l  optimal pa ten t models is the only 
fea s ib le  one and, if  no t,  whether i t  is super io r  in terms of
so c ia l  w elfare  to o the r  fe a s ib le  games.
The game in which the Innovator plays ro le  R and optimizes over 
z ,  with the P.O. playing ro le  S and optimizing over w w ill be 
re fe r re d  to as a (R z ,S w ) game. Thus, excluding the double
leadersh ip  case, the re  a re  in princip le  s ix  games (i.e. s ix  
fea s ib le  combinations of s t r a t e g ic  ro le  and con tro l variable) 
the P.O. can choose from, as shown in Table I . l .
Fo llow er 
cr T
PATENT OFFICER
1 Leader
Fa, FT
Follow er
FT, Fa FT, La
INVENTOR
La, FT
Leader
Table I.l
A lte rn a tiv e  P a ten t Games C la ss ified
By Control Variable and S tr a te g ic  Role
-  18  -
The s ix  p a ten t  games of Table I.l can be grouped into three  
c la sse s ,{  <Fcr, Ft ) , <Lcr, Ft ) } ,  { CFt , Fct) , <Lt , Fct) , <Ft , Lct) },  
and <Fct, L t ) ,  with each c la ss  yielding a d is t in c t  equilibrium, 
as shown below.
Lemma I . l :  I r re sp ec t iv e ly  o f  the  innovator's s t r a t e g ic  ro le ,
fo llow ership  by the  P.O. combined with optimization over t  
y ie lds  the  economically in s ig n if ican t  (0,0) equilibrium (no 
innovation, zero p a te n t  l i f e ) .
In both the (F ct, FT ) and <Lcr,FT) games, the f i r s t - o r d e r  
condition fo r  the maximization of so c ia l  welfare i s “®*
W., (CT, T) = —L( C T ) / r  < 0  1 . 5
and the a ssoc ia ted  reac tio n  function is
T""° (CT) = 0  1 . 6
When the P.O. follows and optimizes over t , her reac tion  
function is degenerate  and coincides with the CT-axis, thereby 
genera ting  the economically in s ig n if ican t  no-innovation, zero- 
p a ten t  l i f e  equilibrium. ■
Lemma 1.2: I r re sp ec t iv e ly  o f  the  innovator’s  s t r a t e g ic  ro le ,
optim ization over ct by the P.O. y ie lds  the ( c r * , l )  
equilibrium , i.e. p a te n t  l i f e  is  in f in i te  (t = 1 )  and the 
minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard  cr"" is  determined by 
t ^ ° ( c t ^ )  = 1, where t***  ^(ct) is  the P.O.’s  reac tion  function. 
Consider f i r s t  the (Lt , F ct) game which, i t  may be noted, is the
In obvious no ta tion , su b sc r ip ts  s tand  for d i f fe re n t ia t io n .
— 1 g  —
m ir ro r - Image of the t r a d i t io n a l  ‘optimal’ pa ten t l i f e  model: 
whereas in the l a t t e r  the P.O. plays the leader’s ro le ,  here she 
choose to follow and, in c o n t ra s t  with the conventional model, 
allows the innovator to determine pa ten t l i f e ,  sub jec t to a 
minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard .
The innova to r - l e a d e r ’s problem is:
max G ( y <t ) )  — R ( y C x > )  1 , 7
where (<r) and is  the P.O.’s  reac tion
obtained from the f i r s t - o r d e r  condition for the maximization of 
w elfare, i.e.
W^Ccr,x) = ^ [ C ^ < a ) + G ^ C c r > ] + ^ ^ L „ < c r ) - R < a )  = 0  1 . 8
[C^C<T)+G^<a)+L^(CT)-rR(CT>] 1 . 9
I t  is simple to show th a t  Tc.. ( x )  >0, and thus the p a t e n t - l i f e  
c o n s tra in t  is  binding ( x = l )  and the minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  
s tandard  cr* is determined by x ^ ’^* (cr*) = 1 :
Tt.,(x) = + Y .«(x) { p  G „ ( a )  -  R^(cr) )>0  I .  10
Inequality  1.10 follows from the fa c t  th a t  the q uan t ity  in curly
b ra c k e ts  e q u a ls  — p  {C^-<cr) + ( 1—x )  [L^. C<r)+Go. ( ct) 3 }<0 and 
( x )  is the rec ip roca l of the slope of the P.O.’s reac tion  
function, which is negative  in view of the second-order 
condition fo r  the maximization of welfare.
Under the ( F x , F ct) and (F x ,L c r )  games the innovator’s f i r s t -
order condition is
(CT,x) = G (CT)/ r  > 0  I . 11
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I.e. the p a t e n t - l i f e  c o n s tra in t  1 is binding; or, to put i t
d i f f e re n t ly ,  the innovator’s  reac tion  function is degenerate (the 
b e s t - re p ly  level of t  is  a constan t)  and coincides with the t =1  
line.
In conclusion, a l l  th ree  games in which the P.O. optimizes over 
the minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard  cr yield the <cr^, 1)
equilibrium , charac te r ized  by an in f in i te  pa ten t l i f e  and a 
minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard  cr^ determined by the 
in te rsec t io n  of the x = l  line and the P.O.’s reac tion  function 
shown as point A in Fig. 1.2. ■
Summarizing the argument so fa r :  we have shown th a t  ou t of
s ix  possib le  pa ten tin g  schemes two (namely, (F<t , F t:) and
(Lct, F t )) y ie ld  the economically in s ign if ican t so lu tion  of no
innovation, th ree  (namely (Fx,Lo-), (Ft , F a) ,  and (Lx, F a ) )  are  
fea s ib le  and a l l  s u s ta in  the same equilibrium, charac terized  by 
an in f in i te  p a ten t  l i f e  and by a minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard , 
cr*^ , lying on the P.O.’s reac tio n  function.
The in te re s t in g  question , of course, is whether th is  equilibrium 
can yie ld  a h igher level of welfare than the t ra d i t io n a l  version 
of the p a ten t  game, in which the P.O. ac ts  as a leader and 
optimizes w.r.t. p a ten t  l i f e  x ,  i.e. the (Fa, Lx) pa ten t  game.
In th is  re sp ec t  we can prove the following
Theorem I . l :  There is  always a range o f  values o f  co s t  and 
demand param eters  such th a t  the (Fa, L x) p a ten t  game 
y ie ld s  lower w elfare  levels  than under the a l te rn a t iv e  
game (L x , F a ) .
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Proof. As the second-order conditions for the maximization of
p ro f i t  and w elfare  (see 1.3-4) guarantee th a t  the innovator’s
and the P.O.’s reac tion  functions  are  respec tive ly  upward- and 
downward-sloping in the plane, to prove the above
theorem i t  s u f f ic e s  to show th a t  they cross a t  a point where 
T> 1, or, equ iva len tly ,  th a t  <o^>=x^ < c t )  =  1 ( o ^ > c t )  , as
shown in Fig. 1.2. In fa c t ,  th is  would imply not only th a t  the 
a l te rn a t iv e  p a ten t  game ( L x , Fcr) performs b e t t e r  than the 
t r a d i t io n a l  (For, L x )  whenever the l a t t e r  ca l ls  fo r  an in f in i te
pa ten t  l i f e ,  bu t a lso  (by con tinu ity )  th a t  there  e x i s t s  a s e t  of
cost and demand param eters  such th a t  the two games yie ld  the 
same level of w elfare  W(0^, t )  = W ( o r ^ , l ) ,  with t <  1, as shown 
in Fig. 1.2. Therefore the (L x , F ct) game would perform b e t te r  
than the c la ss ic  (F cr,L x) game whenever demand and cost 
conditions were such th a t  the l a t t e r  game called fo r  an optimal 
pa ten t  l i f e  x®, t<x® ( 1.
The re levan t f i r s t - o r d e r  condition, and assoc ia ted  reac tion  
function, for the maximization of the innovator’s p r o f i t s  are 
respec t ive ly
(cr) = p  G«,(<t ) -  ( ct) = 0  1 . 1 2
Let x*^° (cr**') = l , i.e., from 1.9, C^. (cr*)+G^ (o r^)—rRo-(cr*^) =0 , 
then
T '  ((T-) = > 1 I .  14Go- (<r*)
Def ine  ct as  x * ( ct) = 1, then  as  x ^ ( c r ) > 0 ,  ct < cr*. B
-  22  -
r
patent
life
T  (O')
r \ ( T )
T  =  1
W(<T, z)  =  
W(<r*,l)
patentability
standard
Fig. 1.2
Optimal p a ten t l i f e  vs optimal p a te n ta b ility  standard
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1 . 3  P a r a m e t r l z a t i o n s  a n d  e x a m p l e s
At th is  s tag e  i t  may be u se fu l  to r e s o r t  to some sp ec if ic  cost 
and demand functional forms so as to a sce r ta in  under what 
conditions which pa ten ting  arrangement performs b e t te r .
The following param etriza tions  have been chosen both fo r  th e i r  
s im plic i ty  and because they have been used ex tensively  in the 
l i t e r a t u r e  and th e re fo re  w ill  allow the reader to make
comparisons with o the r  models.
The inverse demand function P (Q) is assumed to be l inear  in 
ou tpu t (w.l.o.g. we can take the slope to be unity , for th is
merely involves a su i ta b le  choice of u n it  of measurement)
P (Q )  = a  -  Q I .  15
Both pre-innovation  marginal cos t is constant and equal to c ^ .  
The technology fo r  the production of (as yet unspecified) 
innovation is summarized in an Innovation P o ss ib i l i ty  Function 
(IFF), R (cr) , th a t  maps the ex ten t  of the innovation, cr into the 
expenditure  in R&D inputs, R.
The IFF is  assumed to belong to the is o -e la s t ic  family:
R(cr) = 8(7^ I .  16
Depending on whether the innovation is of the ‘p ro cess ’ type 
(and thus the ex ten t  of the innovation r e fe r s  to the s h i f t  of
the MC curve) or of the ‘p roduc t’ type (which s h i f t s  the P (Q)
curve) the pos t- innova tion  cost and demand curves w ill  be
—  2 4  —
C ( Q , e )  = c =  -  1 . 1 7
P ( Q , e )  = a  + -  Q 1 . 1 8
Using 1.15-16 and assuming fo r  s im plic i ty  th a t  without R&D 
investment the production of Q is ‘m arginally’ unprofitab le  (i.e. 
a=Cc,), i t  is elementary to  compute Gross p ro f i t s  GCa) ,  
Consumer su rp lu s  CCct) ,  and deadweight Loss L <cr) :
C(<t) = L(cr) = 2G Ca) = — ■ 1 . 1 94
Therefore the two p la y e rs ’ payoffs  can be w rit ten  as
W ( e , T )  = ~'^ Q^ ^  1 . 2 0
n ( e , T )  = -  0cr ’ 1 . 21
where, as usual,  x = 1—e "
The two re le v an t reac tion  functions  required to compare the
tra d i t io n a l  ( F a .L x )  game and the a l te rn a t iv e  (Lx,Fcr) scheme 
are as follows:
x : ( e )  = 1 . 2 2
= 4 -  1 . 2 3
Of
Under the (Fo ',LT) regime, in which the P.O. maximizes welfare 
(1.20) w.r.t. X ,  taking x *  Cct) as a cons tra in t ,  the (unique)
so lu tion  is:
ï f ! ; ^
x * = {  (j^={  1 . 2 4
1 f o r  l / 4 < o c < l / 2 ' 2 0 r '
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Remarks:
1. If  Innovations a re  ‘e a sy ’ (i.e. l / 4 ^ o c < l / 2 ) ,  the g ran ting  of 
a pa ten t  is not an e f fe c t iv e  way of counter-balancing the 
o u tp u t - r e s t r i c t in g  behaviour of an Innova tor-Monopolist. The 
P.O. h i t s  the 1 c o n s t ra in t  when the marginal b en e f i t  of 
pa ten t  l i f e  extension is s t i l l  pos it ive .  Indeed the Innovator 
is able to a t t a in  h is  f i r s t - b e s t  optimum and so c ia l  w elfare 
would be unaffec ted  i f  pa ten t  term were se lf -adm in is te red  
by innovators.
2. When innovations a re  ‘d i f f i c u l t ’ (o t< l /4 )  s h o r t- l iv e d  
p a ten ts  a re  an e f f e c t iv e  means to check the propensity  to 
o v e r- in v es t  in R&D by an unregula ted  Innovator-Monopolist 
(assuming a = 0 . 1 ,  optimal pa ten t l i f e  is le ss  than 6 (3) 
years if  r= 10%  (20%)). Somewhat su rp r is ing ly ,  p a ten ts  seem 
to be more e f f ic ie n t  in curbing p o te n tia l ly  excessive 
innovation than in promoting i t .
To obtain  a more complete p ic tu re  of the circumstances under 
which the (Lt , F ct) p a ten ting  scheme y ie lds an improvement on 
the conventional (Fct, LT) scheme, we may compute the 
equilibrium value of the ex te n t  of innovation under a (Lt , F ct) 
scheme, cr*, i.e. = 1 fo r  the above param etrization ,
which tu rns  out to be :
(T- = ( 1 1 ^ ) “ ' ' ' - = " “ ’ 1 . 2 5
One of advantages of the above formulation is th a t  w elfare
-  26  -
levels can be fu lly  parametrized in terms of a ,  the R&D
e la s t ic i ty  of the minimum pa ten tab i l i ty  standard, i.e. for any
given ce we can compute and plot the levels of welfare
associated with the equilibrium of each of the two patent games 
CF(t, L t ) and < L x ,F a ) ,  namely W ( a ^ ,x ^ )  and W(cr^, 1) ; see
Fig. 1.3.
0.14 OC
Fig. 1.3
The <LXfFcr> game v s  the <F cr ,Lx)  game
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Fig. 1.3 revea ls  th a t  the a l te rn a t iv e  game yields an improvement 
on the conventional arrangement, not only when innovations are  
easy (i.e. l / 4 ^ a < l / 2 )  and thus pa ten t l i fe  is in f in i te  under 
both regimes, bu t a lso  when innovations are  ‘not too d iff icu lt*  
(i.e. l /7 < a < l /4 ^ .
In conclusion, th i s  simple param etrization  has the advantage of 
showing ra th e r  d ram atically  th a t  the presence of a binding 
c o n s tra in t  on the con tro l va r iab le  s e t  by the leader may n u l l i fy  
and even rev e rse  the b e n e f i t  of being a leader a t  a l l .  The 
reason for th is  r a th e r  in tr ig u in g  fac t  can be b e t t e r  understood 
if  p layer j  *s reac tio n  function  x-*’<cr) is in te rp re ted  as an 
Innovation schedule th a t  s p e c if ie s  the minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  
s tandard  ct requ ired  to be g ranted  a pa ten t term x . When 
innovation are  not ‘d i f f i c u l t ’, the soc ia l  benef i t  flowing from 
the a b i l i ty  to s e t  a high minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard cr^ 
more than o f f s e t s  the cost of le t t in g  the innovator choose an 
in f in i te  pa ten t  l i fe .
1 . 4  C o m p a r i s o n s  w i t h  T a n d o n ’ s  m o d e l
Another, a lb e i t  ind irec t,  way of te s t in g  the robustness  of the 
claim th a t  the ( L x ,F a )  game may yield a s u b s ta n t ia l  
improvement on the (F<j,Lx) game is to compare the former with 
an ‘augmented* version of the l a t t e r ,  in which the P.O. plays the 
leader and s e t s  not only p a ten t  l i fe ,  x , but a lso  a compulsory
—  2 8  —
roya lty  r a t e  p .  Such an 'augmented' model has been analysed by
Tandon <1982), who, using a model very s im ilar  to the one
sketched above, ob ta ins  two main r e s u l t s :
1. optimal p a ten t  l i f e  is always in f in ite ;
2. the optimal royalty  r a t e ,  p ^ , is the so lu tion  of the
following equation:
40£—1 p ^  -  3p  + 1 = O 1 . 2 6oc
I t  might have been thought th a t  for a model in which the P.O. is 
endowed with tw o  policy instrum ents  <x and p )  the im plicit 
assumption of conventional models th a t  the <Fo- ,L t ) game is 
always the most b en ef ic ia l  could indeed be valid.
On the contrary , using the above param etrization, i t  is simple 
to show th a t  although endowing the P.O. with a second 
instrum ent does narrow the range of vales of a. such the the 
a l te rn a t iv e  (L x , Fcr) scheme is welfare superio r ,  i t  does not 
e lim inate  i t  a l to g e th e r .
L etting  p be the compulsory royalty  ra te  expressed as a 
percentage of the minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard  cr, soc ia l  
w elfare and the Innovator’s p ro f i t s  can be w ritten  respec tive ly  
as
W< o r , x , p )  =  " ^  1 . 2 7
n:((T, X, p )  =  — p x a ^  — Oct’ 1 . 2 8
In Tandon's a r t i c l e ,  the optimal p is defined by the 
following cubic (where x = ( l —a ) / a ) :
— <x—3 ) p ^ +  <x—6 ) p ^ +  4-p=0; however, by fac to r ing  out the 
economically meaningless so lu tion  p = l , we obta in  1.26.
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Note th a t  for p=% the Tandon scheme bo lls  down to the
t r a d i t io n a l  OFCTj Lt:) game.
Denoting the equilibrium values under the Tandon scheme and 
under the (Lt ,F<t) game with a bar and with a s t a r
re spec t ive ly ,  we obtain
T = = 1 (infinite patent life)
p }
= [ f f  (T- = ( 1 1 ; : ) “ ' ' ’ - = “ ’ 1 . 3 0
Fig. 1.4 p lo ts  the values of W (c, t , p )  and W < cr* ,l)  for a l l  
adm issible values of the param eter a  and shows th a t  for ‘easy’ 
innovations (i.e. fo r  0 .2 8 ( c c < %) the P.O.’s  advantage of being 
endowed with an ad d it io n a l  policy instrument is  more than 
o f f s e t  by the d isadvantage of not being able to  s e t  a high
minimum p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard .
■* As is the case fo r  most models of regu la ted  monopoly, an 
obvious c r i t ic ism  to any model of optimal pa ten t  l i f e  is 
th a t ,  i f  the re g u la to r  (i.e. the P.O.) has a l l  the Information 
requ ired  to compute the 'optimal* value of her  instruments 
(i.e., pa ten t l i f e  and/or compulsory royalty  ra te ) ,  she will 
no t choose to re g u la te  the monopolist in the prescribed 
manner, for she would be able to a t ta in  a f i r s t - b e s t
so lu tion  by command. In the context of the model sketched
above, th is  means th a t  the P.O. would merely in s tru c t  the 
Innovator to invest the soc ia l ly  optimal amount in R&D, 
reward him with a lump-sum and then market the new good a t  
marginal cost.  Tandon’s d ism issal of the above c r i t ic ism  on 
the ground th a t  lump-sum rewards are  “to ta l ly  im practical’’ 
is il l-founded, as h is  own model does not provide any 
explanation as to why lump-sum compensation should be 
unfeasib le . If lump-sums are  im practical (and they are) i t  
must be on account of fac to rs  ignored by Tandon (and by
most of the l i t e r a tu r e  ). The Inherent con trad ic t ion  of
-  30  -
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0.28
Fig. 1.4
The (LXfFor)  game and Tandon *s scheme
optimal patent l i fe  models is that on the one hand as long 
as they are cas t  in a complete-information framework they 
cannot provide a ra tiona le  for regu la ting  innovators by 
pa ten t- re la ted  means (e.g. patent l i fe ,  compulsory royalty 
ra te s ,  etc) and on the other, as soon as incomplete 
information is introduced they fa i l  to provide an optimal 
regulatory mechanism.
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CHAPTER II
W in n er t a k e s  a l l  v s  l o s e r s  g e t  som e:  
the Schumpeterian trad e-o ff and patentability  standards
II.1 Introduction
Among the sup p o r te rs  of the pa ten t system as a socia lly  
ben e f ic ia l  in s t i tu t io n ,  few have been more e u lo g is t ic  than 
Bentham ;
[A paten t]  ... unites every property vhlch can be wished for In 
a reward. I t Is variable, equable, commensurable, characteristic, 
exemplary, frugal, promotlve o f  perserverance, subservient to 
compensation, popular and revocable.*'^ *
Even Bentham was aware th a t  the "w inner-takes-a  11” fe a tu re  of 
the p a ten t  system could r e s u l t  in a w astefu l duplication  of 
inventive e f f o r t s ,  bu t believed tha t the ne t e f f e c t  was s t i l l  in 
favour of a " f i r s t - p a s t - th e - p o s t "  reward s t r u c tu re  for 
inventions. I t  is in te re s t in g  to note th a t  Bentham l i s t s  three 
r a th e r  feeble  arguments in support of h is  ve rd ic t  in favour of 
a w in n e r - ta k e -a l l  pa ten t  system:
* J. Bentham, The Rationale o f  Reward, London, 1825, p. 92.
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(1) the pain of disappointment a f t e r  t r i a l  is more than
o f f s e t  by the p leasu re  of expectations before i t ;
( i i )  in any given f ie ld  of inventions there  are  not "many" 
p o te n t ia l  com petitors;
( i i i )  lo se rs  may reap ind irec t b enefi ts  ("develop th e ir  
ta len t") .
Point (i) is  based on the questionable assumption th a t  
in te rpe rsona l comparisons of card inal u t i l i t i e s  can be 
s c ie n t i f i c a l ly  validated ; po in t ( i i )  is an unwarranted 
assumption, e spec ia lly  in view of the widespread phenomenon of 
'c lu s te r  technologies ' and of the fac t th a t  the number of 
p o te n t ia l  com petitors can be a l te re d  by manipulating the ru le s  
whereby p a ten ts  a re  awarded (i.e. the f ie ld s  of inventions are  
not given); f in a l ly ,  po in t ( i i i )  misses the c ruc ia l  f a c t  th a t  the 
ind irec t  b en e f i ts  to the lo se rs  can be p ro f i tab ly  turned into 
d i re c t  b e n e f i ts  by changing the very s t ru c tu re  of the pa ten t 
system.
The aim of th is  Chapter is to show th a t  there  e x i s t  changes in 
the p a ten t  system th a t ,  by increasing the pay -o ffs  to the 
lose rs ,  can combine a l l  the des irab le  p roperties  described by 
Bentham with a reduction  in the net welfare losses c rea ted  by 
pa ten ts .
This Chapter is concerned with an old dilemma;
Suppose th a t  a monopolist, faced with the prospect of being 
g ranted  a p a ten t  th a t  gene ra tes  a ne t p ro f i t  of £ 71, would
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Invest £ x ,  in R&D and charge a price of p ,  per u n it  of 
pa ten ted  good. Consider now the a l te rn a t iv e  arrangement whereby 
each of n  firms is allowed to pa ten t the same good: each firm 
would earn  le ss  than £ T c , /n  (unless collusion is p e rfec t) ,  would 
invest £ x „  « £ x ,  ) in R&D and charge p„  « p i  ). Which market
s t r u c tu r e  is so c ia l ly  p re fe rab le?
A huge l i t e r a t u r e  -  admirably surveyed by Kamien and Schwartz 
(1982) and Baldwin and Sco tt (1987) -  has attem pted to model 
and in v e s t ig a te  em pirically  the t ra d e -o f f  underlying the above 
dilemma. The so -c a l le d  Schumpeterian t ra d e -o f f ,  of course, is 
between "dynamic eff ic iency"  ( re la ted  to the a l loca tion  of 
resources  to R&D) and " s t a t i c  effic iency" ( re la ted  to the 
a l lo ca t io n  of resources ,  fo r  given levels of R&D): a monopoly 
g enera tes  a h igher r a t e  of technical change but a lso  la rge r  
w elfare  losses  due to h igher prices. I t  would take an
uncommonly large dose of se lf -e s te em  to believe th a t  anyone can
add anything of even marginal in te re s t  and o r ig in a l i ty  to the
vas t  l i t e r a t u r e  on Schumpeterian competition (Baldwin and Scott 
(1987) c i te  340 re fe rences) .  The su rp r is in g  fac t ,  th a t  I believe 
w arrants  a fu r th e r  add ition  to the l i te r a tu r e ,  is th a t  the ro le  
of the p a ten t  system in a l t e r in g  the above t r a d e -o f f  seems to 
have escaped no tice  or even mention.
The issues  a t  s tak e  can be put in a b e t te r  focus if  i t  is
recognized th a t  R&D a c t iv i ty  and manufacture of f in a l  goods are  
obviously two d i f f e r e n t  s ta g e s  of the production process and
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th a t  ce te r is  paribus increased competition a t  each s tag e  is
so c ia l ly  b enefic ia l .  What makes the Schumpeterian t rad e -o f f
in te re s t in g  is th a t  increased competition a t  one level is
incompatible with increased competition a t  the o the r  so th a t  the 
problem is not one of r a is in g  the degree of com petitiveness, but 
r a th e r  th a t  of s t r ik in g  the r ig h t  balance between competition 
and p ro tec tion  from competition. In th is  perspective  the system 
whereby p ro tec tion  from competition is e s tab l ished  (i.e. the 
pa ten t  system) can be seen as a key element of the
Schumpeterian t r a d e -o f f .  In th i s  Chapter I sh a l l  analyse the
t r a d e -o f f  im plic it in the fa c t  th a t ,  while ra is in g  the degree of 
com petitiveness a t  the ou tpu t s tag e  by g ran ting  property  r ig h ts  
to  more than one inventor does benefi t  the u se rs  of the 
invent ion (s), the r e s u l t in g  non-cooperative behaviour, by 
lowering the expected r e tu rn s  to R&D, w ill d iscourage en try  into 
the race, thus c u r ta i l in g  competition a t  the R&D s tage .
Thus i t  is a genuine policy dilemma whether i t  is p re fe rab le  to 
r e s t r i c t  competition a t  the output s tage  by g ran ting  exclusive 
property  r ig h t s  in invention to only one firm thereby 
encouraging en try  (and competition) a t  the R&D s tag e  or to
award more than one pa ten t ,  reaping the b en e f i ts  of increased
competition on the f in a l  good market and foregoing the b en ef i ts
of a la rg e r  pool of p o te n t ia l  inventors.
The Chapter is  organized as  follows: in the next sec tion  I s h a l l  
consider the p ra c t ic a l  and th e o re t ic a l  problems of designing an
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optimal ‘n o v e l ty ’ p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandard; in sec. II.3 a simple 
model of R&D and pa ten tin g  is formalized; sec. 11.4 rep o r ts  the 
main r e s u l t s ;  sec. II.5 h ig h l ig h ts  the relevance of the preceding 
ana ly s is  fo r  p a ten t  reform, especia lly  in the f ie ld  of 
biotechnology; f in a l ly ,  Appendices II.A-E contain e i th e r  spec ia l  
cases  o r  complementary issues  of the general analysis .
II.2 The ‘novelty* patentability  criterion*®*
The p a ten tly  obvious f a c t  th a t  defining a ‘novelty’ p a te n ta b i l i ty  
c r i t e r io n  is  ind ispensib le fo r  the very existence of the pa ten t 
system ought not to deserve mention, were i t  not th a t  only very 
recen tly  economists have begun to address the question of
designing an optimal novelty  standard . In fac t ,  i t  is c lea r  th a t  
the whole pa ten t  system would be completely subverted  if  the 
novelty requirement were enforced so as to g ran t a pa ten t to
any new va r ian t ,  however t r iv ia l ,  of a genuine invention; a t
the o the r  extreme, a s t r i c t  in te rp re ta t io n  of the novelty
c r i t e r io n  could para lyse  technological progress (e.g. te lev is ion  
as ‘rad io  with p ic tu r e s ’). The reason why economists have been 
re lu c ta n t  to face the problem of defining ‘nove lty ’ is, of 
course, the d i f f i c u l ty  of charac te r iz ing  the ‘s im i la r i ty ’ between
* A condensed version of sec tions  II.2-4 has appeared in 
La Manna e t al, (1989).
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goods: in the Arrow-Debreu world there Is no way of determining 
in a meaningful way the degree of ‘closeness* between s ize  9 
shoes, s ize  9% shoes, and chocolate bars."®*
I t  is not su rp r is in g ,  if  not excusable, th a t  in the once-
recu rr ing  debates  on the p a te n t  system, the a l te rn a t iv e  had been 
between the complete ab o l i t io n  of the pa ten t system and i t s  
re te n t io n  with an unspecified  novelty criterion."'**
There a re  two modelling s t r a t e g ie s  to analyse the problem of 
a ssess in g  the e f f e c t s  of a l te rn a t iv e  novelty c r i t e r i a .  As an 
example of the f i r s t  approach consider the following case; an 
inventor, by expending R&D resources , produces a s ing le  good 
located a t  po in t a  on the product line for which aggregate
demand in the absence of any o ther  varie ty  would be D ( p ) .
Consumers a re  located on the product line with a given
d is t r ib u t io n  of the ‘t ra n sp o r t  cost* of su b s t i tu t in g  a l te rn a t iv e  
v a r ie t i e s  fo r  the pa ten ted  good and with a given d is t r ib u t io n  of 
re se rv a t io n  p r ices .  In th is  context, defining a novelty c r i te r io n  
means determining the s ize  of the pa ten t-ho lde r  market, i.e. the 
‘width* w of the p a ten t ,  in the sense th a t  no competing firm can 
produce a v a r ie ty  within a d is tance  w of the paten ted  good. 
The b e s t  example of th is  approach can be found in Klemperer 
(1989), who has charac te r ized  the optimal du ra tion /b read th  mix
"®* For an in te re s t in g  a t tem pt to define a topology appropria te  
to ch a rac te r ize  product qua l i ty ,  see  Horsley (1982).
"“** For an in s ig h tfu l  account of the early  con trovers ies  on 
pa ten t  law, see  Machlup and Penrose (1950).
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In the context of a model of horizon ta l product d i f fe re n t ia t io n  
(HPD) and has e s tab l ish ed  th a t ,  under fa i r ly  robust conditions, 
the optimal mix depends on the re la t ionsh ip  between the 
d is t r ib u t io n  of re se rv a t io n  p rices  across consumers and the 
d is t r ib u t io n  of th e i r  t ra n s p o r t  (or u t i l i t y  mismatch) cos ts .  The 
HPD approach to  defin ing  the optimal novelty standard 
emphasises the add i t iona l  w elfare  loss due to a wide paten t 
breadth , namely the loss s u f fe re d  by consumers whose p refe rred  
v a r ie t ie s  f a l l  w ithin the sp ec if ica t io n  of the paten ted  good and 
who have to s e t t l e  fo r  the cheaper unpatented good. The HPD 
approach, though, is unsu ited  to analyse how the incentive to 
undertake cos tly  R&D investment can be a l te re d  so as to 
determine the optimal ex ten t  of pa ten t p ro tec tion  in the case 
of a number of e s s e n t i a l ly  iden tica l inventions. The idea of 
competition underlying the HPD approach is th a t  fo r  any 
p o te n t ia l  p roduct/p rocess  c la ss  there  is a t  most one firm 
engaged in R&D, whose p r o f i t s  have to be p ro tec ted  from the 
erosion due to cheaper copies being made availab le  to consumers 
by im ita to rs  who do not con tribu te  anything to technical 
progress . The notion of competition underlying the a l te rn a t iv e  
approach taken in th is  Chapter is qu ite  d i f fe re n t  in so fa r  as 
i t  is assumed th a t  a t  any one time there  is a number of firms 
engaged in R&D a c t iv i ty  so th a t  the problem for  the Patent 
Office is  not th a t  of p ro tec ting  a s ing le  inventor from 
p la g ia r i s t s ,  bu t r a th e r  to reg u la te  competition among genuine
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Inventors. A good example of an industry whose c h a ra c te r i s t ic s  
are  c lo se r  to our approach than to the product d i f fe re n t ia t io n  
approach is the biotechnology industry, in which firms have a 
c lea r  idea of the des ired  invention and thus d ire c t  th e ir  R&D 
e f f o r t  towards a f a i r ly  narrow segment of the re levan t product 
space:
" A British court has Just decreed that Genentech, a 
biotechnology company in California, cannot retain  exclusive 
marketing r ig h ts  in Britain for i t s  heart product, TPA. The
judge ruled that the terms o f the patent were too broad
To stop  others working C.) would s t i f l e  research and not be 
in the public in terest. Genentech plans to appeal against the 
decision. I f  i t s  pa ten t were to stick , 19 companies would 
have to abandon their work on their TPAs.**
iThe Economist, July 18, 19871 
Most of the th e o re t ic a l  l i t e r a tu r e  on pa ten ts  has l i t t l e  to 
con tr ibu te  towards addressing  the question posed in the above 
quota tion , in so f a r  as i t  has h i th e r to  fa iled  to consider any 
in term ediate  so lu tio n  between a s t r i c t  f i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t
system and the complete abo lit ion  of pa ten ts .  The problem is 
th a t ,  even though in p rac t ice  even la te  f in ish e rs  genera lly
obta in  some po s it iv e  payoff to th e ir  R&D e f fo r t ,  formal models 
of pa ten t  races  typ ica lly  assume th a t  the winner takes all."®*
<s> Well-known examples a re  Dasgupta and S t ig l i t z  (1980), Loury 
(1979), Lee and Wilde (1980).
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In th is  Chapter I s h a l l  examine whether i t  is soc ia l ly  des irab le  
to  adopt p o lic ies  which increase the ex ten t to which the 
rewards to  R&D are  shared between the p a r t ic ip a t in g  firms. 
Before examining the w elfare  Implications of a reformed pa ten t 
system, i t  has to be e s tab l ish ed  whether i t  be a t  a l l  feas ib le  
to widen the d is t r ib u t io n  of re tu rn s  to R&D without abolishing 
a l to g e th e r  the p a ten t  system. The problem, of course, is th a t  if  
p a ten ts  do not p ro te c t  genuine inventors from mere p la g ia r i s t s  
(i.e firms th a t  r e f r a in  from investing in R&D and simply im ita te  
the improved process/p roduct) , the Incentive to undertake R&D 
a c t iv i ty  would be d ram atically  reduced with p o te n t ia l ly  damaging 
w elfare  e f f e c t s . A  simple way of excluding f r e e - r id e r s  and 
allowing genuine inventors who f a i l  to a rr ive  f i r s t  to b en ef i t  
from th e i r  R&D a c t iv i ty  is the following 'open r e g is t ry  scheme'. 
Suppose th a t  a p a ten t  is awarded T '  periods a f t e r  f i l in g  (under
* Suppose, a t  one extreme, th a t  the pa ten t system were 
abolished. Incentives to undertake R&D would s t i l l  remain, 
as argued long ago by Plant (1934). Production lags, 
enhanced by in d u s t r ia l  secrecy, give ear ly  inventors 
temporary market power before copies appear. Indeed, i t  is 
well documented th a t  re sea rche rs  sometimes f a i l  to apply 
for p a te n ts  on th e i r  d iscoveries  even though they are  
ava ilab le  [see, e.g. the re fe rences  in Levin (1986)1. Now, in 
the absence of p a te n ts ,  a genuine inventor who 
independently r e p l ic a te s  a discovery, say a month a f t e r  the 
f i r s t  to find i t ,  does benefi t  because even with two 
producers super-norm al p ro f i t s  w ill  generally  be availab le . 
This fe a tu re  is in c o n t ra s t  to the reward s t r u c tu r e  im plicit 
in the t r a d i t io n a l  p a ten t  system in which the independent 
inventor who completes the research  pro ject a l i t t l e  la te  
rece ives  nothing (a t le a s t  if  pa ten t l i fe  is of any length) 
ju s t  as does the p la g ia r i s t  who simply seeks to copy the 
work of o the rs .
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the cu rren t  p a ten t  system the adm in is tra tive  lag between f i l in g  
and being awarded a p a ten t  averages 2% years); any application  
fo r  a product/p rocess  w ithin the same c lass  Is g ranted  a pa ten t 
provided I t Is f i led  fo r  before  the award of the pa ten t to the 
f i r s t  claimant, with the obvious provision th a t  d e ta i l s  of 
pa ten t  app lica tions  a re  not d isclosed before the date  of the 
award. As In many cases production of the paten ted  good lags 
sev e ra l  years  from the g ran tin g  of the patent,*^* the open 
r e g is t ry  scheme need not delay the production of the new good/ 
process.
Is the re  any m erit In a losers-take-som e reward s t ru c tu re  ? 
Given r is k  avers ion  I t follows th a t ,  o ther things equal, sharing  
the rewards w ill  enhance the a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  of R&D and so 
Increase the flow of R&D. As demonstrated In Appendix II.A th is  
may well be an Important b e n e f i t ,  bu t Is not the e f f e c t  explored 
here, fo r  r i s k  n e u t r a l i ty  Is assumed. Even so, the r isk  reduction 
im plicit In a reward s t r u c tu r e  th a t  shares  the re tu rn s  may have 
r e a l  e f f e c t s .  With a conventional pa ten t system, a l l  th a t  
m a tte rs  Is g e t t in g  home f i r s t  and so r i s k -n e u t ra l  firms engaged 
In a p a ten t  race  have an Incentive to gamble on a risky  
research  s t r a t e g y  [see K le tte  and de Meza <1986a)l. Completing
In the next chapter I t  w ill  be argued th a t  In many cases 
w elfare  can be increased by s t ip u la t in g  th a t  p a ten ts  be 
awarded to research  pro to types  requ iring  s u b s ta n t ia l  p o s t­
pa ten t development investment, thereby making any delay 
between f i l in g  for p a ten ts  and production of no 
consequence.
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the course In the expected time v ir tu a l ly  guaran tees  th a t  the 
race w ill  be lo s t ,  a t  le a s t  if  there are many competitors. When 
a l l  th a t  m a tte rs  is  winning, i t  is b e t te r  to s e le c t  a bold 
s t r a te g y  th a t  y ie lds  the p o s s ib i l i ty  of a very f a s t  time even if 
the re  is a even g re a te r  chance o f  complete fa i lu re .  It makes no 
m atte r  whether you a re  second or la s t .  In a R&D context, the 
consequence is th a t  R&D s t r a t e g ie s  turn out to be excessively 
r isky  from a so c ia l  viewpoint. Although inventing a week before 
a r iv a l  has a high p r iv a te  payoff, the soc ia l  advantage is 
s l ig h t .  Introducing m ultip le  p rizes  diminishes the cost of not 
being f i r s t  and the re fo re  leads to a soc ia l ly  p refe rred  choice 
of re sea rch  s t r a te g y .  However, th is  p o te n tia l  b en e f i t  is a lso  
excluded from the p resen t  ana lysis ,  fo r  firms are  assumed to be 
unable to influence the r isk in e ss  of th e ir  R&D plans.
The concern of th is  Chapter is with the t ra d e -o f f  im plicit in 
the fa c t  th a t ,  while allowing more than one inventor to p ro f i t  
from R&D leads to non-cooperative behaviour which diminishes 
the expected re tu rn  to R&D, given the volume of R&D, competition 
among inventors w ill  b e n e f i t  the users  of the invention. The key 
issue is whether i t  is b e t t e r  to encourage competition in the 
discovery or the d issem ination of improved p roducts /p rocesses.  
As suggested  above, th is  is  a genuine dilemma and thus i t  is 
not su rp r is in g  th a t  i t  cannot be determined unambiguously 
whether introducing m ultip le  p rizes  is des irab le  or not. Indeed, 
i t  is s l ig h t ly  su rp r is in g  th a t  f a ir ly  genera l conditions have
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been found under which rewarding la te  f in ish e rs  is welfare 
improving.
The model developed here  is  highly s ty lized . The purpose is to 
sugges t th a t  the w in n e r - ta k e s -a l l  fea tu re  of the conventional 
pa ten t system is not n ece ssa r i ly  the bes t possible  arrangement. 
In p rac t ice  the e x is t in g  p a ten t  system o ften  does give some 
reward to la te  f in ish e rs  and thus l ie s  between the two polar 
cases we analyse. The purpose is to identify  whether i t  is 
d e s irab le  to introduce th is  fea tu re  de libera te ly .  The r e s u l t s  
a re  likely  to be robus t,  bu t i t  must be recognized th a t  many 
p ra c t ic a l  d e ta i l s  w ill  be t r e a te d  cursorily .  Nevertheless, th is  
Chapter makes the case th a t  i t  is worth taking a l te rn a t iv e s  to 
the p resen t p a ten t  system se r ious ly .
II.3 The model
The genera l s t r u c tu re  of the model follows th a t  of Dasgupta and 
S t ig l i t z  (1980). R isk -neu tra l  firms spend an amount x  on R&D a t 
time O and th is  y ie lds  a known probability  of inventing a t  each 
subsequent m o m e n t . F o r  most of the ir  ana lysis  Dasgupta and 
S t ig l i t z  specify  a Poisson d is tr ib u t io n  of invention times, but
The assumption of a f ix ed -s iz e  R&D pro jec t is undemanding: 
as shown by Dasgupta & S t ig l i t z ,  even if  x  is variab le ,  i t s  
equilibrium value is always the same (provided there  are  
many en tra n ts ) .
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fo r  my purpose I can a f fo rd  not to sp ec ia l ise  the density  
function. Firms follow Independent R&D s t r a t e g ie s  and seek a 
p a r t i c u la r  new product. At moments a t  which there  is but a 
s ing le  producer I t  earns  monopoly p ro f i t s  of i r , . When there  are  
n > l  producers co llusion  Is Imperfect and each earns g ross 
p ro f i t s  of with nïrn<7t,. As we assume th a t  R&D Is aimed a t  
producing a new product (I.e. a product which p r io r  to Invention 
cannot be sold  a t  a p ro f i t a b le  price) and th a t  a l l  p o te n tia l  
producers a re  equally  e f f ic ie n t ,  I t  Is easy to see th a t  a 
su ccess fu l  m ultip lan t Inventor w ill never choose to licence 
o the r  firms to produce the new product.
Two pa ten t  regimes w il l  be considered. Under the s t r i c t  regime 
the f i r s t  to Invent rece iv es  a pa ten t la s t in g  for T, years. 
During th i s  period no o th e r  firm rece ives a pa ten t  and so 
cannot produce. When the p a ten t  expires there Is freedom of 
en try  Into the Industry. Under the a l te rn a t iv e  p e r m i s s i v e  
regime, p a ten ts  are  awarded to a l l  genuine Inventors (I.e. non- 
p la g ia r i s t s )  as long as they apply within T* years of the f i r s t  
claimant. I t  can be seen th a t  th is  formulation embodies the 
o p en -reg ls t ry  scheme d iscussed  In the Introduction. One obvious 
problem with the perm issive scheme Is th a t  I t  pays for any one 
Inventor to buy up a l l  o th e r  pa ten ts  thereby earning monopoly 
p ro f i t s .  However, th is  drawback Is unlikely to carry much force, 
not only because, as shown by Salant e t al. (1983), the s t ra te g y  
of buying up com petitors Is p ro f i tab le  only If a very large
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proportion of p a ten ts  is  secured , but also because the a n t i t r u s t  
a u th o r i t i e s  would have l i t t l e  d if f ic u l ty  in enforcing a 
r e s t r i c t io n  th a t  a firm cannot own more than one pa ten t on the 
same product/p rocess . I t  can then be sa fe ly  assumed th a t  
monopolisation is  not fea s ib le .
A permissive regime with p a ten t  l i f e  Tp allows fo r  m ultiple 
producers even during the l i f e  of the f i r s t  pa ten t granted . Once 
the f i r s t  p a ten t  exp ires  the idea is public property  and, 
because of the long lead time, new production can s t a r t  quickly, 
rendering a l l  o the r  p a te n ts  economically w orthless.
Let the re  be n  e n t ra n ts  to  the R&D s tage  under the s t r i c t  
regime and w rite  the d ens ity  function th a t  the f i r s t  discovery 
occurs t ,  periods a f t e r  time O, the second a f t e r  periods and 
so on as Under a s t r i c t  regime (using a
formulation th a t  appears cumbersome but is subsequently u sefu l)  
a f re e -e n t ry  equilibrium s a t i s f i e s  :
E - C P ( t , , . . , t „ ) 7 t , g C t i ) >  - n x  = 0 I I . 1
where
g ( t , ) = {  I I . 2
O V i > l
r  is the d iscount r a te  and tc, is instantaneous monopoly p ro f i t .
Consider now the permissive regime. Since there is  normally a
pos it ive  p robab il i ty  th a t  the f i r s t  inventor w ill face
competition within the l i f e  of i t s  pa ten t and assuming th a t  in
th a t  event co llusion  is imperfect, i t  follows th a t  with no
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change In p a ten t  l i f e  o r  the number of e n t ra n ts ,  expected 
p r o f i t s  w ill  be lower than under a permissive regime. Therefore, 
a t  a f r e e -e n t ry  equilibrium  the permissive regime, ce ter is  
paribus, s u s ta in s  fewer firm s, m<n. Instantaneous gross per- 
firm p ro f i t s  when m firms are  ac tive  are  re, and m7t,< <m—1) Tt,_,. 
If  m firms e n te r  the R&D race , then under the permissive regime
E { P ( t , ,  . . , 2  ire, f  ( t ^ )  } -  mx = O I I . 3
1-1
where
l / r C e " ’’**- t , + T * > t , , ,  1 ) 1
f  < t , ) =  {  t,^,> t,+T* > t ,  1 )1  I I .  4
O t , > t , + T ‘ 1>1
II.4 The Case fo r  Permissive Pa ten ts
The two pa ten t  regimes can now be appraised according to th e i r  
ne t expected so c ia l  w elfare , defined as the sum of expected 
consumers' su rp lu s  and industry  p ro f i t s ,  ne t of R&D costs : 
Proposition II .1 : The perm issive regime is  w elfare  su p er io r  
to  the s t r i c t  regime If p a ten t  l i f e  is  a policy variab le ,  
the re  a re  cons tan t r e tu rn s  to sca le  in the production of 
the new good, and market demand is  not ‘too convex’ (e.g. 
l in ea r  o r  o f  constan t e la s t i c i ty ) .
Proof : The general form of the proof is to show th a t  if  T , is 
the optimal pa ten t  l i f e  in the s t r i c t  regime then in a
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permissive regime the re  e x i s t s  a pa ten t l i f e  Tp>T* which 
a t t r a c t s  the same number o f  e n tra n ts  to the race and yields 
g r e a te r  soc ia l  b e n e f i ts .  The advantage of s t ip u la t in g  th a t  the 
number of e n t ra n ts  be the same under the two regimes is th a t  
a t te n t io n  can be r e s t r i c t e d  to so c ia l  welfare g ross  of R&D 
expenditures . As, c e te r is  paribus, the f re e -e n try  number of 
firms under the permissive regime is less  than under the s t r i c t  
regime, i t  follows th a t ,  in o rder  fo r  the two scheme to su s ta in  
the same number of firm s, n ,  pa ten t  l i f e  under the permissive 
regime must be increased, say to Tp. I t  is not obvious th a t  
the re  e x i s t s  a Tp s u f f ic ie n t ly  large to induce the required 
amount of add i t iona l  en try ,  but in Appendix II.B i t  is shown 
th a t  th is  is not a problem. Here i t  is simply assumed th a t  a Tp 
with the requ ired  property  does ex is t .
From I I .1 and 11.3 we ob ta in
E { P < t , ,  . . , t „ )  {[  f  C t , )  l7t,/TC,> } =0  I I .  5
i - 2
Now consider the w elfare  implications of a switch from the 
s t r i c t  to the permissive regime. Aggregate soc ia l  e ff ic iency , net 
of R&D cos ts ,  a t  each moment is the sum of consumers’ su rp lus  
plus industry  p ro f i t s .  This is  c lea r ly  maximized when price 
equals marginal cost.  Actual welfare may the re fo re  be w ritten  
as  the d iffe rence  between th is  maximum level of w elfare, W*, and 
D , , the temporary deadweight loss incurred for the dura tion  of 
the pa ten t when the re  are  i  firms ac tive  in the market. I t  
follows th a t
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E-(W®>=E{P<t,, . . , t„> [  < W * /r)e“’'^’-D  s < t , ) ]  } - n x  I I .  6
E-CVr>=E{P<t,, . . , t„ )L  <W*/r>e"'‘^’- 2 D i f  < t i ) ]  } - n x  I I .  7
i-i
These equations embody the fac t  th a t  when the f i r s t  pa ten t 
exp ires  deadweight loss  is  zero if  a t  le a s t  one firm has 
invented. From II.6-7 i t  can be seen th a t  a switch from the 
s t r i c t  to the perm issive regime y ie lds a welfare gain if  :
E { P C t , ,  . . , t „ )  I f f  ( t , ) D y D J  } > 0 I I . 8
i - 2
From II.5 and II.8 i t  is  ev ident th a t  the switch ra is e s  welfare 
i f
iTCj/TC, > Di/D, V l ( n  I I . 9
Although we have not charac terized  optimal p a ten t  l i f e  under a 
permissive regime, we have iden tif ied  the inequality  th a t  has to 
be s a t i s f i e d  in order fo r  a switch to a permissive regime to be 
we If are-improving. To a s c e r ta in  under what conditions inequality
11.9 holds, some spec i a l i z i a t  ion of the demand functions is 
required , because knowledge of local p roperties  is in su ff ic ien t  
to eva lua te  w elfare  losses .  Appendix II.C shows th a t  II.9 holds 
when demand is l in ea r  in ou tpu t or of constan t e l a s t i c i ty .  That
11.9 holds provided demand is not ‘too convex’ can be shown as 
follows.
In Appendix II.D i t  is e a s i ly  es tab lished  th a t  under Cournot 
assumptions
dl°sqg.. > dlosD.. I_n+m52r£is<îl2.>0 11.10
d n  d n  D„
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where P ( n )  and Q ( n )  a re  re spec t ive ly  price and outpu t in a n -  
firm Cournot oligopoly.
When n = l  the above inequality  is always s a t i s f i e d  and as 11.10 
is  simply the continuous version of 11.9, th is  sugges ts  th a t  if 
the ru le s  of the permissive regime r e s t r i c t  the number of 
pa ten tee s  to  two a t  most, then i t  must be p refe rab le  to a 
s t r i c t  regime. However, as the change from n = l  to n=2 is not
small, 11.10 could tu rn  out to be a poor approximation of 11.9.
However, i t  can be shown th a t  in o rder for Proposition II. 1 not 
to hold in the continuous case, demand has to be ‘very convex'. 
Notice th a t ,  as  the deadweight loss ‘t r i a n g le ’ D is less  than 
the rec tan g u la r  a rea  AQ<P—c ) ,  where AQ is  the increase in 
market demand when price  f a l l s  from the n - f i rm  oligopoly level 
P ( n )  to the com petitive level c ,  inequality  11.10 can be 
w rit ten  as
1-n+XQ/AQ > 0  1 1 . 1 1
where X = <P—c)A Q /D  > 1.
Under Cournot assumptions P ( n ) —c equals P ( n ) / e n ,  where s  is
the point e l a s t i c i t y  of demand evaluated a t  P ( n )  .
Defining the a r c - e l a s t i c i ty  of demand e* as 
(AQ/AP ) (P C n ) /Q ( n )  ) , where AP=P ( n ) —c ,  i t  follows th a t
11.11 implies
So, if  11.10 is to f a i l
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i.e. e*>e; th is  is tu rn  req u ire s  th a t  over the re levan t range 
the e l a s t i c i t y  c  be increasing in Q. This imposes a severe 
r e s t r i c t io n  on the cu rva tu re  of the inverse demand curve P CQ) ; 
in fa c t  i t  ru le s  ou t concave, l inear  and const an t - e l a s t i c i t y  
demand curves and req u ire s  P (Q )  to be s trong ly  convex. In fac t ,  
s t ra ig h tfo rw a rd  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  revea ls  th a t  in order for d e / d P  
to be negative , the e l a s t i c i t y  of the slope of the inverse 
demand curve, i.e. P**<Q )/(P* <Q)Q) must exceed ( l + e ) / s ,  i.e. 
P (Q )  has to be s trong ly  convex.
If P (Q )  is s tro n g ly  convex, the deadweight loss D is 
s ig n if ic a n t ly  le ss  than % (P—c)A Q . Hence X is ce r ta in ly  g re a te r  
than 2.
To v i o l a t e  11.11 i t  i s  th u s  r e q u i r e d  th a t  e* ) — — e .n —1
This is the b as is  fo r  claiming th a t  un less  the poin t e l a s t i c i t y  
o f  demand r i s e s  very rap id ly  as  p rice  f a l l s ,  a  permissive regime 
is  p re fe rab le  to  a s t r i c t  p a te n t  regime. ■
It is in te re s t in g  to note th a t  Proposition I I .1 holds even if  the 
instan taneous p robab il i ty  of success depends only on cu rren t  
(per-period) R&D investment, r a th e r  than, as in the Dasgupta & 
S t ig l i t z  model on R&D co s ts  sunk a t  the s t a r t  of the programme.
A p o s s ib i l i ty  not explored here  as a th ird  a l te rn a t iv e  between a 
s t r i c t  and a permissive regime is the case of a s t r i c t  pa ten t  
regime coupled with compulsory licensing. I t  could be argued
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th a t  the l a t t e r ,  by avoiding the R&D costs  incurred by la te  
f in ish e rs  while the r e g i s t ry  is open and by imposing a maximum 
price , can combine the advantages of the two ‘p u re’ pa ten t 
regimes. However, i t  must be recognized th a t  a licensing scheme 
s u f f e r s  from a number of problems th a t  do not occur under a 
permissive scheme, i.e.:
(i) by sharing  rewards, the permissive pa ten t arrangement 
cu ts  the r e a l  cos t of r isk ,  if ,  as is almost ce r ta in ly  
the case, inventors  a re  r isk  averse. This b en ef i t  would 
be lo s t  under a compulsory licence scheme which s t i l l  
p reserves  the w in n e r- ta k es -a11 fea tu re ;
( i i)  a compulsory licence scheme gives an inventor an 
incentive not to apply for a pa te tn  a t  a l l  and re ly  
instead  on secrecy. Resources w ill  be expended to 
maintain secrecy and, in any case, the period of 
p ro tec tio n  afforded  byt secrecy is unlikely to be ideal 
from a so c ia l  po in t of view;
( i i i )  e spec ia lly  if  the pa ten t is granted  to a research  
pro to type (see next Chapter), a compulsory licence th a t  
d isc lo se s  the b a re s t  d e ta i ls  of a new process/product 
may be of limited value if  the inventor is not w illing 
to cooperate by providing ancilla ry  information;
(iv) complusory licences w ill e n ta i l  resource  cos ts  in 
monitoring revenues, ou tpu ts ,  e tc . to pay the fees 
accura te ly ;
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<v) as mentioned in sec. I I .1, la te  f in ish e rs  w ill  not
normally come up with identica l ideas, even though
under the e x is t in g  ru le s  these may not be s u f f ic ie n t ly  
novel to  be gran ted  a paten t.  S t i l l ,  the additional 
v a r ie ty  may well be enough to ju s t i fy  the R&D costs  
expended during the possibly short  period of time the 
r e g i s t ry  remains open.
Thus, the s u p e r io r i ty  of a s t r ic t-c u m -l ic e n se s  scheme over the 
permissive regime is a m a tte r  of conjecture, to be decided on 
em pirical grounds.
In Proposition 11.1 i t  is  s t ip u la te d  th a t  the re  be constant
re tu rn s  to sca le  in production (i.e. excluding the fixed cost of 
R&D); the reason fo r  th is  is  th a t  by allowing for economies of 
sca le  the balance between to two regimes is tipped aga inst the 
permissive regime, owing to fa c to rs  th a t  are  independent of R&D 
i t s e l f .  I t  is  t r i v i a l  to show th a t:
P roposition II.2; A s t r i c t  regime may be superio r  to  a permissive
regime i f  economies o f  s ca le  in production a re  su f f ic ie n t ly
g re a t .
Now put e v e ry th in g  in  r e v e r s e .  Let Tp be the optimal pa ten t 
l i f e  under the  p e rm is s iv e  regim e. Choose T% to y ie ld  the same 
number of firms. Following the same procedure th a t  leads to
11.9, the s t r i c t  regime is c e r ta in ly  welfare superio r  if
! < / <  < DI/DT V n ) i ) 2  1 1 . 1 4
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where D* is the d if fe re n ce  between ne t  soc ia l su rp lu s  when 
there  is a f r e e - e n t ry  equilibrium  in the producing industry (i.e. 
the equilibrium when knowledge is public) and rea l ized  aggregate  
b en ef i t  when th e re  a re  only i  firms producing. Notice tha t,  
because of economies of sca le ,  i t  is possible th a t  a f re e -e n try  
e q u i l ib r iu m  s u s t a i n s  too  many f irm s  and hence Dr<0.
Appendix II.E shows th a t  with l inear demand curves and a fixed 
production cos t,  inequality  11.14 may be s a t i s f ie d .  The economic 
in tu i t io n  underlying Proposition  11.2 is simply th a t  in the 
presence of economies of sca le ,  production e ff ic iency  ben ef i ts  
from concentra tion  and th i s  may more than o f f s e t  the losses 
from reduced p rice  com petition.
$ $ $
The argument deployed to show under what conditions a switch 
from the s t r i c t  to the perm issive regime may genera te  welfare 
gains breaks down is p a te n t  l i f e  is not a policy instrument, as 
i t  would be the case whenever the economic l i f e  of pa ten ts  is 
sh o r te r  than th e i r  lega l span. In fac t ,  succeeding waves of 
technical change may render ex is t ing  discoveries  economically 
obsolete; as a r e s u l t ,  many firms taking out p a ten ts  have l i t t l e  
expectation th a t  the invention w ill be of commercial value for 
the fu l l  legal l i f e  of the p a ten t .  Under these circumstances i t  
would be impossible to s e t  Tp>Tg, in so fa r  as pa ten t l i f e  
would have to be the same under the two regimes and beyond the
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Paten t O ffice 's  control/®*
There is  another reason fo r  in te r e s t  in the case of equal
pa ten t  l i fe .  The abo l i t ion  of the pa ten t system a l toge the r  
would r e s u l t  in an environment s im ilar  to th a t  of the 
permissive regime a lb e i t  with, in e f f e c t ,  a sh o r t  Tp. If i t  can 
be shown th a t  the w elfare  e f f e c t s  of a switch in regimes are  
ambiguous when Tp=T,, th is  w ill  remain true  fo r  some Tp<Ts. I t  
can now be shown tha t;
Proposition  II.3: I f  p a te n t  l i f e  is  the same under a permissive
and a s t r i c t  regime then, even with cons tan t re tu rn s  
in production, i t  is  ambiguous which is  soc ia l ly
p r e f e r a b l e / ’ ®*
In order to prove Proposition 11,3 i t  is  s u f f ic ie n t  to use a
simpler version of the model sketched above. Upon payment of a 
research  fee, x ,  a firm is given a lo t te ry  t ick e t  th a t  y ie lds a t  
some fu tu re  moment a p a r t ic u la r  product-innovation with 
p robab il i ty  p . If the firm does not invent a t  th a t  time, i t  
never will. Under the s t r i c t  regime the (single) pa ten tee  reaps 
the reward flowing from h is  invention in the form of gross  
monopoly p ro f i t s ,  it ,.  In the event of m firms 's t r ik in g  gold',
each is awarded it, with p robab il i ty  1/m . If there  are  N 
e n t ra n ts  and en try  is free ,  the following zero expected p ro f i t
Of course a change in regime may a f f e c t  the date  a t  
which the next genera tion  of products is  expected to 
appear, bu t th is  complication w ill  be ignored.
A less  genera l proof can be found in La Manna e t  aï. 
(1989), pp. 1435-7.
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condition w ill hold :
p + q = i  1 1 . 1 5
i.e.
=  I z s .E { tC®> =  • Tt, T  -  X  = 0 I I .  16
where x (= C l - e  / r  ) is  the discount fac to r  and T is paten t 
l i f e .
Under the permissive regime, as a l l  su ccess fu l  inventors are 
g ranted  a p a ten t ,  g ro ss  p r o f i t s  w ill  depend on the number of 
su ccess fu l  inventions. Once again i t  is assumed th a t  collusion 
is  not fea s ib le  and th a t ,  i f  the re  are  m ultiple p a ten tees ,  they
w ill  engage in a Cournot game. With free  en try  and n  en tra n ts ,
the zero expected p r o f i t s  condition ensures th a t  :
) p ‘*'q"‘“ ' ” « . . i t  -  X =  o  1 1 . 1 7
4 - 0  1
I.e.
-  X = O 1 1 . 1 8
1-1 1
where Ttj.., is g ross  p e r-f irm  p ro f i t s  in a i - f i r m  oligopoly. 
L etting  ^ i= x  ( I tci+L j ) ,  where is the aggrega te  deadweight 
w elfare  loss  in an i - f i r m  oligopoly, and w* the welfare gain 
a f t e r  the pa ten t  has expired and price  has been driven to 
marginal cost,  then a t  a f r e e -e n t ry  equilibrium the r a t i o  of net
expected w elfare under the two regimes can be w r i t ten  as:
^ ------------- C l - q " )  [ w / r -  -  v:»- I I . 19
E{W "} < l - q " ) W / r -  -  Z ( ? ) p ' q " " % .
1 - 1  1
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Proposition  I I .3 follows from the two following Lemmata:
Lemma I I .1: Under c e r ta in ty  the  permissive regime is  w elfare 
superio r .
:  l l  < 1 ” - 2 0
Notice th a t  under c e r ta in ty  the permissive regime not only 
g en era tes  sm aller  w elfare  losses  (as but a lso  lower
aggrega te  research  expenditures  (as under f ree  en try , of course, 
N x>nx).
Lemma II.2: As p  approaches 0  the  s t r i c t  regime becomes w elfare 
superio r .
Applying de 1' H ospital 's  ru le  i t  is e a s i ly  e s tab l ished  th a t  
l i m  y ( p )  = - > ! . ■  1 1 . 2 1
F>-»o ri
The economic ra t io n a le  fo r  Lemma 11.2 is s tra igh tfo rw ard : when 
inventions a re  'd i f f i c u l t '  (i.e. p  is ‘sm all’) the b en e f i t  flowing 
from the la rg e r  en try  genera ted  by the s t r i c t  regime in the 
form of an increased p robab il i ty  of having a t  le a s t  one 
su ccess fu l  invention may more than o f f s e t  the double 
d isadvantage of the s t r i c t  regime, i.e. the h igher research  
expenditure and the lower g ross  soc ia l  su rp lus  if  an invention 
does occur.
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II.5 Conclusion
The debate over the so c ia l  ne t b en ef i ts  of the pa ten t  system, in 
focusing on the s ta rk  a l te rn a t iv e  between a no -pa ten t system 
(which allows p e r fe c t  f re e - r id in g )  and a ' s t r i c t '  pa ten t regime 
(which prevents  genuine but la te  inventors from b en ef i t t in g  
from th e ir  own R&D investment), has ignored the mid-way option 
of a 'perm issive ' regime. Such a system excludes true  f ree ­
r id e r s  (i.e. those who have not invested in R&D) but does not 
penalize genuine inventors fo r  not a rr iv ing  f i r s t .
The permissive regime could be in s t i tu te d  by changing the ru le s  
by which p a ten ts  are  awarded. Taking into account th a t  there  
e x is t s  an adm in is tra t ive  lag between f i l in g  fo r  a pa ten t and 
obta in ing  i t ,  a simple way of implementing a permissive regime 
would e n ta i l  accepting a l l  app lications  up to the date of the 
award of a pa ten t  to the e a r l i e s t  inventor of a given c lass  of 
new products /p rocesses .  Of course, i t  must be assumed th a t ,  as 
under the cu rren t  ( s t r i c t )  regime, the Patent Office w ill not 
divulge the technica l d e ta i l s  of pa ten ts  before they are  awarded 
even if  under the permissive regime there  would e x is t  an 
incentive to bribe pa ten t o f f ic e r s .
A no -pa ten t  regime can be in te rp re ted  as a permissive regime 
with pa ten t  lives s h o r te r  than production and im ita tion lags. 
Instead of d isc losing  ea r ly  in re tu rn  for a pa ten t,  inventors 
would minimize the flow of pre-production information and
—  5 7  —
p o te n t ia l  f r e e - r id e r s  would have to wait u n t i l  the product 
appear before  copying i t .  This would give the in i t i a l  inventors 
an in te rv a l  in which to reap supra-normal p ro f i t s  and, more 
importantly, r e tu rn s  would not be limited to the f i r s t  p a s t  the 
post.  The length of time th a t  inventors enjoyed p ro tec tion  from 
f re e - r id in g  would probably be s h o r te r  than a t  p resen t,  but since 
i t  is  already  q u i te  common fo r  firms not to ava i l  themselves of 
p a ten ts ,  th is  would not n ece ssa r i ly  be a crippling  blow. Of 
course, the re  a re  some products fo r  which a pa ten t remains 
valuable fo r  the whole of i t s  legal l i f e .  In such cases, the 
e f fe c t iv e  shorten ing  of p ro tec tion  afforded to the inventor 
would be important and may more than o f f s e t  the advantages of 
sharing  the r e tu rn s .  However, i t  is worth noting th a t  inventions 
th a t  a re  of durable  economic value are  likely to be major 
inventions in the sense of genera ting  large cos t f a l l s  or 
s ig n if ic a n t ly  improved products. I t  is p rec ise ly  such inventions 
th a t  K lette  and de Meza (1986b) show should anyway be rewarded 
with the s h o r te s t  p a ten ts .
In the pas t ,  s e r io u s  economic cases have been made th a t  pa ten ts  
should be abolished because they over-reward the inventor [e.g. 
P lant (1934)1. What does not seem to have been apprec ia ted  is 
th a t  abolishing p a te n ts  tends to increase the rewards to coming 
second or th ird .
Although no unequivocal case can be made, I hope to have 
o ffe red  a persuasive  argument th a t ,  fo r  reasons th a t  have
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previously  been neglected , a 'permissive ' pa ten t regime, or even 
a no -pa ten t  regime, deserves se r ious  consideration for, under 
reasonable  assumptions, i t  may be soc ia lly  p refe rab le  to what 
has t r a d i t io n a l ly  been seen as the ideal of a ' s t r i c t '  regime.
The above ana ly s is  can provide a usefu l s t a r t in g  point to 
a s se s s  the s u i t a b i l i ty  of ex is t in g  pa ten t law fo r  the growth 
and success of one of the most promising a reas  of in d u s tr ia l  
re sea rch  -  biotechnology. The problem can be put in focus by 
considering two examples, the p a te n ta b i l i ty  of sexually  
propagated p lan ts  and p a ten t  p ro tec tion  fo r  micro-organisms. 
Economists tra ined  to t r e a t  qua l i ty  as a sca la r  or, a t  most, as 
a two-dimensional vec to r  may well find bewildering the fac t  
th a t  under European p a te n t  law for a var ie ty  of barley to be 
considered "new”, only one ou t of i t s  f i f t y  "d esc r ip to rs” has to 
be d i f f e re n t  from e x is t in g  v a r ie t ie s ;  change, by backcrossing, 
the length of leaf  h a i rs ,  and you have a "new” v a r ie ty .  In the 
terminology of th is  Chapter, the application  of the novelty 
c r i t e r io n  to p lan t v a r ie t ie s  is d e f in i te ly  "permissive” . Given 
the (very) high p robab il i ty  of success in what amounts to 
"cosmetic breeding”, one may surmise th a t  Lemma II .1 may apply. 
Similar problems in defin ing  a "novel” product are  encountered 
in the case of micro-organisms; in the well-known case of 
a lp h a - in te r fe ro n ,  which was f i r s t  patented by Biogen (and 
Hoffmann-La Roche) in 1980 in Europe and a few months la te r  in 
the U.S. by Genentech, the l e t t e r ' s  gene d if fe red  from Biogen's
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fo r  a s t r in g  of twenty four aminoaclds out of hundreds. I t  seems 
almost ce r ta in  th a t  Genentech did not copy Biogen's paten t; in 
in d u s tr ia l  biotechnology competing companies have very c learly  
defined research  ta rg e ts  and thus i t  is not wholly su rp r is ing  
th a t  two very s im ila r  p a ten ts  were f i led  within a short  period 
of time. In th is  case, i t  would appear th a t  the open-reg is try  
scheme mentioned above could provide a workable and more 
d es irab le  a l te rn a t iv e  to the cu rren t  system, which combines the 
worse of both world. In fa c t ,  under the European Patent 
Convention, companies may delay publication  of th e ir  paten t 
app lica tion  for e ighteen  months a f t e r  the date  of p r io r i ty  
application . This means th a t  i f  the application  is  successfu l 
and is given wide "coverage” resources  expended by competitors 
on R&D on s im ila r  p ro jec ts  during the 18-month "black-out” 
period would have been wasted and the pa ten t would have fa iled  
to provide a valuable "early  warning s ig n a l” (see next Chapter).
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A p p e n d 1x  I I . A
In th is  Appendix i t  is shown th a t  under r isk  aversion a mild 
re lax a tio n  of the s t r i c t  p a ten t  regime which allows the f i r s t  
two inventors to be awarded a pa ten t (ra ther  than only one) may 
y ie ld  a ne t w elfare  gain. In order to focus on the spec if ic  
e f f e c t s  of r is k  aversion, a l l  o ther  p o te n tia l  b en e f i ts  flowing 
from a permissive p a ten t  regime are ignored; in p a r t ic u la r  i t  is 
assumed th a t  i f  two o r  more firms succeed a t  the R&D s tag e  the 
two even tual p a ten tee s  share  monopoly p ro f i t s  thereby
elim inating the b e n e f i ts  flowing from competition a t  the output 
s tag e .  Upon payment of an R&D fee, q>, each e n t ra n t  acquires  a
lo t te ry  t ic k e t  y ie ld ing  a given new product with p robab il i ty  p .
Let u < y —<p) be each e n t ra n t 's  u t i l i t y  function, where y  is the 
g ross  payoff of the game, which, of course, depends on the 
n a tu re  of the p a ten t  regime; under a s t r i c t ,  f i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t  
regime y=it,  whereas under a more permissive tw o-paten t regime 
if  two firms succeed, each rece ives  y= n :/2 .  The u t i l i t y  function 
is normalized so th a t  u ( o ) = l .
Under a s t r i c t  p a ten t  regime, assuming th a t  if  k firms succeed 
a t  the R&D s ta g e  each has a p robab ility  1 / k  of reaping it, the
equilibrium number of e n t ra n ts ,  n ,  w ill s a t i s fy  the following
condition:
u<TC-q>) = 1; p + q = l  I I A .  1
Under a permissive tw o-paten t regime, the equilibrium number of
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e n t ra n ts  N is determined by the following:
= 1 I I A . 2
where  ^)p '* 'q "  " "  ' is  the p robab il i ty  th a t  a success fu l
firm w ill  be faced with o th e r  i  successfu l inventors and the
p robab il i ty  of being awarded one of the two availab le  pa ten ts  
2e q u a ls  Notice th a t
i f r  =  2 i l z 3 ! :2 _  _  2p < î-  . I I A .  3
If the equilibrium  under a permissive tw o-patent regime 
s u s ta in s  more firms than under a s t r i c t  regime, then there  will 
be a ne t  w elfare gain from the higher p robab il i ty  of a 
discovery being made a t  a l l .  The following simple example shows
th a t  under r isk  avers ion  N may indeed exceed n .
Suppose th a t  n = 2 ;  then from IIA.l and IIA.2, a tw o-patent 
regime w ill y ie ld  a 50% increase in the number of e n t ra n ts  (i.e. 
N=3) provided th a t
pq^u<Tt—q>) + [ ^ (  1—q^)—2pq^] u ( ^ ( p )  ) ) u ( t i —q>) , I I A .  4
I t  is simple to confirm th a t  IIA.4 holds iff*'*''* 
u ( -  -  q>)
-  V )  "  4  •  " ^ - 5
For appropria te  value of tc and q> IIA.5 w ill be s a t i s f i e d  i f  the
income e l a s t i c i t y  of the u t i l i t y  function is le ss  than 1 / 3 .
Notice th a t  IIA.4 holds for Vp>0; however, th is  r e s u l t  
does not extend to a l l  n  and N.
-  6 2  -
Although the le ss  r i s k -a v e rse  inventors are , the less  dramatic 
the e f f e c t  on en try , the permissive regime always encourages 
en try .
-  6 3  -
APPENDIX 113
In the proof of Proposition I I .1 I t  Is assumed to be possib le  to 
find a Tp which Induces as much en try  as does T ,. This requ ires  
th a t  Tg Is f in i te .  I t  Is e a s i ly  shown th a t  I t  normally w ill be. 
The dem onstration th a t  follows is for a zero discount r a te ,  
however th is  Is no problem because It  can be shown th a t  Tg Is 
decreasing  In
Let the expected da te  of f i r s t  discovery be t = t  ( n ) . Granted 
th a t  freedom of en try  always r e s u l t s  In zero expected p ro f i t s  
fo r  the firms, the so c ia l  problem Is to minimize the ne t  loss to 
consumers from delaying the cheap a v a i la b i l i ty  of the Invention. 
The problem Is thus to minimize
S = ts , + TgS, I I B . l
where Is the gain In consumer su rp lus  when the new good Is 
Introduced a t  a price  equal to marginal cos t,  as opposed to S,  
which Is the gain In consumer su rp lus  when price f a l l s  from the 
monopoly level to marginal cost.  Minimizing S requ ires
Now, en try  Is determined by the zero p ro f i t  condition :
T
Tt,—^  -  X  = O I I B,  3
There Is an e r ro r  In Dasgupta and S t l g l l t z ’s  (1980) 
formulation of the optimal pa ten t l i f e  problem. This Is 
corrected  In K lette  and de Meza (1986a) who show Tg 
to be a decreasing function of r .
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Equation IIB.3 implies th a t  fo r  some f in i te  pa ten t lives R&D 
c o s ts  a re  s u f f ic ie n t ly  low to induce multiple en try . However the 
Dasgupta and S t ig l i t z  approach makes no sense unless th is  is 
true .
D if fe re n t ia t in g  IIB.3
From IIB.2 and IIB.4, a t  an optimum
S, + So 4 ^  = 0  I  IB . 5a n  X
However, when Tg is  la rge  and hence so is n ,  d t / d n  w ill be a
negative  number of small absolu te  value -  when there  are
already many firms seeking to invent en try  of another one
cannot advance the expected dateof f i r s t  discovery by much. 
Thus for n  'large* the LHS of IIB.5 must be pos itive .  For I IB .5 
to  hold p a ten t  l i f e  must be lowered thereby ra is in g  d t / d n  and 
reducing the aggrega te  deadweight loss. Optimal pa ten t  l i f e  is 
f in i te  under a s t r i c t  regime.
Granted th a t  Tg is not in f in i te ,  i t  is s t i l l  not ce r ta in  th a t
even an in f in i te  Tp w ill induce the en try  of n  firms under the 
permissive regime. But instead  of allowing an unlimited number 
of p a ten ts ,  if  the reward was limited to, say, the f i r s t  two 
inventors to succeed, i t  is  v ir tu a l ly  ce r ta in  th a t  if  Tg induces 
n  firms to e n te r  then, except in the extreme case of Bertrand 
competition and p e r fe c t  s u b s t i tu t e s ,  duopoly p ro f i t s  would not 
be so low as to preclude n  firms with a s u f f ic ie n t ly  large Tp.
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This is of relevance because Proposition II .1 would hold even if 
permissive is in te rp re te d  as  two firms r a th e r  than one.
—  6 6  —
Appendix II.C
The i s o —e l a s t i c  m a r k e t  demand c a s e  
In obvious n o ta t ion ,  inverse market demand is w rit ten  as
p = Œ q .)" '"  l i e .  1
Let W. be s o c ia l  w elfare , n e t  of production co s ts  (but gross of 
research  cos ts ) ,  when m o lig o p o lis ts  are  active , i.e.
w. = ^  ( i  4 . c g q .  l i e .  21-1 1-1
where is  the prof it-maximizing level of ou tpu t of firm i in 
an m-firm Cournot oligopoly and c  is marginal and average cost, 
i.e.
:Ti = max (q* [ q i + à i ] ' ' ‘ “ c q ,  } I I C . 3
Hi inj
I t  is simple to confirm th a t  a t  a symmetric equilibrium per-firm
ou tpu t and pe r- f irm  p r o f i t s  a re  given respec tive ly  by
^=C m e c /< m e —1 ) 3 “‘/m  and =C m sc /C m e—1 ) 3 <em?)  11C.4
D efine  W* as the f i r s t - b e s t  level of gross so c ia l  w elfare, i.e.
W = mqx { ^  Q " - " " -  c Q )  = I I C . 5
Finally , define D. as the deadweight loss assoc ia ted  with an in­
firm oligopoly as compared with the f i r s t - b e s t  level of socia l 
welfare :
D„=W*— c ’"‘ {1—( <me+e—1 ) /m e ) ( (me—1 ) /m e  )'■’ } I I C . 6
For Proposition 11.1 to hold, i t  has to be shown th a t
mTt./7t, > D./D, l i e .  7
i.e., using 110.4 and 11C.6
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< m £ - l ) / ^ l*   ^ /m^ { l - f  (me-1)/mg*~^ V m -[<m g-l)/m gl‘ HC 8
< e - l ) / e ] ‘- ’ -  [(E-l)/s]
which holds fo r  Vm) 2 .  ■
The l i n e a r  demand c a s e
Using the same n o ta t ion  as  above i t  is  easy to confirm th a t  if  
the inverse market demand is  linear ,  i.e.
p = a  -  5  qi l i e . 9
i-i
then Proposition II. 1 holds because
( A y r -  " C  10
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APPENDIX IIJ)
Write industry  p r o f i t  as
nitn = Tc(n) = (P ( n ) - c ) Q ( n )  I I D .  1
where Q ( n )  is industry  ou tpu t .  Hence
■ l ‘ * S  i  5
D = J jQ C z) dk -  ( P - c ) Q  I I D .  3
and thus
I I  =  -  ( P - C )  ^  I I D .  4
ÉleSÊ = _ <P=£l Q dP i ÉS P IID 5
d n  D ^  d n  P d P  Q
But as
d l o R ?  _  d P  Q dQ 1 
d n  “  dQ P d n  Q I I D . 6
Equation 11.10 of the te x t  follows from IID.7, reca l l in g  tha t a t  
a Cournot equilibrium
-  dP  _ Q _  = „  
dQ P - c
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APPENDIX ÎIE
An example that sa t i s f i e s  Inequality 11.14-
Suppose th a t  Tp Is such tha t only two firms en te r  the
race (n=2) and th a t  a f r e e -e n t ry  equilibrium would su s ta in
th re e  firms if  R&D were f ree .  I t  is read ily  ca lcu la ted  tha t in
th e  l i n e a r  demand c a se  f ix e d  c o s t s  must amount to  tc®, where
are  monopoly p r o f i t s  g ro ss  of fixed cos ts .  I t  is easy to
ver ify  th a t  ne t  monopoly and duopoly p ro f i t s  are  respective ly  
3  7
71,= and TTg = .® The deadweight losses a s s o c ia t e d  w ith
Tc, and TTz (taking as a bench-mark the f re e -e n t ry  equilibrium) 
a re  given by
^  8 . n* _  _  _ 8
I t  follows th a t
2 tc2 _  1 4  , 1 7
7T, 2 7  D; 27
as requ ired  for 11.14 to hold.
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C H A P T E R  I I I
P a t e n t s  a s  E a r l y  W a rn in g  D e v i c e s  i n  a  
Two—S t a g e  M odel o f  R e s e a r c h  and  D e v e lo p m e n t
I I I . l  In troduction
In th is  Chapter I s h a l l  form ulate a model of R&D in which
Research and Development a re  not seen, as in most of the 
l i t e r a tu r e ,  as a n a ly t ic a l ly  id en tica l,  but ra th e r  as two d is t in c t  
s ta g e s .  Having thus provided a r ich e r  (and more r e a l i s t ic )  
ch a ra c te r iza t io n  of the innovation process, I s h a l l  consider
whether the Patent Office could make use of the d is t in c tio n  
between research  and development by manipulating p a te n ta b i l i ty  
s tandards  in a we If are-improving manner. In p a r t ic u la r ,  I sh a ll  
address the question  of whether p a ten ts  should be granted to 
the outcome of e i th e r  the research  s tag e  (e.g. to research
proto types) or the development s ta g e  (e.g. to fully-developed 
products /p rocesses) .  In order to provide a fu l l  welfare ranking 
of pa ten t  regimes, in answering the above question I sh a l l
analyse both the options considered in the previous chapter, i.e. 
I s h a l l  examine both s in g le -  and m u ltip le -p a ten t  schemes.
The genera l conclusion of the ana lysis  is th a t ,  if  research  and
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development a re  two s e p a ra te  s ta g e s  and pa ten ts  a re  granted to 
the research  p ro to types , then p a ten ts  can take on a new ro le  -  
th a t  of conveying valuable information to firms. The information 
p a ten ts  convey does not p e r ta in  to technical knowledge but to 
market s t ru c tu re :  by g ran tin g  pa ten ts  to research  prototypes the 
P aten t Office can remove uncerta in ty  on the s t ru c tu re  of the 
fina  1-product market. Thus, by e i th e r  reducing or increasing 
endogenous market u n ce r ta in ty ,  the Patent Office can a l t e r  the 
a l lo ca t io n  of resou rces  between research  and development; i t  is 
then shown th a t  whereas under a s in g le -p a te n t  regime the 
reduction  in u n ce r ta in ty  engendered by g ranting  pa ten ts  to 
research  p ro to types  is (almost) always welfare improving, under 
a m u l t ip le -p a te n t  regime, expected ne t soc ia l  welfare can be 
increased by g ran tin g  p a ten ts  to fully-developed products/ 
processes, i.e. by introducing add itional uncerta in ty  into the 
system.
The Chapter is  organized as follows: in sec. III.2 the lamentably 
s h o r t  l i t e r a t u r e  on tw o-stage  R&D models is surveyed; in sec. 
111.3 a tw o-stage  model of research  and development is 
formulated; sec, III.4 o f f e r s  a f u l l  taxonomy of p a ten t  regimes 
according to two p a te n ta b i l i ty  c r i t e r i a  ( ‘in d u s tr ia l  ap p l ica t io n ’ 
and ‘nove l ty ’); sec. III.5 analyses the welfare implications of 
g ran ting  p a te n ts  to e i th e r  research  prototypes or fu lly  
developed products  under a s in g le -p a te n t  regime; sec. III.6 
considers the e f f e c t s  on in d u s tr ia l  s t ru c tu re  and so c ia l  welfare
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of a m u l t i -p a te n t  regime In which p a ten ts  a re  granted to
resea rch  p ro to types ,  which a re  then con trasted  In sec. III. 7
with the im plications of g ran ting  m ultiple pa ten ts  to fu lly
developed p roduc ts /p rocesses .  F inally , In sec. III.8 It w ill be
suggested  th a t  the above ana lysis  could be p ro f i tab ly  applied to 
the form ulation of p a ten t  reform In areas  such as biotechnology. 
All technica l d e t a i l s  a re  re leg a ted  to footnotes .
III.2 ‘R&D*: Unravelling the "R* from the *D*.
In the f ie ld  of the economic theory of R&D few authors  have 
been as candid as Brander and Spencer (1983) In acknowledging 
th a t  " the re  Is nothing in [the] model th a t  formally 
d is t in g u ish e s  between cost-reducing  R&D and Investment In
c a p i ta l  stock" (p. 226): th is  admission points  r a th e r  s ta rk ly  to
the fa c t  th a t  most R&D models use research  and development a t
bes t  as an example (and a t  worst as an excuse) to analyse the 
e f f e c t s  of 'lumpy' Investment, d isregard ing  the sp ec if ic  fea tu res  
of the innovative process. I t  Is there fo re  not wholly su rp r is in g  
to note  th a t  w ithin the large s e t  of ‘R&D’ models, the subse t of 
models th a t  d is t in g u is h  In a meaningful way between research 
and development Is very small and the subse t of 'proper' R&D 
models th a t  envisage a s ig n if ic a n t  ro le  for p a ten ts  comes
dangerously c lose  to being a s ingle ton , as witnessed by the 
following survey of the re levan t l i te r a tu r e .
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Nelson (1982). An in te re s t in g  a ttem pt to r e l a t e  R&D cap ab il i t ie s  
to a w ell-defined  notion of ‘knowledge* can be found in Nelson 
(1982), who addresses  an even more fundamental issue than the 
d is t in c t io n  between research  and development, by providing 
various examples of how ‘knowledge* can be quan tif ied  as a 
focusing device th a t  allows R&D to be conducted more 
e f f ic ie n t ly .  However, although c lose in s p i r i t  to the model 
formulated in the next sec tion , Nelson's model does not deal 
with the in te ra c t io n  between research , development, 
a p p ro p r iab il i ty  (as determined, among o the r  things, by 
p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandards) ,  and in te r - f i rm  r iv a lry  th a t  forms 
instead the core of our model.
Reinganum (1985). The a r t i c l e  by Jenn ifer  Reinganum on ‘A Two- 
Stage Model of Research and Development* provides a good 
example of the inventiveness of game th e o r i s t s  in using R&D as 
a vehicle to devise so p h is t ic a ted  m u l t i-s ta g e  games with 
c o u n te r - in tu i t iv e  implications.
Resorting to the analogy of p a ten t  races with track races,  i t  
can be sa id  th a t  Reinganum's is a s p r in t  race with a peculiar  
ru le  fo r  the s t a r t - o f f :  before  being allowed to s p r in t ,  a l l  
race rs  have to run a one-hurdle  course and, provided (a t least)  
one p a r t ic ip a n t  c le a rs  the hurdle , then a l l  p a r t ic ip a n ts  can line 
up for the s p r in t  with no handicaps -  the only advantage for 
the winner of the hurd le  race being th a t  of having the option 
of holding the s t a r t e r ' s  gun and thus being able 'to  move first* .
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The su rp r is in g  r e s u l t  is th a t  the winner of the hurdle race 
(i.e. in the research  s tag e )  w ill  choose not to move f i r s t  and 
w ill run a t  a lower pace in the s p r in t  race (i.e. w ill invest 
le ss  in development).
The p rice  Reinganum pays to make the R&D process f i t  into her 
ingenious game is to  ru le  out any informational ro le  for 
p a ten ts  in a f fe c t in g  the a l lo ca t io n  of resources  between 
research  and development by assuming th a t  “research  findings 
rap id ly  become common knowledge" (p. 276): th is ,  of course,
presumes th a t  re sea rch  findings cannot be patented . Although by 
defin ing research  as s u f f ic ie n t ly  ‘b a s ic ’, one can always a t tach  
to research  ou tpu t the p roperty  pos tu la ted  by Reinganum, a t  the 
o ther  end of the R&D process, i t  is almost never the case tha t 
development expenditu res  cease with the g ran ting  of a paten t,  
as assumed in her model. Thus the (tenuous) d is t in c t io n  drawn 
by Reinganum between research  and development cannot address 
the question  of how developed a product/ process should be in 
order to be p a ten tab le ,  e.g. whether p a ten ts  should be granted 
to research  p ro to types or fu l ly  developed products.
Grossman and Shapiro (1987). The f i r s t  (and to the present 
w r i te r ’s b e s t  knowledge, only) model th a t  both provides a 
ch a rac te r iza t io n  of research  and development as two 
meaningfully d i s t i n c t  s ta g e s  and considers  the ro le  of paten t 
policy is to be found in Grossman and Shapiro (1987). Their 
model can be summarized as follows: two firms a re  engaged in a
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race to discover a new product/process  and tw o  breakthroughs 
are  requ ired  to win the race ,  the p e r -u n i t -o f - t im e  cost of 
achieving a breakthrough with p robab ility  p  being c ( p ) .  
Grossman and Shapiro c a l l  research  (development) the s tage  
leading to the f i r s t  (second) breakthrough; the f i r s t  
breakthrough has no in t r in s ic  value, but has to be a t ta in e d  in 
order to p rogress  to the next s tag e .  Although one might 
question  the assumption of research  and development being 
equally  uncerta in  and co s tly  (i.e. c ( p )  is the same in both 
s tag es ) ,  i t  can be accepted as  a f i r s t  approximation. The c ruc ia l  
assumption made by Grossman and Shapiro r e l a te s  to the 
f e a s ib i l i ty  o f  re sea rch  monitoring: unlike a track race , in which 
monitoring one's r iv a l s '  pos it ion  is feas ib le  and (almost) 
costless**’ *, in a m u l t i - s ta g e  research  race firms cannot observe 
each o th e rs '  re sea rch  e f f o r t s  (almost by d e f in i t io n  of 
Independent research). Thus, Grossman and Shapiro's assumption 
th a t  "each firm can observe the s t a t e  of p rogress of i t s  r iv a l ,  
i.e. whether the r iv a l  has success fu lly  completed the f i r s t  
s tag e  of research  or not" (p. 374) is highly questionable . Not 
only i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to envisage s i tu a t io n s  in which firms know 
the s t a t e  of progress  o f  th e i r  r iv a l s  but not how the progress
■*’ * In races  o the r  than s p r in ts ,  an early  leader has the
disadvantage of being constrained (by v i r tu e  of the
location of the eyes a t  the f ron t  of the head) in h is  or 
her a b i l i ty  to monitor constan tly  h is  or he r  r iv a l s '
pos it ions .
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has been achieved, but, more s ig n if ican tly ,  in Grossman and 
Shapiro 's  model each firm has a pos itive  incentive to
m isrep resen t i t s  cu rren t  s t a t e  of progress. As a r e s u l t ,  th e i r
ana ly s is  of the im plications of g ran ting  a pa ten t  to the
‘in term ediate  r e s u l t '  (i.e. the outcome of the f i r s t  research  
breakthrough) misses one fundamental ro le  of p a ten ts ,  namely to 
convey information on the firm s ' s t a t e  of p rogress of research. 
Moreover, in considering the welfare implications of granting
p a ten ts  to e i th e r  the interm ediate r e s u l t  or the finished 
product, a key fa c to r  is  bound to be the e f f e c t  on en try  to the 
race: again, Grossman and Shapiro's exogenously given duopoly 
s t r u c tu r e  robs the pa ten t  system of o the r  important function, 
namely to encourage (or discourage) entry .
Horstmann. MacDonald, and S liv inski (1985). Although not d irec tly  
re le v an t to the tw o-stage  model of the next sec tion , mention 
should be made of perhaps the only model to t r e a t  pa ten ts  as 
information t r a n s f e r  mechanisms, namely the a r t i c l e  of the same 
t i t l e  by Horstmann, MacDonald and Sliv inski (1985) in which i t  
is  assumed th a t  success  a t  the R&D s tage  (they do not
d is t in g u ish  between the two) gives the winner p r iva te  
information on the p r o f i t a b i l i ty  of the various options open to 
a competitor (i.e., e x i t ,  im ita tion, and duplication). As a r e s u l t ,  
the decision whether or no t to pa ten t is taken on s t r a t e g ic  
grounds, i.e. taking into account tha t the very ac t  of paten ting  
allows the r iv a l  to rev ise  h is  or her expectations regarding the
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p ro f i ta b i l i ty  of the various R&D options. Thus, the inform ation 
being tra n s fe rre d  by p a te n ts  does not p e r ta in  to  market 
s t r u c tu re  (as in the model analysed in Secs. III.3 -7 ).
Green and Scotchmen (1989). F inally , a recen t paper by Green and 
Scotchmen ought to  be mentioned, fo r i t  in troduces, a lb e it  in an 
a lto g e th e r  d if fe re n t  model from the one d iscussed  below, the 
no tion  of an optim al ‘p a te n ta b ili ty  standard*. The contex t is a 
tw o-period, tw o-firm , se q u e n tia l innovation model. The per- 
period  value (w illingness to  pay) o f period-one innovation is  x , 
has a d is tr ib u tio n  F ( x ) ,  and a fixed  cost c-, . Paten ting  the 
period-one innovation allow s an improved version  to  be made by 
period-tw o innovator w ith a co s t o f c ^ ,  value y + x , w ith y 
being d is tr ib u te d  according to  G < y ). Normalizing m arginal cost 
to  zero and considering  the case of B ertrand com petition, le t  ÿ 
be the minimum p a ten tab le  improvement on period-one innovation, 
i.e. any improvement y < y  cannot be marketed w ithout p rio r 
perm ission by period-one innovator. The optim al p a te n ta b ility  
s tan d ard , ÿ**', g u aran tees  th a t the period-tw o innovator's 
expected p ro f i ts  equal the expected su rp lu s  from period-tw o 
innovation, i.e. ÿ *  so lves the follow ing equation:
J [ y + ( l - # ) x ] d G ( y )  + <1—cc)J y d G (y )  = J  y d G (y )  I I I . l
y o o
The f i r s t  term on the LHS in I I I .l  is the expected p ro f it  
accruing to period-tw o innovator in the event of a p a ten tab le  
period-tw o innovation being made, where ( 1 —a )  is  the 
p roportion  of the bargain ing  su rp lu s  accruing to  period-tw o
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Innovator; the second term is the share o f the expected 
bargain ing  su rp lu s  accru ing  to  period-tw o innovator if  the 
improvement is  no t p a ten tab le . The ex istence o f a ÿ*  th a t
so lv es  II I .l is  e a s ily  e s ta b lish e d  by w riting  the LHS o f III .l as
J*ydG  (y )  + ( 1 - a )  x  [ 1 -G  ( ÿ )  ] -a J ^ y d G  (y )  111. 2
o o
and no ting  th a t the second and th ird  term should add up to  0,
th e ir  sum ranging  from <1—oc>x to —ccE<y) as ranges from
O to <».
What follow s is  perhaps the sim plest fo rm aliza tion  th a t cap tu res 
some of the basic  d iffe re n c e s  between research  and development 
and th a t allow s p a te n ts  to convey u se fu l inform ation to firm s.
III.3 The model
Firms take th ree  key dec isions:
(i) w hether to pay a research  fee, q>, th a t y ie ld s a
p ro b ab ility  p  of producing a su ccessfu l pro to type of a 
new p roduct/p ro cess;
<ii) to what e x te n t, x ,  to  develop the re sea rch  pro to type
by expending re so u rces  in development inpu ts, v ;
( i i l )  how much f in a l o u tp u t, Q, to produce.
As usual w ith m u lti-s ta g e  games th a t use a sub-game p e rfec t 
equilibrium  as so lu tio n  concept, our th re e -s ta g e  game can be 
solved 'backwards', s ta r t in g  w ith the f in a l s ta g e .
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Stage 3 : Production
Assuming th a t the  re sea rch  lo t te ry  has been en tered  and has 
re su lte d  In success fo r  k  firm s, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium  
le v e l  of o u tp u t o f a ty p i c a l  f irm  i ,  Q*, can be d e fin e d  in  
term s of investm ent in development inpu ts  by firm  i, v ^ , and by 
a l l  o th e r k - 1  firm s, v_* = < v , , ^, v * . . , , ) ,  i . e . ,
Q* = Q ~ ( v i , v _ i )  and th e  re s u lt in g  g ro ss  p ro f i t s  (net p ro f i ts  
p lus development co s ts , v )  can be w ritte n  as k ) .
W ell-behaved p re fe ren ces  fo r the  f in a l product a re  assumed to  
ensure th a t  ? (  ) is  concave and increasing  in v*. Notice th a t 
the  above form ulation  allow s fo r more than one p a ten t to  be 
g ran ted  w ith in  th e  p roduct/p rocess c la ss  th a t  defines  "the" 
in d u stry  (i.e. k )  1
Stage 2 : Development
Whereas the choice between a s in g le -  or a m u lti-p a te n t regime 
a f fe c ts  the  outcome of the  game through i t s  impact on the 
production s tag e , the  profit-m axim izing le v e l o f development
Consider th e  follow ing param etriza tio n s  in  obvious no ta tion : 
p<qi+q_i) = A - (qi+q_i)
C i C q i . V i )  =  [c e .  -  x ± ( V i ) ] q i  +  v *
A = Co
Then i t  is  sim ple to  show th a t:
q % ( V i ,v _ i )  = X i ( V i )  -  ^  Xj (V j )
? ( V i , v _ i , k )  = [ j ^  X i ( V i )  -  =
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expend itu res depends a lso  on w hether "pa ten ts  a re  gran ted  to  
research  p ro to ty p es  o r to  fu lly -developed  p roducts/p rocesses. In 
the  former case the  id e n tity  of the su c c e ss fu l firm (s) is  known 
before re so u rces  a re  committed to  development, whereas in the  
l a t t e r  case a firm  i  succeeding a t the re sea rch  s ta g e  w ill s e t  
i t s  Vi so as  to  maximize th e  expected (as opposed to  ac tu a l) 
p ro f i ts  earned in  the  la s t  s tag e .
In o rder to  make the  model both in te re s t in g  and re a l is t ic ,  
development c o s ts  a re  assumed to  be a continuous function of 
the ex ten t, x , of the  improvement of the  p roduct/p rocess being 
developed, i.e ., Xi = x < V i> .
Depending on w hether x  is  in te rp re te d  as the  s iz e  of the
outward s h i f t  o f th e  in v e rse  demand curve as a re s u lt  of
development o r as the  downward s h if t  of the  m arginal cost 
curve, the  model can accommodate both "product" and "process" 
innovations.
S tage 1 : Research
By paying a re sea rch  fee, q>, each firm  buys a p ro b ab ility  p  of 
producing a su c c e ss fu l re sea rch  prototype.
A ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  th is  very simple c h a ra c te riza tio n  of 
research  is  th a t i t  p o in ts  sharply  to  some of the key
d iffe re n ces  between resea rch  and development by tak ing  them to  
extrem es: while i t  is  widely accepted th a t  re search  is  'more
u n certa in ’ than development, he re  the l a t t e r  is  assumed to  be
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a lto g e th e r  n o n -s to ch as tic . Research output Is  a lso  recognized to  
be more "d iscontinuous" than the  improvements obtained through 
development: whereas the  ‘e x te n t’ o f product (or process)
improvements, x , is  a continuous function  o f development 
expend itu res, v, a s tro n g  th resho ld  e f fe c t is  assumed to  operate  
in the  case of research , in  the sense th a t  u n less  a fixed 
re search  fee, q>, is  paid, no new ideas can be produced, w ith 
ad d itio n a l expend itu res y ie ld ing  no in c reases  in th e  p robab ility  
of producing a su c c e ss fu l re search  pro to type.
The follow ing n o ta tio n  w ill prove u se fu l la te r  on: le t
h  (p , m, j  ) be the  p ro b ab ility  th a t ( j  —1) out o f m e n tra n ts  
succeed in producing a re sea rch  p ro to type, or, a lte rn a tiv e ly , as 
the  p ro b a b ility  th a t, cond itiona l on one firm  out of m having 
succeeded in  producing a pro to type, j  o th e rs  a lso  succeed, i.e.
h ( p ,  m . j )  = (“^ ’ )
I t  should be noted th a t, i f  only one p a ten t is  awarded fo r each 
c la ss  of new p rodu c ts /p ro cesses, success a t the  re search  s tag e  
does not guaran tee  the  award of the  pa ten t; thus, i f  j  
inven to rs  succeed a t  th e  research  s ta g e  and each has a 1 / j  
chance o f being awarded the  p a ten t, th e  p ro b ab ility  of a 
su c c e ss fu l inven to r being awarded a p a ten t in an m -firm  
in d u stry  w ill be
z  (p , m) = 2  h ( p ,  m, j ) -T—
j  —O J
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I1L4- A taxonomy o f patent ' regimes
In the prev ious chap ter we saw th a t p a te n ta b ili ty  s tandards can 
be c la s s if ie d  according to  a n o v e l t y  c r ite r io n , whereby a 
pa ten t regim e can be e i th e r  s t r i c t  — i f  i t  defines the  
product space so th a t only o n e  p a ten t i s  g ran ted  fo r any 
given c la s s  o f p ro d u c ts / p rocesses — or p e r m i s s i v e ,  i f  
m u l t i p l e  p a te n ts  a re  allowed.
In th is  sec tio n , we s h a ll  consider an a d d itio n a l c r ite r io n  to  
define  p a te n ta b i l i ty  s tandards , namely the  c r ite r io n  o f 
i n d u s t r i a l  a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  In th is  we s h a ll  depart from 
tr a d i t io n a l  p a ten t models which, because of th e ir  f a ilu re  to  
d is tin g u ish  between re search  and development, cannot address 
the  q uestion  of what is  being patented , which c le a rly  l ie s  a t 
the h e a rt o f th e  problem of designing an optim al pa ten t system. 
In fac t, bu ild ing  on the  model sketched in the  previous section , 
we can c la s s ify  pa ten t regim es according as to  w hether p a te n ts  
a re  awarded to  re search  p ro to types ( i d e a s —b a s e d  regime) or 
to  fu lly -developed  products ( p r o d u c t —b a s e d  regime). Of 
course, th e se  two p a ten t regim es can be considered as the two 
extrem es of a continuous spectrum  th a t grades p a ten t 
ap p lica tio n s  according to  th e ir  degree of in d u s tr ia l  
ap p lic a b ility . The advantage o f our binary c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme 
is  th a t i t  is  r ich  enough to  address s ig n if ic a n t policy is su e s  
w hilst being sim ple enough to  be tr a c ta b le  and (p o ten tia lly )
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implementable.
Combining the two c r i te r ia  for p a ten tab ility , namely novelty and 
in d u s tr ia l app licab ility , we can then examine each of the four 
possible paten t regimes in the re su ltin g  2x2 matrix:
Id eas-
T o J. J T based I n d u s t  r i a l
A p p l i c a b i l i t y
C r i t e r i o n  P roduct-
based
N o v e l ty C r i t e r i o n
P e r m i s s i  ve S t r i c t
(m u l t i-p a te n t) ( s in g le -p a te n t)
PI SI
PP SP
T a b l e  111 . 1 
Patent regimes c lassified  according to criteria  
of novelty and industrial applicability
We are now in a position  to  define the p ro f its  accruing to a 
p o te n tia l en tran t under each of the four possible patent 
regimes; as one of the aim of the model is  to determine the
e ffe c ts  of a lte rn a tiv e  patent regimes on industry  s tru c tu re , we 
sh a ll take the number of ac tive  firms as endogenous and
determined by a ze ro -p ro fit condition.
SI: S tr ic t,  Ideas-based paten t regime 
Under an SI regime, a s ing le  paten t is awarded to  the firm tha t
produces a successfu l research  prototype; i f  j  firms are
successful, then each has a p robab ility  of 1 / j  of being awarded
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th e  p a ten t. The key fe a tu re  of the  SI regime is  th a t the  
p a ten tee  can plan development expend itu res under ce rta in ty . If  N 
firm s e n te r  the  ind u stry , then each can expect a p ro f it  equal 
to;
E-Ctc®*> = p z < p ,N >  m ax [y Cv ; 1 ) - v ] — <p I I I .  3
As p  is  the  p ro b ab ility  o f success, z  the  p ro b ab ility  of being 
awarded th e  p a ten t i f  su ccess fu l a t the  research  s tage , and 
m a x !Y (v ; 1 ) —v ] th e  p ro f i ts  from development, th e  f i r s t  term 
in I I I .3 is  expected p ro f i t s  from research , while th e  la s t ,  <p, is  
th e  cost o f research .
SP: S tr ic t ,  P roduct-based  p a ten t regim e
Unlike the  SI regime, under an SP regime firm s th a t  succeed a t 
the  resea rch  s ta g e  have to  develop th e ir  p ro to types before the 
id e n tity  of the  (s ing le ) p a ten tee  is  revealed , and thus the  
profit-m axim izing  amount of reso u rces  invested  in development 
w ill depend on both the number of e n tra n ts , n , and on the 
p ro b ab ility  of success, p; as  a r e s u lt  the expected p er-firm  
p ro f i ts  under an SP regime a re  given by
= p  m ax [zC p , n )  y (v ; l ) - v ]  -  q> I I I .  4
PI: Perm issive, Ideas-based  p a ten t regim e
Let Jti ( k )  be the  p ro f i ts  made by a ty p ica l firm  1 a t a 
(symmetric) Nash equilibrium  in a C k + l) - f irm  oligopoly where 
each firm  chooses independently i t s  own lev e l o f development
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expenditure, i.e. " '
TCi <k) = max v _ i ,  k + 1 )  -  v* ]  I I I .  5
Then
E-Cti^ *> = p ^  h<p,  N, k > i t ( k )  -  q> I I I .  6
k “O
As p is  the  p ro b ab ility  th a t a firm succeeds a t the  research  
s ta g e  and h<p,  N, k> is  th e  p ro b ab ility  th a t k out of the 
rem aining N -1  firm s a re  a lso  su ccessfu l, the  f i r s t  term in I I I .6 
is  expected p ro f i t s  from research , from which the  research  cost, 
9 , has to  be su b trac ted . N otice th a t,  as p a te n ts  a re  awarded to  
research  p ro to types, firm s commit reso u rces  to  development 
expend itu res knowing w ith c e r ta in ty  the s tru c tu re  of the  f in a l-  
ou tpu t market.
PP: Permissive, Product-based patent regime
Under a PP regime, p a ten ts  a re  g ran ted  to  any firm  th a t has 
both succeeded a t  the  re sea rch  s ta g e  and developed i t s  
p ro to type so as  to  meet th e  (more demanding) c r ite r io n  of 
in d u s tr ia l  a p p lic a b ility . As p a te n ts  a re  now awarded to  fu lly  
developed p roduc ts /p ro cesses, those firm s th a t have been 
su ccess fu l a t  the  research  s ta g e  have to  invest in  development 
expenditu res w ithout knowing how many o th e r  firm s have a lso  
succeeded, i.e. w ithout knowing the  s tru c tu re  of the  f in a l 
product market. As a re s u lt ,  the  underlying game becomes one of
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incomplete inform ation; the  number o f  (ac tive) p layers is  
unknown a t th e  tim e when resou rces a re  committed to  developing 
a su c c e ss fu l pro to type.
Taking Bayesian equ ilib rium  as the  ap p ro p ria te  so lu tio n  concept 
fo r games w ith incom plete inform ation, i t  is  easy to  see th a t 
the  game th a t firm s play under a PP regim e is  but a very simple 
example o f a Bayesian game. As is  well-known (see Fudenberg & 
T iro le  (1986)), a Bayesian equilibrium  is  a s t r a ig h t  f or ward 
ex tension  o f th e  Nash equilibrium  concept in  which each p layer 
recogn ises th a t the  o th e r p lay e rs ' s t r a te g ie s  depend on th e ir  
"types", o r " c h a ra c te r is tic s " . In our case a t the  beginning of 
the  resea rch  s ta g e  each firm, upon payment of the  research  fee 
9 , knows i t s  own type, i.e. whether i t  is  "successfu l"  or 
"unsuccessful", but, o f course, does not know th e  type of a l l  
o th e r firm s. However each firm  knows the  p ro b ab ility  
d is tr ib u tio n  from which "types" a re  drawn and each firm knows 
th a t every firm s knows i t ,  e tc . — the  p ro b ab ility  p  is  common 
knowledge.
Thus, i t  tu rn s  out th a t th e  underlying Bayesian game is  
exceedingly sim ple, not only because firm s can belong only to  
e i th e r  of two types, "successfu l"  o r "unsuccessful", but a lso  
because "unsuccessfu l" types simply do not p a r tic ip a te  to  the  
development s ta g e  of the  game. As a re s u lt ,  the  ty p ica l 
maximand of a su c c e ss fu l firm  w ill be
E-Cït'’*’} = p  m ax [ ^  h ( p ,  n , k )  Y ( v ; k ) - v ]  -  9  I I I .  7
'  k—O
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In I I I .7 h < p , n , k> is  the  p ro b ab ility  th a t a su c c e ss fu l firm be 
faced w ith k  o th e r su ccess fu l Inven tors and Y (v , k )  Is  the 
g ro ss  p ro f i t  accru ing  to  the firm  In a ( k + 1 ) - f i rm  oligopoly; 
thus ( ' ) Y (v ; k )  Is  the expected g ro ss  b en efit from 
development.
IIL5 P roduct- vs Ideas-based  S in g le -p a ten t Regimes
In term s of Table I I I .l  the previous chap ter can be seen as an 
an a ly sis  o f th e  w elfare  Im plications o f the  s t r ic tn e s s  (or, 
a l te rn a tiv e ly , the  perm issiveness) of th e  novelty  c r ite r io n  fo r 
p a te n ta b ili ty  s tan d ard s  and I ts  q u a l i ta t iv e  r e s u l t s  apply 
Ir re sp e c tiv e ly  of w hether the  pa ten t regime Is Ideas- or 
product-based.
In th is  ch ap ter th e  emphasis Is  on the  w elfare  Im plications of 
the In d u s tr ia l  a p p lic a b ility  c r ite r io n  and In th is  sec tio n  we 
sh a ll consider w hether I t  Is  p re fe rab le  to  g ran t p a ten ts  to  
research  p ro to ty p es  or to  fu lly  developed products In a s in g le ­
pa ten t regime. In th is  re sp ec t we can prove th e  following: 
Theorem I IL l:  Assuming th a t  th e  number o f firm s can be tre a te d  
a s  a continuous v ariab le , a s t r i c t  Ideas-based  regime 
Is  unambiguously w elfare  su p e rio r  to  a s t r i c t  p roduct- 
based regim e (provided the  l a t t e r  s u s ta in s  a t  le a s t  
two firm s).
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Proof. Let <1—p > = q , then using  th e  identity^®»
C ' )  ITT
I I I .3 and I I I .4 can be re w ritte n  as:
E-Ctc®*> = ) m ax ( v ) - v } -  <p I I I .  8
ECrt^^y  =  [ max { y ( v )  -  [ ■ v } -  q> I I I .  9n  V *• ' 1—q ”  ■' ^
W riting expected p ro f i ts  under th e  two regim es in the above 
form has th e  advantage of showing very c le a rly  th a t under the 
SP regime i t  is  as  i f  firm s faced a h igher u n it cost of 
development as compared w ith firm s under an SI regime; in fac t, 
fo r  V n )2 , (which can be in t e r p r e te d  as  th e  u n it  c o s t
of development under an SP regim e) exceeds unity*-** (i.e. the 
u n it cost o f development under an SI regime). As a re s u lt ,  firm s 
w ill in v est le s s  in development under an SP regime than under 
an SI regim e. In  f a c t  i f  we l e t  v®* and be the so lu tio n s
of the maximization of 111.8 and 111.9 re sp ec tiv e ly , i.e .,
Y* ) =1 and y* th e n  as  y C- y  i s  concave
in  V and > 1 (p ro v id ed  n ) 2 ) ,  th e  SI regim e y ie ld s  ‘ more
improved’ p rodu c ts /p ro cesses: v®*>v®^.
i ;  c î ) p ‘q"-‘ è  -
^ I, (?) h  i ^ ^
-1  p 'q""' -  " 1  iV)  p'q...... <".
-  8 9
In lin e  w ith much o f the  l i te r a tu r e  ' on the  sub ject, the  
c r i te r io n  deployed here to  a sse ss  which p a ten t regime is  
so c ia lly  su p e r io r  is  net expected so c ia l w elfare, E-CW), defined 
as the sum of expected consumer su rp lu s  CS and in d u stry  p ro f i ts  
n. The g en era l form ula fo r EfW) is  thus:
EfW) = [p ro b a b ility  of a t le a s t  one discovery] x [gross 
s o c ia l w elfare  under c e rta in ty ]  -  [expected industry  
development co s ts ]  -  [in dustry  research  co s ts ]
Applying th e  above d e f in itio n  to  the SI and SP regim es and 
defin ing  G (v )  as  g ro ss  in d u stry  p ro f its ,  we ob ta in
E<W®*> = {CS<v®*>+G<v®*>-v®^ }-Nq> I I I .  10
= d - q " )  {CS<v®"')+G<v®'’ > }-npv® '’- n 9  I I I .  11
I f  the  in te g e r  c o n s tra in t is  ignored and research  co sts , <p, a re  
such th a t  E I tc®*> =E-CTt®'*> =0 w ith both N and n  being in teg e rs  
then i t  is  easy  to  show th a t
E I V r 'lB d - q * ^ )  C S ( v ^ ') >  d - q " )  CSCv®'*)=E<W®'"> I I I .  12
The above in e q u a lity  follow s by noting  th a t as consumer su rp lu s  
is  in c reasin g  in v, CS<v® * ) >C SC v^^) and as is
in c reasing  in  v , th e  two regim es cannot su s ta in  th e  same number 
of firm s in  a z e ro -p ro f it  equilibrium , fo r i f  N = n  then 
E-Cïü**> > E-Cte®**!. Then, fo r both E<it®*> and E-Ctc®^> to  be 
equal to  zero, N must exceed n , fo r <1—q**)/k  is  decreasing  in
—  9 0  —
fl
Theorem I I I . l  says th a t, I f  th e  in teg e r  co n s tra in t is  ignored, 
then th e re  is  no b en e fit to  be had by gen era tin g  u n certa in ty  
with the  in tro d u c tio n  of a p roduct-based  p a ten t regime: as a 
re s u l t  o f th e  a d d itio n a l cost engendered by u n certa in ty  (i) 
firm s w ill in v est le s s  in development and thus the lucky 
paten tee-m onopolist w ill r e s t r i c t  ou tput to  a la rg e r  ex ten t than 
under an SI regime; and ( ii)  few er firm s w ill e n te r  the  research  
s tag e , thereby  reducing th e  p ro b ab ility  o f a t  le a s t  one 
su c c e ss fu l re sea rch  p ro to type being produced a t a l l .
However, in  the  almost c e r ta in  event of e i th e r  N o r n  (or both) 
not being In teg e rs , the  question  must be asked whether the 
in teg e r  c o n s tra in t can rev e rse  the  above inequality . Obviously, 
i f  n  were an in te g e r  but not N, th e  case fo r a SI regime would 
be s tren g th en ed  (as the super-norm al p ro f i t s  enjoyed by the 
IN I firm s would have to  be added to  consumers su rp lu s, where 
[ N] is  th e  n e a re s t in te g e r  le s s  than N). To a sc e r ta in  whether a 
n o n -in teg e r n  can be of q u a lita t iv e  consequence, one has to
i s  d e c re a s in g  in  k  i f f
1 > q*< ( 1 - p k )  I I I .  13
As th e  r . h . s .  o f I I I .  13 re a c h e s  a maximum a t p ^ :
= < l+p-*k) <l-p*>*< I I I .  14
s u b s t i tu t in g  III. 14 in to  III. 13, i t  can be seen th a t 
in eq u a lity  III. 13 holds, fo r  
l > < l - p * > “ -^’ . ■
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re s o r t  to  some param etr Iza t Ion. For ease 'o f comparison with th e  
r e s t  of th e  l i te r a tu r e ,  I  s h a ll  use the  popular param etrIzat Ion 
of a l in e a r  Inverse demand curve, constan t m arginal co s ts  and an 
I s o -e la s t lc  development function. I.e.
P = Po -  5  Qi ; m = n , N I I I .  15
i  —1
C = CCo — + Vi I I I . 16
X* = 0 v ?  I I I . 17
The above assum es th a t Improvements brought about by 
development a c t iv i ty  take the  form of a downward s h i f t  of p re - 
Innovatlon m arginal cost; equ iva len tly  I t  can be assumed th a t 
development s h i f t s  the  p r e - InnovâtIon Inverse demand curve by x  
( I . e . ,  P = Po + X -  2  Q*)'i  —1
For sim p lic ity . I t  Is  a lso  assumed th a t w ithout the Innovation
production Is  m arginally  u n p ro fitab le . I.e., Co=Po«
S tra ig h tfo rw ard  s u b s t i tu t io n  y ie ld s 
1 /(1  — )
V®* = I I I .  18
V®* I I I .  19
1 / ( 1  —2oc >
I I I .  2 0'  n p  *
Taking In to  account th a t CS ( v )= % G (v ) , s u b s t i tu t in g  III. 18-21 
Into  III. 10-11 and assum ing th a t re search  c o s ts  are  such th a t 
E-Cn®*> = O w ith N being an In teger, we f in a lly  ob ta in
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E<W®^> = < l-q '^ )v ® V 4 cc  I I I .  22
E fV rn  = <l-q"""*) 3y  (v®**)/2-1  nl pv®'“- [  n] ( l -2 a )  C 1-q"^) v®*/2oN
I I I . 23
where [ n ]  i s  th e  n e a re s t in te g e r le s s  than n.
Thus E-CW®*> 5  E-CW®^ > according as to  w hether
^ ^ ^ ^ ; C n 3 p < 3 -4 g )  ( " iS o p  ) H I .  2 4
Inequality  I I I .24 does not lend i t s e l f  to  sim ple g en era liza tio n s  
about the  q u a l i ta t iv e  e f f e c ts  of changes in the  param eters 
on expected so c ia l  w elfare. However, some g en era l po in ts  can be 
made:
(i) There e x is t com binations of p  and a  such th a t the 
in tro d u c tio n  of the  in te g e r c o n s tra in t does reverse  
th e  g en e ra l presum ption of the  w elfare  su p e rio rity  of 
the  SI regim e (see Theorem I I I .l ) .  The r e s u l t s  of 
s im u la tions w ith a range of values o f the  c ru c ia l 
param eters a re  rep o rted  in Table I I I .2.
( ii)  As shown in Table III.2 , as inven tions become more 
d i f f ic u l t ,  i.e. as p  fa l ls ,  th e  SI regime becomes 
correspondingly  more a t t r a c t iv e  and in the lim it (as 
p-$0) is  unambiguously su p erio r to  th e  SP regime
C n 3  1 jT  <   ^ —201 >
W ritin g  I I I . 24 as
1 —riN 1— 1 c 1 —2 oc 3
< ^ ^ - ^ > C N + 2 C n l  < l - 2 a ) ] / N  J  En] (3 -4 cc )  )p  ^ '  E nJ p  ^
and applying de 1' H o sp ita l's  ru le  to  both s id e s  we ob ta in
11m = N ; 11m j
p-»0 P p-*o p^
and th u s  11m  E{W®^ } > I im  E{W“ ^ } , as  N>n.
p-»o p-*o
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The economic ra tio n a le  fo r th is  r e s u l t  is  easy to  
app rec ia te : w ith inventions being " d if f ic u l t”, th e
super-norm al p ro f i ts  genera ted  by a n o n -in teg er n  a re  
in s u f f ic ie n t to  o f f s e t  the  b en e fit genera ted  by the  
la rg e r  number of inven to rs  su sta in ed  by the  SI regime, 
( i i i )  The converse does not hold, i.e. as p  approaches unity , 
th e  SP regime does not become n ece ssa rily  p re fe rab le  
to  th e  SI regime. One of the reasons behind th is  
asymmetry is  ra th e r  in trig u in g ; i t  can be shown th a t 
w h ils t E-CW®*} is  m onotonically increasing  in p, 
E<W®'*> is  no t^^ \ This may bring  about a re -sw itch in g  
w ith the  SI regime being w elfare  su p e rio r fo r values 
o f p  around O and 1 and the  SP regime being 
p re fe ra b le  fo r in te rm ed ia te  values of p; Fig. I I I .l  
i l l u s t r a t e s  th is  p o ss ib ili ty .
Ignoring the  cost of research , nq> (which is  independent of 
p ) and using, the  param etr iz a t ion III. 15-17, E{W®*^} can be 
w ritte n  in the  form
W = h  th u s
dW ^  W . n ( l - p ) " - :  _  2 a ,  
d p  1—2ot  ^ 1— ( l —p  ) "  p  *
Hence W has a tu rn ing  point a t 0 < p ^ <  1 and is  negative ly  
sloped a t p = l ;  in fac t a t  p = l  dW /dp= —2oc and a t p = 0  
dW/dp=+«» as can be shown by w riting
dW _  W rp n  ( l~ p  — f 1— ( 1—p 2 a  •>
d p  l - 2 o t   ^ p  [ l -  ( l - p  )” ]
and applying de 1' H osp ita l’s  ru le .
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Table III.2 ' '
Simulatitm re su lts  o f  welfare ctmparisons 
between SI and SP patent regimes 
[ Key to the table; bracketed (unbracketed) entries specify the range of values of p  
such that the 5^ (alt,, SI) regime yields a higher expected net welfare level]
« = 0 . 0 5  
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
« 0.00-0.52
[0.53-1,003
o 0.00-0.36
[0,37-1,003
4
N
0,00-0.31
[0,32-1,003
0.00-0.32 
[0,33-0,853 
0,86-1.00
6 0,00-1,00
7 [0,67-1,003 0.00-0,66
[0,45-0,803 0.00-0.i4
0.81-1.00
oc=0, 1 
n
3 4
P 0.00-0.55 
[0,56-1,003
3 0.00-0.48 
[0,49-1,003
4 0,00-1,00
hL 0,00-0,50
 ^ [0,51-1,003
6  0 ,00- 1,00 
7 [0,77-0,843 0,00-0,760,85-1,00
8 0,50-1,00 0,00-0,49
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Table III.2 (continued)
« = 0 . 1 5  
n
1 2 3 4 5
2 0,00-0,58[0,53-1003
3 0,00-1,00
4 0,41-0,50 [0 ,S H , 003
0,00-0,40
N
5 0,00-1,00
6 [0,60-0,633 0,61-1,00
0,00-0,59
7 0,93-1,00 0,24-0,92 0,00-0,23
8 0,58-1,00 0,00-0,57
1
a=0.175 
n
2 3 4 5
2 0,00-0,60[0,51-1,003
3 0,00-1,00
4
0,00-0,62 
[0,63-0,303 
0,91-1,00
N
5 [0,86-i, 003 0,00-0,85
6 0,36-1,00 0,00-0,35
7 0,69-1,00 0,00-0,68
8 0,91-1,00 0,38-0,9 0,00-0,37
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FIG . I I I .  1 
Re-Swltchîng in an Optimal S tr ic t Patent Regime
9 7  -
m.6 The W elfare C h a ra c te r is tic s  o f Perm issive P a ten t Regimes
Before comparing an ideas-based  to  a product-based  mode under 
a perm issive p a ten t regime, I s h a ll  examine in some d e ta i l  
the  w elfare  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of perm issive regim es, tak ing  the  PI 
case as an example. This choice is  m otivated by the  fac t th a t 
the  PI regim e can be seen as the opposite  of th e  tra d i t io n a l  
w in n e r- ta k e s -a ll model in  which no d is tin c tio n  is  drawn between 
R and D (i.e., in our term inology, a SP regime). In fac t, in the  
SP case the  value of the  award — the  p a te n te e 's  monopoly 
p ro f i ts  — does not depend on the number of e n tra n ts , but th e  
p ro b ab ility  of success does; on the  con trary , under a PI regime 
the  p ro b a b ility  of discovery, p, is  independent of market 
s t ru c tu re  but the  value of the  p rize  is  not.
In what follow s I s h a ll make ex tensive  use of the  
param etr iz a t ion III. 15-17, not only because i t  se rv es  w ell my 
purpose o f i l lu s t r a t in g  the  log ic  of th e  argument in a simple 
way but a lso  because in many in stan ces  no gen era l r e s u l t s  a re  
av a ilab le  and th u s  i t  is  u se fu l to  have a fe e l fo r the  
c o n tra s tin g  fo rces  a t  work.
Using III. 15-17, i t  is  s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  to  confirm th a t a t a Nash
e q u il ib r iu m  ex p ec ted  p e r - f i rm  p r o f i t s  development
e x p e n d itu re  and p e r - f i rm  o u tp u t Q*** can be w r i t te n  as
—  9 8  —
v T ' =  ( I I I .  2 6
(1  + 1 )
QT' = 7 î f ï 7  [v T * ]"  I I I . 2 7
Proposition III.l: Let q>(p,N) be the cost of research such that 
in a free-entry equilibrium all N entrants earn zero profits 
(with N Integer); then for any Nj2 q>(p,N) reaches a 
maximum at pe (O, 1)
As q> (p ,N ) = 2  ( ^  {y <v* , v_* }1-1 1 V*
i t  is  easy to  e s ta b l is h  th a t th e re  e x is ts  a value of 
p€(0,l), f5,such th a t:
=0 III. 27d p  I p=p 
D iffe re n tia tin g  q> (p ,N ) w .r.t. p  we ob ta in
cn..,-n ,3
where n* = i  [m ax {y (v^ , v_* ) - V i  }] = iK^ .
As d q > (p ) /d p  is  continuous and i t s  values a t  p = 0  and p = l  
a re  re sp e c tiv e ly  II, >0 and (IIn—IÏn_ , ) < 0 , th e re  e x is ts  a 
p € < 0 , l )  such th a t III.27 is s a t is f ie d .
Let CT,=n,—Il2> 0, then s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  m anipulation y ie lds 
th a t a t  p = p
s ig n ^ jp E ' — =sig n { -q "" ' )p*q"“’'* (N - l- i  }<0
thus proving th a t q>(p,N ) is  dome-shaped with a maximum a t  
P € ( 0 , 1 ) . I
—  99
The fa c t th a t  fo r any N>2 * ( p ,N )  fe ' dome-shaped may seem 
puzzling: g iven a c e r ta in  le v e l o f research  expenditure one
would expect th a t as d isco v eries  become more d if f ic u l t  (i.e. as 
p  f a l l s )  the  number of firm s su sta in ed  by a f re e -e n try
equilibrium  should fa l l .  P roposition  III. 1 a s s e r ts  th a t th e re  is  
always a le v e l of research  fee <p*, such th a t
q> (p , N) ( p = l ; N ) } .  This means th a t fo r  q>=<p*^  th e re
is  always a resw itch ing  in  the  equilibrium  number of firm s as p
v aries. Fig. I I I .2 i l lu s t r a t e s  th is  case fo r  N=2.
The economic ra tio n a le  fo r a re -sw itch in g  is  simple. Suppose 
th a t  d is c o v e ry  i s  easy  ( i . e .  p " < p ( l )  and research  inpu ts  a re  
so expensive th a t  a f re e -e n try  equilibrium  su s ta in s  only 
one firm. As d isco v erie s  become s lig h t ly  more d if f ic u lt
but s t i l l  "easy "  ( i . e . ,  p " ( p S p " )  two firm s may find  en try
p ro fitab le ; th e i r  p ro f its ,  of course, w ill be a weighted average 
of monopoly and duopoly p ro f its .  As th e  weight a ttached  to  
monopoly p ro f i t s  ( p ( l —p ) )  is  sm all, duopoly p ro f i ts  may be 
la rg e  enough to  make en try  a c tu a l ly  p r o f i t a b l e  fo r  two firm s; 
t h i s  i s  because  fo r  p " < p ( l  a f re e -e n try  monopolist earns 
s u b s ta n tia l  super-norm al p ro f its .  As p  f a l ls ,  expected p ro f i ts  
a lso  fa ll ,  but i t  is  expected monopoly p ro f i ts  th a t become 
re la tiv e ly  more im portant. Eventually  a point w ill be reached 
(p*" in Fig. III.2 ) where a f re e -e n try  equilibrium  w ill again 
su s ta in  only one firm.
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M
FIG. III.2
A re-switching in the free-entry numt)er o f firms 
under a permissive ideas-hased patent regime
N=1 f o r  p" < p ( 1
N=2 f o r  p" S p (
N=1 f o r  p^ ( p < p”
N=0 f o r  p < p*"
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Proposition III. 2: Let p=argniax ç(p, N) and p*=argmax N+1);
then p > p*.«®»
Proposition  III.2  s ta t e s  th a t th e  lev e l o f p ro b ab ility  p  a t  which 
expected g ro ss  p ro f i ts  reach a maximum, i.e., p , f a l l s  as the  
number o f e n tra n ts  N grows.
The s ig n ifican ce  of P ropositions I I I .l  and III.2  can be be
apprec ia ted  by g iv ing  a s l ig h t ly  d if fe re n t in te rp re ta tio n  to  the  
above model. Suppose th a t N firm s, which behave non-
coopera tively  in th e ir  f in a l  product market, finance a jo in tly -  
owned resea rch  f a c i l i ty ,  which can produce two types of reserach  
pro to types: p e rfe c tly  re lia b le  p ro to types, th a t can be developed 
with c e r ta in ty  in to  m arketable products, and im perfectly  re lia b le  
pro to types, th a t  can be tu rned  in to  sa lea b le  products w ith
p ro b ab ility  p < l .  then P roposition  I IL l s ta t e s  th a t  a l l  N firm s
w ill ag ree  on producing the  le s s  re lia b le  prototype; and 
according to  P roposition  I I I .2 the  la rg e r  is  th e  number of firm s 
funding th e  jo intly-ow ned research  labora to ry , the  le s s  re lia b le
To prove P roposition  I I I .2 i t  s u f f ic e s  to  show th a t 
dy  (p ; N+1 ) I where p  i s  defined by
d p  I p=p ^  ^
( l -p )'^- '-V ni + , - n i ) = 0  I I I .  29
i-i
u s in g  th e  same n o ta t io n  o f I I I . 28.
M u ltip ly in g  I I I .  29 by <1—p> and s u b s t i t u t i n g  i t  in to
d ? ( P 'N + l )  „e  o b ta in  
d p
1-1 i  1-1
= )]p ‘ < i-p)““ <n.»,-n .)+p"<n„^,-n„)
1 - 1
a f | ( ^ ) j j ^ ‘ ( i -p )" - ‘ <n.^,-ni)+p"<n„*,-nN) < o. ■
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w ill be th e  profit-m axim izing  prototype., Consider the  case of 
N=2 and le t  and be p ro f i t  pe r-firm  under monopoly and 
duopoly, re sp ec tiv e ly ; then P roposition  I I I . l  can be in te rp re te d  
as saying th a t:
p ( l - p ) T C ,  + p ^ T la s > I I I .  3 0
i . e . ,  l e t t i n g  tc, = ( l+ k )T [ 2 , w ith k > l  to  allow fo r the
d is s ip a tio n  o f p ro f i t s  engendered by com petition
p k  > 1 I I I . 31
Maximizing the  l.h .s. of I I I .30 w .r.t. p  y ie ld s
p  = < 1 I I I .  3 2
thus th e  two firm s w ill in s tru c t  the  re sea rch  labo ra to ry  to  
produce a re sea rch  p ro to type o f im perfect r e l ia b i l i ty .  More 
p erverse ly  s t i l l ,  th e  same r e s u l t  ob ta ins even i f  producing an 
im perfectly  re l ia b le  p ro to type is  (s lig h tly )  m o re  co s tly  than 
producing one of p e rfe c t r e l ia b i l i ty .  P roposition  III.2  may be 
in te rp re te d  as  a warning ag a in st a p o ssib le  s id e -e f fe c t  of 
lowering th e  cost o f re search  (e.g. by subsid iz ing  in te rn a tio n a l 
research  conso rtia ), in so fa r  as the  a tten d in g  increase in 
membership in  the jo in t research  f a c i l i ty  y ie ld s  research  
p ro to types of decreasing  reliability*"'®».
The above example can a lso  be used to  throw a 
d if fe re n t lig h t on the freq u en tly -h ea rd  complaint 
about the  u n sa tis fa c to ry  le v e l of in d u s tr ia lly -  
app licab le  research  in the UK. I f  one considers the  
education  system  as the n a tio n 's  ‘re search  la b o ra to ry ’ 
and B ritish  in d u stry  as a (adm ittedly  in d ire c t)  
determ inant of the q u a lity  of i t s  re sea rch  ou tpu t (e.g. 
by g iv ing  low s ta tu s  and s a la r ie s  to  applied
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As a p re lim inary  s te p  tow ards examining the  w elfare 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of a PI p a ten t regime with f re e  en try  under 
uncerta in ty , i t  may be u se fu l to  analyse the sim pler case of a 
perm issive regim e w ith exogenously given market s tru c tu re  under 
c e r ta in ty  (no tice  th a t under c e r ta in ty  the  d is tin c tio n  between 
id e as- and p roduct-based  regim es d isappears).
In p a r tic u la r , i t  is  in te re s t in g  to  examine th e  e f fe c ts  of 
changes in the  number o f ac tiv e  firm s. Increased en try  (in a 
com parâtiv e - s t a t ic s  sense) produces th ree  e f fe c ts :
(i) h igher in dustry -w ide  resea rch  costs : in th e  absence of 
u n certa in ty , the  resea rch  fee incurred  by an ad d itio n a l 
e n tra n t y ie ld s  no s o c ia l b en e fits ;
d v( i i )  low er r a t e  o f te c h n ic a l  change: i . e . ,  < 0 ; cost 
re d u c t io n s  a re  lower, the  la rg e r  the  number of ac tiv e  
f irm s.
dNQ( i i i )  l a r g e r  o u tp u t: >0 ; en try  (provided i t  is  feas ib le )
w i l l  always r a is e  in d u stry  output^’ ’ *.
s c ie n t is ts ) ,  then the  above model su g g es ts  th a t 
re s u lt in g  low percen tage of research  output turned  
in to  m arketable p ro d u c ts / p rocesses can in  fac t be the  
d ire c t r e s u l t  o f p ro f i t  maximization. Notice th a t, 
a lb e it  under somewhat s t r i c t e r  conditions, the same 
perverse  r e s u l t s  ob ta in  even i f  an o u ts id e r  (a 
Japanese company?) is  committed to  p e rfe c tly  re lia b le  
resea rch  p ro to types.
“  ^ » U sing I I I .  22-25 i t  i s  easy  to  check th a t  in  o rd e r  fo r  
e n try  to  be p r o f i t a b l e  fo r  th e  (N + l)th  f irm  2  (N + iy  ^ *
in d u s try  o u tp u t r i s e s  w ith  e n try  i f f  > ct.
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The fac t th a t opposing fo rces a re  a t work r a is e s  the obvious 
question  as to  w hether e n try  may reduce w elfare.
Using the  p a ram etrlza tlo n  III. 15-17 I t  Is  easy  to  confirm th a t 
fo r any given N, agg reg a te  so c ia l su rp lu s  under a perm issive 
p a ten t regim e w ith no u n ce rta in ty  Is  given by
W(N> = N ( l-4 o c )+ 2  _  N<p I I I .  3 3
4 a
where (see III.26)
1 / ( 1  —2 0 , 5
v (N )  = I I I .  3 4
(N + l)=
Define (N, oc) and q>® <N, a> re sp ec tiv e ly  as th e  research  fee 
such th a t the  net so c ia l b en e fit o f th e  Nth firm  Is zero and 
the  maximum resea rch  fee th a t su s ta in s  an N -flrm  oligopoly, I.e.
(N, - ~v<N ) -  — — ( N- 1 ) I I I .  3 5^  4 a  4 a
1 —2 aN<p- (N, a )  = v (N )  I I I .  3 6
I t  Is  s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  to  confirm th a t th e  re la t iv e  p o s itio n s  of 
<N, a )  and q>® (N, a )  In th e  <q>, a )  plane a re  as depicted  In 
Fig. III.3 .
From Fig. III.3  I t  a lso  tra n s p ire s  th a t th e re  Is  a range of 
values o f Cq>, a )  such th a t en try  (In a com parâtI v e - s ta t le s  
sense) may both fe a s ib le  and so c ia lly  de trim en ta l. For Instance, 
fo r a l l  p a irs  <<p, a )  w ithin  the  shaded a rea  of Fig. I I I .3, the  
b en efit of ad d itio n a l ou tpu t brought about by a th ird  en tra n t Is 
more than o f f s e t  by the  e x tra  research  cost.
-  1 0 5  -
area  between tp'**’C2) and cp** ( 3 )  : entry
(or e x i t )  to duopoly is  ben efic ia l
rea between cp*Cl) and 9 ** ( 2 ): ex it
to monopoly b en efic ia l
area below 9 *=^ ( 3 ) :  entry to 
\  tr iopoly i s  feas ib le
FIG . I I I .  3
E n try  bo th  f e a s ib le  and s o c ia l ly  d e tr im en ta l
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Finally , we can now in troduce an endogenously determ ined number 
of firm s and u n certa in ty . Tedious s u b s t itu t io n  rev ea ls  th a t fo r 
the p a ram etriza tio n  III. 15-17, net expected so c ia l w elfare can 
be w ritte n  as
E{VT'(N)} = 2 .2+l(l-4a) _ III. 37
1 — 1 4-OC
Even by r e s o r t i n g  to  th e  p a ra m e tr iz a tio n  I I I . 15-17 E<W^*>
does not s im p lify  to  a well-behaved function; however, some 
in te re s t in g  r e s u l t s  can be obtained by comparing the  w elfare 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of a N-firm fre e -e n try  oligopoly as compared to  
a (N -D -firm  oligopoly. For th is  purpose define
A<p, N> = E { v r '  (N) } - E { v r '  ( N - 1) } I I I .  3 8
Obviously fo r any given N and oc A<p, N )= 0  defines a l l  the  
p a irs  <q>, p )  such th a t the  marginal expected g ross so c ia l 
b en e fit derived  from the  N th firm is  equal to  q>, the  cost of 
research .
We a re  i n t e r e s t e d  in  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between Eire'** <N)> =0 
and A (p , N )= 0 ; th e  former determ ines the  number of firm s 
ac tiv e  a t  a f re e -e n try  equilibrium  and the l a t t e r  helps 
e s ta b lis h  w hether such equilibrium  su s ta in s  too few or too many 
firm s. I t  should be c le a r  th a t, unlike the t r a d i t io n a l  w inner- 
ta k e s -a l l  p a ten t race  (in which so c ia l w elfare  is  m onotonically 
decreasing  in  the  number of e n tra n ts ) , under a PI regime a f re e -  
en try  equilibrium  may w ell s u s ta in  too few e n tra n ts . This is  
because increased  en try  has th ree  co n flic tin g  e f f e c ts  on 
research  and development: i f  d iscoveries  a re  " d if f ic u lt"  and
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research  c o s ts  a re  not "too" high, a la fg e  number of research  
u n its  may be b e n e fic ia l in so fa r  as i t  g en era tes  a high 
p ro b ab ility  of a d iscovery being made a t a ll;  however, a la rg e  
number o f su c c e ss fu l inven to rs  w ill produce two fu r th e r  e ffe c ts : 
on the one hand i t  w ill y ie ld  a high le v e l of f in a l output, but 
on the  o th e r w ill g en e ra te  a low le v e l of cost reduction  (or 
product improvement). By balancing th ese  th re e  e f f e c ts  one can 
d e f in e  th e  se c o n d -b e s t number of f irm s, N®, which need not 
c o in c id e  w ith  th e  f r e e - e n t r y  e q u i l ib r iu m  number of e n t r a n ts ,  
N°.
F ig u re  I I I .  4 d e p ic ts  A<p, N )= 0  and E < ic^*(N )> = 0 fo r  ct=0. 1 
(the average value o f the  development co st e la s t ic i ty  according 
to  the  em pirica l l i te r a tu r e  on R&D); i t  can be seen th a t the  
C<p, p )  plane can be divided in to  th ree  zones:
ZONE A: N®>N°. When d isco v eries  a re  "d if f ic u lt"  re la tiv e ly  to
the  cost of research , a f re e -e n try  equilibrium  does 
not g en era te  enough research  u n its .
ZONE B: N®=N‘*. Socia l w elfare  cannot be improved by imposing
r e s t r ic t io n s  to  en try .
ZONE C: N®<N®. Although th e  rugged con tours of Zone C do not
allow us to  draw c le a r-c u t conclusions, i t  can be seen 
th a t when d isco v eries  are  "easy" (i.e. p  is  "high") and 
th e  cost of re search  "low", a f re e -e n try  equilibrium  
su s ta in s  too many firm s (and thus any policy change 
th a t makes en try  le s s  p ro f ita b le  may improve w elfare).
-  1 0 8  -
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FIG . I I I .  4
Second-best and F ree-en try Industry  S truc ture  
under a Perm issive Ideas-Based Patent Regime
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I t  Is easy to  show th a t - ,
P roposition  IIL 3: Under c e r ta in ty , given th e  param etriza tion
III. 15-17, a  decrease  in  th e  f re e -e n try  number o f 
firm s i s  always w elfare-im proving.
Let N ° + l be the  f re e -e n try  number o f firm s, i.e., re ca llin g
111.35,
Using 111.34 and 111.39, VP"* <N>>VP“* CN^'+l) can be w ritten  as
N « = = + 3 N ^ + 2 -4 a  ( N ^ + 1 ) ,  v»** (N«=+1 1_ r Œ ^ + 1 )  ® ^  ^ _----------------------------------------->------------------= -I -------------------- j  1 1 1 .  4-0
N'“*+4N <=*+l-4a<N°+l> CN**) N-=<N“ + 2 )='
Taking in to  account th a t the r.h .s. of 111.40 is  la rg e s t a t oc=0 
and th a t  s e t t in g  or=% low ers the  l.h .s ., the  above in eq u a lity  
w ill c e r ta in ly  hold i f
2Me CN®+1)> —^ w h i c h  holds fo r VN“ . ■
N“ ^+2 N‘^ - 1  N‘*CN‘=’+ 2 )^
I I I .7 P a te n ts  as  Early Warning Devices
The main r e s u l t  of the  previous sec tio n  is  th a t, e sp ec ia lly  when 
d isco v eries  a re  "easy” as compared to  research  co sts , a 
perm issive ideas-b ased  pa ten t regime may gen era te  excessive  
re search  and too  l i t t l e  development.
The ra tio n a le  fo r th is  r e s u l t  (and a possib le  suggestion  fo r 
improving s o c ia l w elfare by a change o f pa ten t regim e) can be
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understood by viewing p a te n ts  as inform ation s ig n a ls . Unlike the  
tr a d i t io n a l  model o f p a ten t races  which, by defin ing  p a ten ts  as 
the  reward of th e  combined R&D e f fo r t ,  deprives the paten t 
system  o f any in fo rm ationa l ro le , in our model p a te n ts  can a l t e r  
the  a llo c a tio n  of reso u rces  between re search  and development by 
taking on the  ro le  of "early  warning devices" in the  sense th a t 
by a s u ita b le  choice of p a te n ta b ili ty  c r i t e r ia  (i.e. id eas- o r 
p roduct-based) p a te n ts  may be used e i th e r  to  convey or to  
w ithhold valuab le  inform ation before re so u rces  a re  committed to  
developing re sea rch  p ro to types in to  fin ished  p roducts/ 
processes.
We a re  now in  a p o s itio n  to  compare the  two p ossib le  p a ten t 
regim es under a perm issive mode; i t  should be c lea r  th a t in 
asse ss in g  th e  r e la t iv e  m erits  of an ideas-based  vs a p roduct- 
based regim e a key ro le  is  played by uncerta in ty . In fac t, 
unlike the  case of s t r i c t  regim es where the  d is tin c tio n  between 
id eas- and p roduct-based  p a te n ta b ility  c r i t e r ia  does not vanish
A d is tin c tio n  should be drawn between our model and 
K itch 's views on the  n a tu re  of the  pa ten t system. I t  
w ill be re c a lle d  th a t Kitch (1977) argues th a t p a ten ts  
a re  a n a ly tic a lly  s im ila r to  "m ineral claims" (i.e. 
p a te n ts  a re  viewed are  "prospects") and are  so c ia lly  
valuab le  not so much as a rew ard fo r inventing  but 
r a th e r  as an e f f ic ie n t  means of organizing po st­
invention  a c t iv i t ie s .  The argument developed here is  
to ta l ly  immune from any re fe ren ce  to  tra n sa c tio n  co s ts  
and t r e a t s  p a te n ta b ili ty  s tan d ard s  (i.e. whether 
p a te n ts  a re  "rewards" or "prospects") as policy 
in stru m en ts  to  be used so as to  a f fe c t the  a llo ca tio n  
of reso u rces  between research  and development in 
conditions of uncerta in ty .
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even under c e r ta in ty , in  conditions * o f c e r ta in ty  the  two 
perm issive regim es a re  id en tica l. I f  su c c e ss fu l research  
p ro to types can be produced under c e r ta in ty , i t  makes no 
d iffe re n ce  w hether p a te n ts  a re  awarded to  p ro to types  or to
fu lly  developed p ro ducts /p rocesses, fo r  in e i th e r  case the  
s t ru c tu re  o f th e  f in a l product in d u stry  is  known before
resou rces  a re  committed to  development.
Again unlike th e  case of s in g le -p a te n t (i.e. s t r i c t )  regim es, in 
a m u lti-p a te n t system  the  question  of w hether w elfare would be 
h igher under an id e a s-  o r product-based  regime is  bound to  be 
an open one, fo r the  e f f e c ts  of e n try  a re  q u ite  d iffe re n t; 
whereas under a s t r i c t  system  an ideas-based  regime has the 
unambiguous advantage of inducing more en try  (and thus a h igher 
p ro b ab ility  of a t  le a s t  one su ccess fu l p ro to type being produced 
a t a l l )  w ith no adverse e f fe c ts  on the  ex ten t to  which the  
p roduct/p rocess is  developed, under a m u lti-p a ten t system, 
increased  e n try  is  not n ece ssa rily  w elfare-im proving. In fac t, 
the la rg e r  number o f e n tra n ts  su sta in ed  by an ideas-based  
regime im plies th a t p a ten tee s  would develop th e ir  p ro to types 
le ss  than i f  th e re  had been fewer e n tra n ts . The question  may 
then be asked o f w hether a change from a PI regime to  a more 
demanding PP regim e (in term s of w orkab ility  s tandards) may
not improve so c ia l w elfare in those cases in which a PI regime
y ie ld s too much research  and too l i t t l e  development. In o rder to  
emphasize th e  relevance of en try  to  providing an answer to  the 
above question , i t  may be u se fu l to  e s ta b lish  th e  follow ing
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d ^ Y ( v )  " ,P ro p o s i t io n  I I I .  4 : I f  — >0, fo r  any exogenously given
number o f e n tra n ts  M a PI regim e w ill always be
w elfa re  su p e rio r  to  a PP regim e fo r  p< 1, w ith w elfare
le v e ls  under th e  two regim es converging a t  p = l .
As re search  expend itu res, Mq>, a re  obviously the  same under the 
two regim es and so c ia l w elfare is  inc reasing  in (expected) 
development expenditu re , E { v }, i t  s u f f ic e s  to  show th a t 
E {v ^*  }>E{v*“'*}.
Let M=2 (the ex tension  to  M>2 is  s tra ig h tfo rw ard ); under a PP 
regime is  chosen so as to
m ax p [ ( l - p ) Y ( v ,  D + p y C v , 2 ) - v ] —cp I I I .  41
where y  (v ,  k )  is  g ro ss  p ro f it  (i.e. net p ro f i t  p lus development 
expenditu re) in  a k —firm  oligopoly. The FOC fo r the  maximization
III. 41 is
( l - p ) 5 i g ( v )  + p S zg C v ) = 1 I I I .  42
where ; l e t  g ( v )  be convex:
Let -  = % ( v )  (so th a t  ^ ( v )  is  convex), then:
( d - p ) 6 T + p 5 2 )  I I I .  43
U n d e r  a  P I  r e g i m e  is  the  so lu tio n  of the  following:
[p  ( 1 - p )  m ax{Y  ^v, 1 ) —V }+p^ m ax{Y <v, 2 ) - v } ] —q> I I I .  4 4
The FOCs fo r  th e  above maximization are:
S ig C v )  = l  i.e. <5, >
5 2 g ( v )  = l  i.e. v=%—^ ( 6 2 )
and thus fin a lly :
E (\r% p(l-p )^ -^  <5 , Hp=*^’ (52)>E{v^}=p ( ( l -p ) 5 ,+p6 2 ) n i.4 5
where I I I .45 follow s from the convexity of  ^ ( ) .  ■
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Of course, I f  th e re  Is  free  en try  th,e two regim es cannot 
su s ta in  the  same number of e n tra n ts  and the  PP regime w ill 
always induce fewer firm s to  en ter; indeed I I I .45 is  a lso  the  
condition  th a t  expected ne t p ro f i t  under a PI regim e be g re a te r  
than under a PP regime.
By combining P ropositions I I I .l  and III.3 -4 , we can now show 
th a t:
Proposition III.5; Provided d iscoveries are "not too d iff ic u lt ' (in 
a sen se made precise  below), a switch from a PI regime 
to  a PP regime i s  welfare-improving.
Suppose th a t p = l  so th a t the  two regim es a re  in fac t id e n tic a l
and a t a f re e -e n try  equilibrium  su s ta in  the  same number of
firm s (i.e. N‘=‘=n"=‘) and th a t research  co sts , <j>“  are  such th a t 
w ith N®’(= n “ ) being an in teg e r. In view of Prop.
III.3  we know th a t any change th a t brought about a decrease in 
en try  would be w elfare-im proving; we can now show th a t the  
same r e s u l t  ap p lie s  even under uncerta in ty . Suppose th a t the  
p ro b ab ility  of success in research  f a l l s  by a ‘sm all’ amount, i.e. 
p = l —s . Because o f Prop. I I I . l ,  we know th a t a t  p  }>0;
le t  resea rch  c o s ts  ^  be such to  n u llify  the ( ‘sm all’)
supernorm al p ro f i t s  enjoyed by the N‘=’ firm s. Whereas th ese  two 
sm all changes b ring  about correspondingly sm all changes under a 
PI regime, under a PP regime th e re  w ill be d is c re te  ‘jumps’. In 
fa c t a t <p, p ro f i t s  fo r th e  (=N“ ) firm s a re  negative
and thus a f re e -e n try  equilibrium  w ill su s ta in  N‘=‘—1 firm s
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(each earn ing  supernorm al p ro f its ) . However, a t N'“ - l )
the  net w elfa re  le v e ls  under the two regim es are  ‘close* 
(reca llin g  th a t,  by Prop. III.4 , they converge a t  p = l ) .  Thus, 
taking in to  account the  super-norm al p ro f i t s  now generated  by 
the N*=*—1 firm s, so c ia l w elfare  w ill be h igher under a PP 
regime. ■
In o rder to  a s c e r ta in  how close to  un ity  the  p ro b ab ility  of 
success in re sea rch  has to  be fo r th e  above argument to  hold we 
can r e s o r t  to  the  param etriza tion  111.15-17; s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  
s u b s t i tu t io n  y ie ld s
E { v r^ }  = v r +  N £ { )! ''■ }  I I I .  4 6
-  V I I I .  4 7
I I I .  4 8
E i v r -  ) p ‘ q " “  2 < l T l f = )=““ - n p v '” ’-n q . I I I .  49
v " "  = [ i v : )  ^  p ' " q " - '  I I I .  5 0
Suppose th a t  re sea rch  c o s ts  9  a re  such th a t a f re e -e n try  
equilibrium  s u s ta in  exac tly  3  firm s under a PI regime; fo r any 
p  we can now compute w elfare  le v e ls  fo r the  PI regime and fo r 
the PP regime, bearing  in mind th a t in th e  l a t t e r  one fewer firm 
w ill be ac tiv e .
S im ulations suggest th a t the PP regime w ill y ie ld  a h igher net 
expected s o c ia l su rp lu s  fo r values o f p  around O. 5 (the 
sw itch -over value o f p  appear to  be q u ite  in se n s itiv e  to
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changes in oc, ranging from p = 0 .  5 0 6  f o r  a = 0 .  0 1  to  
p = 0 .  5 8 2  for o£=0. 3 7 5 ) .  When inventions are 'not too  
d i f f i c u l t ’ (i.e. p > 0 .  5 )  and research cost  are 'high' (so that at 
most 3  firms can be a c t iv e )  a sw itch  from the entry-inducing PI 
regime to  the concentrât ion-inducing PP regime may in fact y ie ld  
a w elfare improvement. On r e f le c t io n ,  th is  i s  in l in e  with  
in tu ition : e s p e c ia l ly  when p i s  "high" the two advantages of a 
PI regime — higher entry and higher ouput — may be more than 
o f f s e t  by the advantages o f  a PP regime -  lower industry  
research c o s t s  and more e x ten s iv e  development o f  research
prototypes.
0-5
FIG. III.5
■*P
PI r&glae vs PP reg*lme
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I IL 8  Conclusions ,
In th is  ch ap te r i t  has been suggested  th a t i f  research  and 
development a re  modelled as two sep a ra te  s ta g e s , the  paten t 
system can take on the  h ith e r to  neg lected  and p o te n tia lly  
s ig n if ic a n t ro le  o f a f fe c tin g  the a llo c a tio n  of resou rces 
between re sea rch  and development. This is  p a r tic u la r ly  im portant 
when th e  d e f in itio n  of product space is  "perm issive" so th a t 
m ultip le  p a te n ts  a re  awarded to  c lose s u b s t i tu te s .
Of course, more re sea rch  (and possib ly  more development) is  
requ ired  in th e  h ith e r to  neg lected  a rea  of th e  economics of 
p a te n ta b ili ty  s tan d ard s  i f  econom ists a re  to  meet the  challenge 
posed by recen t techno log ical developments to  th e  s u i ta b i l i ty  of 
the cu rren t p a ten t regime. As examples of in d u s tr ie s  to  which 
the above R&D model could be p ro fita b ly  applied  1 s h a ll  consider 
the  is su e  of the  p a te n ta b i li ty  of p lan t v a r ie t ie s  and micro­
organisms.
Consider th e  case of p lan t v a r ie t ie s  f i r s t :  as any v a ria tio n  in 
the s e t  o f fe a tu re s  of a p lan t is  considered a new v arie ty , the  
cu rren t p a ten t system  defines the product space in a 
"perm issive" fashion. Whether i t  is  id eas- o r product-based  is  
le s s  c lea r, in  so fa r  as cu rren t p a te n ta b ili ty  s tan d ard s  demand 
th a t some development be undertaken (so as to  achieve "stab le"  
and "uniform" v a r ie tie s ) , but on the o th e r no development is  
requ ired  to  s a t i s f y  the  p a ten t a u th o r i t ie s  th a t the "new"
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v arie ty  Is  not merely the  re s u l t  of "cosm etic breeding", but has 
valuable fe a tu re s  in term s o f yield, re s is ta n c e  to  d isease , etc . 
I f  i t  is  p lau sib ly  assumed th a t the  p ro b ab ility  of succeeding in 
changing cosm etica lly  the  fe a tu re s  of a p lan t v a r ie ty  is  c lose 
to  unity , then th e  above an a ly sis  su g g es ts  th a t i t  is  lik e ly  
th a t a sw itch  to  more s tr in g e n t ru le s  on the  requ ired  
development of v a r ie t ie s  p r io r  to  pa ten t f i l in g  could be 
welf are-im proving.
A te ll in g  example of the  economics of p a te n ts  lagging behind 
the need fo r re lev an t policy advice is  given by the  European 
Commission's "Proposal fo r  a Council D irective on the  Legal 
P ro tec tion  o f B io technological Inventions" (1988). The proposed 
D irective c o rre c tly  s in g le s  out a p roperly  designed p a ten t 
system  as  an im portant, indeed as a c ru c ia l, fa c to r  fo r th e  
success of the  European biotechnology in dustry , but is  forced by 
the lack of re le v an t economic models of R&D to  ground i t s  
recommendations on ‘common sen se ’ (i.e. on unrigorous economic 
theorizing). Indeed in the  document one can find various 
examples of the  im p lic it assum ption th a t encouraging com petition 
a t the re sea rch  s ta g e  is  always more so c ia lly  b e n e fic ia l than 
favouring the  wider d issem ination  of new ideas — an assum ption 
th a t the  above an a ly sis  has shown to  be valid  only fo r c e rta in  
ranges o f the  param eters th a t describe technology and demand.
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C H A P T E R  I V
R&D, Quality, and the Integer Constraint
IV. 1 In t roduct ion
As we have seen in the  preceding chap ters, th e  ‘in teg e r 
c o n s tra in t’ due to  the  in d iv is ib i l i ty  of firm s brought about by 
the ‘lumpy* n a tu re  of expend itu res in R&D is  not ju s t  a 
te ch n ica l nuisance th a t can be dism issed with the  popular 
proviso “assum ing the  number of firm s can be tre a te d  as a 
continuous v a ria b le  ... ", but o ften  has fa r-reac h in g  consequences 
in  so fa r  as i t  may re v e rse  the  w elfare im plications derived 
from a n o n -in te g e r-c o n s tra in e d  version  of the  model.
In th is  chap ter, we s h a ll  analyse in some d e ta i l  th e  economics 
o f the  in te g e r  c o n s tra in t and s h a ll suggest th a t i t s  shadow 
looms la rg e r  than is  commonly recognized. As a by-product of 
the an a ly sis  we s h a ll  a lso  show th a t two major s tra n d s  of the  
economics o f te ch n ica l change, namely the  economics of q u a lity  
and the  economics of R&D, a re  not as independent as the  
l i te r a tu r e  might suggest. F inally , i t  s h a ll  be argued th a t even 
in  a sim ple Cournot-Nash oligopoly model w ith no R&D a proper 
fo rm aliza tion  of the  in te g e r  c o n s tra in t can be u se fu l to  
account, fo r example, fo r the  p o s itiv e  c o rre la tio n  between 
p ro f i ta b i l i ty  and concen tra tion  in a model w ith  f re e  en try .
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IV.2 The M issing R&D-Quality Link
In the 1970s a la rg e  l i te r a tu r e ^ ’ * analysed the  to p ic  of q u a lity  
com petition and in p a r t ic u la r  the  e f f e c ts  of given market 
s tru c tu re s  on th e  q u a lity  of ou tpu t, as measured by a sca la r, q. 
In the 1980s th e  em phasis moved on the  one hand on modelling 
market s t r u c tu re  in v e r tic a l ly  d if fe re n tia te d  in d u s tr ie s , and on 
the  o th e r on m odelling R&D w ithin  an e x p lic it ly  gam e-theoretic  
framework.
In th is  sec tio n , 1 s h a ll  argue th a t in te re s t in g  in s ig h ts  can be 
gained by e s ta b lish in g  a link  between q u a lity -co m p etitio n  models 
and g am e-th eo re tic  models of R&D. To th is  end 1 s h a ll  in te rp re t 
Dasgupta and S t ig l i t z  (1980) model o f R&D in the  lig h t of 
q u a lity  com petition  theory.
I t  sh a ll be reca lled  th a t Dasgupta and S t ig l i tz  explore, among
o th e r th ings, th e  R&D behaviour in a socially-m anaged industry  
and in a monopoly. Let th e  so c ia l p lanner's  and th e  m onopolist's 
payoffs be, re sp ec tiv e ly :
U (Q ) -  C<x, Q) IV . 1
p<Q )Q  -  CCx, Q) IV . 2
where U (Q) is  g ro ss  so c ia l w elfare, Q is  ou tpu t, x is  
expenditu re  in R&D, p (Q )  is  the  demand function  and C < x ,Q ) is  
a cost function  th a t Dasgupta and S t ig l i tz  sp e c ia lis e  to:
C (x , Q) = c  (x )Q  + X IV . 3
For a survey, see  Schmalensee (1979).
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By using sp e c if ic  fu n c tio n a l forms fo r U<Q) and c  ( x ) , 
Dasgupta and S t ig l i t z  show a so c ia lly  managed in d u stry  w ill 
engage in  more s u b s ta n tia l  co st reductions than a monopoly, i.e. 
x® >x” .
I t  is  worth considering  the cost function  C C x ,Q ) in some 
d e ta il;  whereas, fo r a given x®, c  (x® )Q  can be in te rp re te d  as 
a proper minimum c o s t fu n c tio n , i . e .  d e r iv e d  from  {m in  w. z
Z > 0
s .  t .  Q = Q (z) } where z  = column vecto r o f inpu ts, w = row 
v ecto r o f inpu t p rices, Q ( z )  = lin e a r  homogeneous production
function, C (x , Q) is  a ‘h yb rid ’ cost function , whose arguments 
a re  ou tpu t Q and an input, x.
Simply by re c a s tin g  C (x , Q> in a more conventional way we can 
e s ta b lis h  the  correspondence between Dasgupta and S t ig l i tz 's  
ty p ic a l model o f R&D w ith a ty p ic a l q u a lity -  compet i t  ion model. 
This r e - in te rp r é tâ t  ion has sev e ra l advantages: on the  one hand 
i t  shows th a t the  r e s u l t  x® >x”  th a t Dasgupta and S t ig l i tz  have 
proved fo r  sp e c if ic  fu n c tio n a l forms fo r U (Q ) and c C x ) , holds 
fo r more g en era l cases, but, on the  o th e r hand, i t  h ig h lig h ts  
the fac t the  th is  r e s u l t  depends on a sp e c if ic  assumption 
regard ing  th e  quality -im prov ing  technology.
Indeed, th e  m issing link  between Dasgupta and S t ig l i t z 's  R&D 
model and a ty p ic a l q u a lity -co m p etitio n  model is  fu rn ished  by a 
quality -im prov ing  technology. Whereas the  l a t t e r  model does not 
specify  how q u a lity  improvements are  brought about (presumably 
by in v estin g  in R&D), Dasgupta and S t ig l i tz  do not s p e ll  out how
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R&D expend itu re  can reduce c o s ts  of production  (presumably by a 
q u a l i ta t iv e  change In the  In d u stry ’s c a p ita l  equipment).
Let q= IC x>  be the  quality-Im proving function  th a t maps 
expenditu re  In R&D, x , on to  a s c a la r  q u a lity  Index q, with 
l * ( x ) > 0 .
D efin in g  c  ( l ~ ’ ( q )  ) = G ( q ) , C < x ,Q ) can be w ritte n  as
C (q ,  Q) = G (q )Q  + 1 “ ’ <q) IV . 4
At th is  s ta g e  we can p ro f ita b ly  re s o r t to  a s tan d ard  re s u lt  In 
q u a lity  com petition  t h e o r y w h i c h  s ta t e s  th a t  I f  p^Q^O and 
CcQ<0, then  a m onopolist w ill produce goods o f In fe r io r  q u a lity  
as compared w ith a so c ia lly  managed Industry , I.e. q®>q” . I t  Is 
easy to  see  th a t  both assum ptions hold fo r th e  sp ec ia l case 
examined by Dasgupta and S tig l i tz ,  In which R&D does not a ffe c t 
th e  demand fu n c tio n  <Pc€a=0) and ( q )  < O and
thus, as I ^  ( x )  >0, I t  follow s th a t {q®>q”  }«{x® >x” }, which 
Is p rec ise ly  th e  r e s u l t  obtained by Dasgupta and S tig l i tz .
Thus by h ig h lig h tin g  the link  between R&D and quality*®* we have
See, fo r  example, Sheshlnskl (1976) and below, sec.
IV.3.
Consider the follow ing quo ta tion  from Dasgupta and 
Heal (1979), p. 475:
The problems o f modelling the e f f e c ts  o f  R and D are  
... p a r tic u la r ly  acute: I t  Is necessary  both to  describe 
the  occurence of techno log ical change and to  specify  
th e  re la tio n sh ip  between the a llo c a tio n  of e f fo r t  to  R 
and D and the  re su ltin g  e f fe c t  on changes In
technology. (...) I t  Is fo rtu n a te  th a t a number of 
Im portant po in ts  can be made w ithout any ex p lic it 
modelling of th e  R and D -  techno log ical change link. 
What we a re  arguing  In th is  sec tio n  Is th a t even a
very m odestly e x p lic it  modelling o f the  link  between 
R&D and q u a lity  can shed lig h t on the  n a tu re  and
lim ita tio n s  of the underlying model of R&D.
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shown th a t:
(1) on th e  one hand th e  re s u lt  th a t a so c ia lly  managed
in d u stry  w ill in v est a la rg e r  amount in R&D is  not 
confined to  th e  sp e c if ic  fu n c tio n a l forms used by 
Dasgupta and S tig l i tz ;
( ii)  on the  o th e r  hand, the  above r e s u l t  app lies  to
sp e c if ic  re la tio n sh ip s  between demand and q u a lity  (i.e. 
P cd ^ O ) and m arginal cost and q u a lity  (i.e., C«,q < 0 ).
As a f in a l  remark on the  correspondence between R&D 
models and models of q u a lity  com petition, i t  may be noted th a t 
by exploring  th e  quality-im provem ent im plications of Dasgupta & 
S t ig l i t z 's  model, the l a t t e r  can be in te rp re te d  in  novel ways. 
Consider the  la rg e  c la ss  o f cases in which th e re  e x is ts  a 
q u a n tif ia b le  d iffe re n ce  between physical and vendible output. 
For example, th e  q u a lity  of ou tput can be s to c h a s tic  and fo r 
some reason  (whether le g a l o r s tr a te g ic )  firm s cannot — or do 
not wish to  — s e l l  ou tpu t below a given minimal standard . Thus 
output must go through a q u a lity  in spec tion  process th a t 
transfo rm s physica l ou tpu t Y in to  vendible output Q. The 
e ffic ien cy  of th e  quality -ch eck  process depends on R&D
expenditure: le t  e < x )  be the percentage of ou tpu t th a t can be
marketed i f  x u n its  of R&D a re  expended, i.e.
Q = e  (x )  Y; e ,< < x )> 0  IV . 5
As w elfare  and market p rice  depend on vendible, ra th e r  than
physical ou tpu t, the  p lan n er's  and the  m onopolist's payoffs w ill
be, re sp e c tiv e ly
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U(Q) -  c -  X IV. 6e (x)
P(Q)Q -  c -  -  X IV. 7e(x)
which, ap a rt from a change in no ta tion , a re  id e n tic a l to  IV. 1-3.
IV .3 Product q u a l i t y  and the Integer  c o n s t r a in t '
Having shown th e  correspondence between R&D models and models 
of q u a lity  com petition, we can now examine the  e f fe c ts  of 
the in te g e r  c o n s tra in t in a model of q u a lity  com petition with an 
endogenously determ ined market s tru c tu re .
All models th a t determ ine the equilibrium  number of firm s 
endogenously by tr e a t in g  i t  as a continuous variab le  
acknowledge th a t  such a p a ten tly  c o u n te rfac tu a l assum ption is  
made fo r convenience and on the b e lie f  th a t allow ing fo r the 
in teg e r c o n s tra in t would leave the q u a l ita t iv e  r e s u l t s  of the 
model unchanged.
The purpose of th is  sec tio n  is  to  show by means o f a simple 
example th a t in the  con tex t of a p ro d u c t-q u a lity  model the  
in teg e r c o n s tra in t does make a s u b s ta n tia l  q u a lita t iv e  
difference^®*. Whereas by tre a tin g  th e  number o f firm s as a
A sho rtened  v ersion  of th is  sec tio n  has been published 
in La Manna (1987a).
‘'®* Although the  emphasis in th is  sec tio n  is  on product quality , 
i t  should be borne in mind th a t the  key issu e  of the  
relevance of the  in te g e r  co n stra in t ap p lies  to  a fa r  la rg e r  
c la ss  o f models — indeed to  any model th a t t r e a t s  market 
s t ru c tu re  as endogenous.
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continuous v a riab le  one o b ta in s  the r e s u l t  th a t in a fre e -e n try  
o ligopoly  th e re  is  excess en try  and th a t th e  equilibrium  lev e l 
of q u a lity  may d i f f e r  from the  so c ia lly  optim al one, when the  
in te g e r  c o n s tra in t i s  allowed for, the so c ia lly  optim al ( in teg e r-  
co nstra ined ) number of firm s may exceed the  ( in teg e r-  
constra ined ) number of firm s su sta in ed  in o ligopoly  and product 
q u a lity  may be th e  same under the two regim es.
In sec. IV.3.1 the  s tandard  product q u a lity  model with be 
extended to  th e  case o f a f re e -e n try  oligopoly; sec. IV.3.2 
con tains an example dem onstrating the the  q u a lita t iv e  r e s u l ts  
derived in IV.3.1 do not n ece ssa rily  carry  over to  the in te g e r-  
constra ined  so lu tio n . A ll p roofs and te ch n ica l d e ta i ls  a re  
re le g a ted  to  Appendix IV.
IV . 3 . 1 P r o d u c t  q u a l i t y  u n d e r  a  s o c i a l l y —m a n a g e d  
i n d u s t r y  a n d  f r e e  e n t r y  o l i g o p o l y
Some p relim inary  remarks on th e  l i t e r a tu r e  a re  in  order.
Almost a l l  of th e  ea rly  models of product q u a lity  com petition
analysed th e  e f f e c ts  o f a given market s t ru c tu re  on product
q u a lity , as measured by a sc a la r , q. The s tan d ard  r e s u lt  was
th a t q  is  independent of th e  q u an tity  of ou tpu t produced, Q
(and thus o f market s tru c tu re )  i f f  both the  follow ing conditions
are  s a t is f ie d :
Pqq(q, Q) = o IV. 8
Cq(q, Q) - QCqeCq, Q) = 0  IV. 9
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where P (  ) and C (*>  a re  th e  inverse  demand function  and the 
cost function, re sp ec tiv e ly .
The theory  o f product q u a lity  underlying the  above re s u lt  is  
q u ite  d if fe re n t  from the theory of v e r t ic a l  product 
d if fe re n tia t io n  pioneered by Jaskold Gabszewicz and Thisse 
(1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) in so fa r  as 
the l a t t e r  analyse the case in  which consumers a re  heterogenous 
(i.e. a tta c h  d if fe re n t  values to  q u a lity  and vary in th e ir  income 
endowments) and, more im portantly , consider market s tru c tu re  as 
endogenous.
The model developed below can be viewed as an in term ed ia te  s te p  
between th e  'o ld ' and the  ‘new’ theory  of product quality , in 
th a t, lik e  the  l a t t e r ,  i t  aims a t determ ining market s tru c tu re  
but, lik e  th e  former, tak es  as i t s  s ta r t in g  point a very 
s im p lified  no tion  of product quality .
The reason  fo r not considering  the more in te re s t in g  case of 
heterogenous consumers is  th a t the  sim pler case of an 'add-on' 
q u a lity  premium valued equally  by a l l  ( id en tica l)  consumers 
a ffo rd s  the  most economical way of making the point on the  
relevance o f th e  in te g e r  co n s tra in t.
Thus the  demand function  is  assumed to  be ad d itiv e ly  separab le  
in ou tpu t Q and product q u a lity  q:
P(q, Q) = f(Q) + g(q) IV. 10
with g ( 0 ) = 0  and P ( q , 0 ) = 0 .  That is  to  say, the  q u a lity -  
augmented demand curve P ( q ,Q )  is  simply the demand curve fo r
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th e  m in im al-quality  good (q= 0) sh if te d  to  th e  r ig h t by the  
amount o f value o f q u a lity  premium g ( q ) .  Of course, the  
fu n c tio n a l form IV.10 g u aran tees  th a t P<,q Cq , Q )= 0 .
Turning now to  th e  cost s ide , sp ec ia l care  must be taken In 
modelling q u a l i ty - r e la te d  co sts . In fac t. In so  f a r  as q u a lity  Is 
obtained  through expend itu res In R&D, I t  Is  bound to  emerge as 
a fixed co s t In C ( q ,Q ) .  And yet th e  e a r ly  l i te r a tu r e  on 
product q u a lity  abounds o f examples th a t assume away the  fixed 
cost fe a tu re  o f q u a lity  change. Take, fo r Instance, th e  following 
fu n c tio n a l form, used by Levharl and Peles (1973) and
Schmalensee (1979), which ru le s  out any q u a l i ty - re la te d  fixed 
cost:
C ( q ,Q )  = H (Q ) + Q G (q) IV . 11
Obviously w ithout some s o r t  o f fixed cost one cannot determ ine 
the  equ ilib rium  number of firm s and a fo r tio r i  consider the 
e f fe c ts  o f th e  In teg e r c o n s tra in t. We can then  Introduce
q u a l i ty - re la te d  fixed  c o s ts  ex p lic itly :
C ( q i , Q i )  = F (q * >  + V < q^,Q *>  IV . 12
Notice th a t  IV. 12 assumes th a t  th e re  a re  no s p i l l -o v e r  e f fe c ts  
(co sts  fo r a ty p ic a l firm  1 depend only on I t s  own q* and Q*).
Output quality and quantity In a socially managed industry.
Assuming com plete Inform ation, a p lanner can lo c a te  h er f i r s t -  
b es t optimum by choosing th e  combination o f Q® (output per 
p lan t), q® (q u a lity  Index) and n *  (number o f p la n ts )  th a t
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maximizes n e t su rp lu s , i.e.
T%Q ,
W(q®,Q®,n®) = max J [f <v)+g(q)]dv - n[F(q)+V(q, Q)] IV. 13
q ,  Q . n  O
i.e. q®, Q®, n® a re  th e  so lu tio n  of the  FOCs:
WcCq, Q, n ) = n [ f  <n®Q®)+g<q®)-Vc»Cq®. Q ® )]= 0  IV . 14
W q(q, Q, n )= n [Q ® g q (q ® )-F q (q ® )-V q (q ® , Q ® )]= 0  IV . 15
W n(q, Q, n )= Q [ f (n ® Q ® )+ g (q ® ) ] -F (q ® ) -V (q ® , Q ® )=0 IV . 16
Notice th a t IV, 14 and IV. 16 y ie ld  the  u n su rp ris in g  r e s u l t  th a t, 
fo r  any given q , MC <q>=AC < q )= P  < q ) , while IV. 15 says th a t, 
fo r any given Q, product q u a lity  is  chosen so  as to  equate i t s  
m arginal b e n e fit, Q g ^ ( q ) , to  i t s  m arginal co st, F^+ V ^C q, Q ). 
O utput q u a lity  and q u a n tity  in  a  f re e -e n try  oligopoly  
All firm s a re  assumed: (i) to  have access to  the  same
technology; ( i i )  to  behave non-cooperatively ; ( i i i )  to  e n te r ta in  
Cournot co n jec tu res  regard ing  th e ir  co n tro l v a riab les , q  and Q;
(iv) to  determ ine q  and Q sim ultaneously. These assum ptions 
guaran tee  th a t  th e  r e s u lt in g  Cournot-Nash equilibrium  is  
symmetric. Furtherm ore, i t  is  assumed th a t th e re  a re  no b a r r ie rs  
to  en try  and th a t e n try  take  place as long as e n tra n ts  make 
non-negative  p ro f its .
The a d d itiv i ty  of P ( q ,  Q) in  q  and Q s im p lif ie s  g re a tly  the  
modelling o f th is  o ligopoly  environment in so  f a r  as i t  ru le s  
out any product se le c tio n  problem: goods produced by a l l
o lig o p o lis ts  a re  p e rfe c t s u b s t i tu te s  and are  so ld  a t  u n it p rice s  
equal to  a q u an tity -d e te rm in ed  common constan t p lus a q u a lity -
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re la te d  premium. Defining
j t < q « ,Q « ) = ^ { f < Q . ,+ Q , ) + g < q , ) Q , - F < q . ) - V < q „ Q , )  ) IV . 17
and re c a llin g  th a t,  a t a f re e -e n try  equilibrium  Tc<q®, Q®, n® )= 0  
th e  so lu tio n  <q®,Q®,n®> is  defined by:
îtQ<q, Q )= f(n ® Q ® )+ Q f* (n ® Q ® )+ g (q ® )-V Q (q ® , Q ® )=0 IV . 18
n q (q ,Q )= Q ® g ^ (q ® )-F q (q ® )-V q (q ® ,Q ® )= 0  IV . 19
K (q , Q )= Q ® f(n ® Q ® )+ Q ® g (q ® )-F (q ® )-V (q ® , Q® ) = 0  IV . 2 0
Comparison between S ocia l Optimum and Oligopoly Equilibrium  
In the  Appendix to  th is  Chapter i t  is  shown th a t:
n® >n^ IV . 21
Q®<Q® IV . 22
q ® ;q =  IV . 2 3
a c c o rd in g  as  to  w hether F q (q )+ V q (q ,Q l^ Q V ^ q C q ,Q ) .
These r e s u l t s  a re  sim ply a s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  g en e ra liza tio n  of 
s tandard  p ro d u c t-q u a lity  models th a t take n  as  exogenously 
given (see, fo r  example, Sheshinski (1976)).
IV.3.2 The im portance o f th e  In teg e r c o n s tra in t
Because o f q u a l i ty - r e la te d  fixed  costs , F ( q ) ,  firm s are  non- 
d iv is ib le  and hence n  cannot be tr e a te d  as a continuous 
variab le . Indeed, as th e  p ro b ab ility  of n  being an in te g e r is  a 
s e t  o f m easure zero, i t  is  ‘alm ost c e r ta in ' th a t n® w ill not be 
an in te g e r  and th e re fo re  (n® ,q® ,Q ® ) cannot be a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium .
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A sim ple way out of th is  Impasse is  affo rded  by re c a s tin g  the 
model as a tw o -s tag e  game: the  f i r s t  s ta g e  is  ju s t  as described 
above, whereas in  the  second s tag e  |n * |  firm s, where In*  I is  
the la rg e s t  in te g e r  not exceeding n ° ,  re-com pute the  Cournot- 
Nash equilibrium  of the  model, cond itional on th e re  being I n* I 
en tra n ts .
The key po in t to  n o tice  is  th a t whereas I n* j cannot exceed n® 
(fo r p ro f i t s  would be negative  fo r each of the  < |n * j + l )  
e n tra n ts ) , no such u n i-d ire c tio n a l r e s t r ic t io n  app lies  to  a 
so c ia l planner, who, faced w ith a n o n -in teg e r n®, can ad ju st the 
number of firm s e i th e r  downwards or upwards. In the  l a t t e r  
case, firm s, o f course, would be opera tin g  on th e  fa llin g
segment o f th e ir  m arginal cost, but the  lo ss  due to  m arginal-
cost p ric in g  would be more than o f fs e t  by the  la rg e r  consumers' 
su rp lus.
As a r e s u l t  o f th is  asymmetry, i t  is  conceivable th a t, even
though in th e  in teg e r-u n co n stra in ed  case th e re  is  always 
excessive en try , i.e. n °> n® , once the  in te g e r  c o n s tra in t is  
taken in to  account, the  in eq u a lity  may be reversed , i.e.
l n ® |< |n ® |,  where j n ^ j  is  the in te g e r-c o n s tra in e d  value of
n=".
Of course, the in te g e r  co n s tra in t may y ie ld  in e q u a lity  re v e rsa ls  
regard ing  th e  number of firm s with any s o r t  of fixed co s ts  (not 
n ece ssa rily  q u a lity  re la te d ) , but, as th e  follow ing example 
shows, when fixed  co s ts  are q u a lity - re la te d , such re v e rsa ls
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change the  q u a l i ta t iv e  r e s u l t s  derived from the  In teg e r- 
unconstrained  model.
IV.3.3 An Example 
Suppose th a t P < q , Q) Is  lin e a r  In output, I.e.
P ( q ,  Q) = a  -  + g ( q )  IV . 2 4
S u b s titu tin g  IV.24 In to  th e  FOCs th a t determ ine th e  so c ia l 
optimum and the  f re e -e n try  oligopoly equilibrium  we obtain:
Wc*<q, Q, n ) = n [ a - n = Q s + g ( q = ) - V Q ( q s ,  Q ® )]= 0  IV . 25
W q(q, Q, n ) = n r Q S g ^ ( q S ) - F q ( q = ) - V q ( q S ,  Q ® )3=0 IV . 26
W„<q. Q, n ) = Q [ a - n = Q s + g ( q = ) ] - F ( q S ) - V ( q s ,  Q ^ )= 0  IV . 27
rtcaCq, Q )= a-< n O + l> Q ® + g < q ® )-V c< q ® , Q®>=0 IV . 28
n q ( q ,  Q ) = Q * g q ( q * ) -F q ( q O ) - V q ( q O ,Q ° ) = 0  IV . 29
Tt (q , Q, n)=Q® [ a-n®  Q® +g<q® ) ] - F  (q® ) -V (q®  , Q ® )=0 IV . 30
Comparing IV.25-27 with IV.28-30, I t  Is  easy to  see  th a t a 
s u f f ic ie n t condition  fo r the  two regim es to  y ie ld  the same 
output per firm  and the  same product q u a lity  level, 
ir re sp e c tiv e ly  o f th e  s ig n  o f F ^ ( q ) + V q ( q ,Q ) - Q V ^ Q ( q ,Q ) ,  Is 
th a t
|n = !  = ( |n ® |+ l )  IV . 31
In fac t, under th is  condition, the FOCs with re sp ec t to  q  and Q 
would be Id e n tic a l fo r the  two regimes, and IV.27 and IV.30 do 
not apply In the  second s ta g e  of the game, when n® and n® are
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in te g e r-  co n s tra in ed  and exogenous. 
P aram etrizing P ( q ,  Q) and C (q , Q) as follows:
P ( q ,  Q) = 5 1 . 7  -  gQ -  IV . 32
C(q, Q) = q= + 1. 5qQ = IV. 3 3
ro u tin e  c a lc u la tio n s  confirm  th a t IV.21-23 hold:
Q® = 1 .5 8  > Qo = l .  4 4
q® = 3 . 7 5  > qO =3. 7
n® = 4 . 5 8  < n ® -4 . 9 6
Let ( |q O | ,  IQ* I ) and ( iq ® ! ,  IQ®! ) be, resp ec tiv e ly , the 
p ro f i t -  and w elfare-m axim izing le v e ls  o f product q u a lity  and 
output per firm  when the  number of firm s is  in teg e r-co n s tra in ed  
(i.e. the so lu tio n s  o f th e  second s ta g e  of th e  game). I t  is  easy 
to  confirm th a t  a so c ia l p lanner would a t ta in  a h igher lev e l of 
net so c ia l w elfare  by ad ju stin g  n® upwards (as shown in Fig. 
IV. 1), i.e.
W (lq ® l, 1Q®1, l n = l + l )  > W (lq ® l, |Q ® |,  ln ® | ) 
Therefore, as  condition  [IV.31] holds, l.e. I n®! =  ( |  n “ 1+1 ), we
obta in
In® ! = 5 > In*  I = 4 
IQ ^l = |Q®I “  1 . 5 3
|q=l = |q°l “ 3.73
Notice th a t co n tra ry  to  the  im plication  o f th e  in te g e r-  
unconstrained case, product q u a lity  is  th e  same under the two 
regimes, even though (q )+V^ <q, Q) >QV^q (q, Q) •
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F ig .  IV. 1
The Im portance o f  th e  In te g e r  C o n stra in t
1 3 3  -
IV. 4 Profits, Concentration, and the Integer 
Constraint“
In the example sketched  in the previous sec tio n  each of the 
In®! o lig o p o lis t enjoys s t r i c t l y  p o s itiv e  super-norm al p ro f its , 
in s p i te  o f the in d u s try  being modelled as a f re e -e n try  
oligopoly. This shows q u ite  c lea rly  th a t as soon as the  in teg e r 
c o n s tra in t is  taken in to  account, free  e n try  and p o s itiv e  
p ro f i ts  a re  no longer incom patible. The q uestion  can then be 
ra ised  as  to  w hether the  in te g e r  co n s tra in t can account for the 
p o s itiv e  c o rre la tio n  between p ro f i ts  and concen tra tion  under 
f re e -e n try  conditions.
Prima facie  th e re  is  no mystery in the  commonly observed 
em pirical c o rre la tio n  between concen tration  and p ro f ita b ili ty .  
The answ ers th a t most in d u s tr ia l  econom ists would provide i f  
asked to  provide a th e o re tic a l  explanation fo r i t  would point to  
the fa c t th a t (i) in a cooperative model, high concen tration  
leads in ev itab ly  to  h igher p ro f i ta b i l i ty  because of increased 
co llusion  — the  fewer firm s th e re  are, the  e a s ie r  co llusion  is, 
thereby ra is in g  ind iv idual and jo in t p ro f its ;  ( i i )  in a non- 
coopera tive model, as long as concen tra tion  is  defined as an 
inverse  function  o f N, the  number of firm s in th e  industry , 
then, provided firm s choose ou tpu t le v e ls  sim ultaneously , i t  can 
be shown [see Seade (1980)] th a t p ro f i ts  per firm  f a l l  as N
This sec tio n  draws on La Manna (1986).
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r is e s .
N either o f the  above exp lanations re fe r s  e x p lic it ly  to  en try  
conditions — and fo r a good reason: i f  i t  is  assumed th a t
th e re  a re  no b a r r ie r s  to  en try , then, in so fa r  as free  en try  
im plies zero  super-norm al p ro f i ts  ir re sp e c tiv e ly  of the  value of 
n , th e re  ought to  be no c o rre la tio n  a t a l l  between p ro f i ta b il i ty  
and concen tra tion .
I t  follow s th a t,  according to  the  received wisdom, no th e o re tic a l 
exp lanation  of the  p ro f ita b ili ty -c o n c e n tra t io n  link  is  ava ilab le  
i f  one makes th e  reasonab le  jo in t assum ption o f f re e  en try  and 
non-cooperative behaviour
In th is  se c tio n  i t  w ill be shown th a t because o f the in teg e r 
c o n s tra in t a r is in g  from the in d iv is ib il i ty  of firm s, 
concen tra tion  and p ro f i ta b i l i ty  a re  co rre la te d  even in  a non- 
cooperative oligopoly  w ith f re e  en try . I t  w ill be shown th a t 
super-norm al p ro f i t s  depend on two s t ru c tu ra l  param eters:
1 . the  s iz e  o f en try  fees; the re su lt in g  ‘s iz e  effect*  is  
unambiguously p o s itiv e  in  the sense th a t, c e te r is  paribus, 
in d u stry  w ith high en try  fees  a re  charac te rized  by high 
concen tra tion  and high p ro f i ts  per firm s;
2 . the ex ten t to  which the in teg e r co n s tra in t is  binding; the  
sign  of the  re s u lt in g  ‘In teg e r  c o n s tra in t effect*  is  
ambiguous and in  some sp e c ia l a lb e it un likely  cases may even 
o f fs e t the  ‘s iz e  effect*  and produce a perverse  negative
For an in te re s t in g  model w ith both f re e  en try  and co llusion , 
see  Brander and Spencer <1985).
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co rre la tio n  between concen tra tion  and p ro f i ta b il i ty .
F inally , i t  w ill be shown th a t, provided the  d is tr ib u tio n s  of 
en try  fee s  ac ro ss  in d u s tr ie s  a re  ‘w ell-behaved’ (in a sense made 
p rec ise  below), then c ro s s - in d u s try  re g re ss io n s  w ill show, on 
average, a p o s itiv e  c o rre la tio n  between concen tra tion  and 
p ro f i ta b il i ty .
The log ic  o f th e  argument is  sim ple and can be i l lu s t r a te d  as 
follows: suppose th a t the  number of firm s su sta in e d  by a f re e -  
en try  equilibrium  in in d u stry  i  (respec tive ly , j  ) is  2.5 (4.5). 
Obviously only two (four) firm s can be ac tiv e , each earning 
super-norm al p ro f i ts .  One would expect th a t, ce te r is  paribuSt 
the more concen tra ted  in d u stry  i  to  be more p ro f ita b le  than 
in d u stry  j . This is  because, f ig u ra tiv e ly  speaking, the sp o ils  of 
h a lf  a firm  a re  worth more in in d u stry  i  and, moreover, a re  
shared among fewer firm s. However, i t  is  not d i f f ic u l t  to  see 
th a t, because of the  in te g e r  co n s tra in t, more concentrated  
in d u s tr ie s  may tu rn  out to  be le s s  p ro f ita b le . Let and rij
be re sp e c tiv e ly  2.01 and 3.99; in in d u stry  i  p ro f i ts  w ill be 
close to  zero, w h ils t the th ree  firm s ac tiv e  in in d u stry  j  w ill 
share  the  n o n -n eg lig ib le  p ro f i ts  th a t would have accrued to  the 
"n ine ty -n ine  hundredths o f a firm" which would have ex isted , had 
not been fo r the  in te g e r  c o n s tra in t.
What follow s form alizes the  in tu it iv e  argument sketched above.
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IV.3.1 Free-entry Cournot Equilibrium and the Integer Constraint
Consider an economy w ith M fre e -e n try  in d u s tr ie s  indexed by j  
U = Assume (fo r s im p lic ity  only) th a t each industry  is
faced w ith a lin e a r  inverse  demand function  fo r i t s  homogenous 
product and th a t  each firm  has constan t m arginal co sts , i.e. 
rij
P j = -  b j  Z  i = l , . . , r i j  IV . 3 4
j
Cij(Xi) = CjXij + Fj IV. 35
where: x ^ j = i t h  firm 's  ou tpu t lev e l in in d u stry  j  
n j  =number o f firm s in in d u stry  j
F j = in d u s try -sp e c if ic  fixed en try  fee in in d u stry  j  (on 
a pel—p e r io d  b a s is ) .
In o rder to  focus on in te r - in d u s tr ia l  d iffe re n c e s  in en try  fees,
i t  may be assumed th a t a l l  in d u s tr ie s  a re  id e n tic a l in a l l
re sp e c ts  but en try  fees (nothing of substance hinges on th is
n o ta tio n -sav in g  assum ption) :
= a ; b j  = b ; = c  V j IV . 36
Notice th a t,  a s  firm s a re  id en tica l, the rec ip ro ca l of the  number 
of firm s can be used as an unambiguous index of concentration . 
Given the number of firm s in industry  j , a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium  is  e s tab lish ed . S tra igh tfo rw ard  c a lcu la tio n s  show 
p ro f i ts  per firm  to  be
Hj = ( a - c ) = / b ( n j  + l ) =  -  F^ IV . 3 7
The f r e e - e n t r y  e q u i l ib r iu m  number of f irm s  in  in d u s try  j ,
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Is determ ined by the following zero -p ro f I t s  condition;
Fj = (a-c)=/b(n%+l)= IV.38
Of co u rse , th e  p r o b a b i l i ty  o f being an In teg e r Is a s e t of 
measure zero; thus, le t  1 rij I be the  In teg e r-co n stra in ed  
number o f firm s In Industry  j, I.e., the la rg e s t In teg e r not 
exceed ing  n%.
I t  can be seen th a t In d u s tr ia l  s tru c tu re  Is  modelled as a 
p e rfec t equilibrium  of a tw o-stage  game: in  the  f i r s t  s ta g e
firm s sim ultaneously  decide whether to  incur the non- 
recoverable  fixed e n try  fe e  Fj. In the  second s tage , those 
firm s  (num bering nj) th a t have paid F j  choose th e ir  p ro f i t -  
maximizing ou tpu t leve ls .
Actual p r o f i t s  p e r firm , | I I j | ,  a re  given by
in,I = (a-c)=/b(|nj;+l)= - (a-c)=/b(n%+l)= IV. 39
i . e . ,  def in in g  Nj = I n j  1+1 and n ^ - l  1 =pi€ <0, 1) , we obta in
I nJ ! = (a-c) = (2Nj +pLj ) pij /bNjC Nj+ ( 2 N^  +pij > 1  IV. 40
I t  can be e a s i l y  v e r i f i e d  th a t ,  fo r  any pi^,
i n j  = IHj^ l <=» I " i l  f  IV. 41
According to  IV.41, concen tra tion  — as measured by l/|rij| — 
and p ro f i ta b i l i ty  — as measured by ! Ilj 1 — are  p o s itiv e ly
co rre la ted . However, from IV.40 i t  can a lso  be seen th a t a c tu a l 
p ro f i ts  depend not only on the s iz e  of fixed en try  fees ( 's iz e  
e f f e c t ’), but a lso  on the d iffe ren ce  between the f re e -e n try
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equilibrium  of firm s w ith and w ithout f ra c t io n a l en try , i.e. on p. 
( ‘in te g e r  c o n s tra in t effect*).
Whilst th e  s iz e  e f f e c t  always leads to  a p o s itiv e  c o rre la tio n  
between concen tra tion  and p ro f i ts  (see IV.41), th e  in teg e r 
co n s tra in t e f fe c t  can work in the opposite  d irec tio n ; indeed, 
cases may a r is e  in  which the  l a t t e r  more than o f f s e ts  the 
former, g iv ing  r is e  to  an o v e ra ll neg a tiv e  c o rre la tio n  between 
concen tra tion  and p ro f ita b ili ty * ® * .
In o rder to  show th a t, on average, the  s iz e  e f fe c t can be 
expected to  be s tro n g e r  than the in te g e r  co n stra in  e f fe c t, 
thereby accounting fo r the  observed p o s itiv e  c o rre la tio n  between 
p ro f i ts  and concen tra tion , the following fa c ts  should be taken 
in to  account;
F a c t  1, Ind u stry  j  w ill su s ta in  J xijj firm s a t a f re e -e n try  
equilibrium  i f f
F " —  )
b < | n j | + 2 > b < ! n j | + l )
F a c t  2. The leng th  of the above half-open  in te rv a l f a l ls  with 
I n j  I .
F a c t  3 . For any given ! n j  I , I ITj 1 is  an increasing  concave
function  of p j , as shown in Fig. IV.2 (a).
Let J  be the  s e t  o f in d u s tr ie s  with jn jj a c tiv e  firm s and
le t  5 j ( F j )  be th e  d is tr ib u tio n  of fixed en try  fees  over
C on sid er th e  fo llo w in g  example: a = 2 , b = c = l ,  F ,= 2 .  1~^ 
F a = 3 . 9 ~ ^ , From IV.38 i t  follows th a t I n ,  1=1, | n 2 l= 2 ,
p ,= 0 .  1, p 2 = 0 . 9. Using IV.39 we can compute a c tu a l
(super-no rm al) p ro f i t s  : 111,1=^0.0232 < I = 0 .0 4 5 6 .
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pm «x n eed less to  say th e re  Is a one-to -one 
correspondence between 6 j < F j )  and a s u ita b le  d is tr ib u tio n  
defined  over CO, 1 ) .
In o rder fo r  a c ro s s - industry  reg ress io n  of average p ro f i ts  
onto any index of concen tra tion  based on the  number of ac tiv e  
firm s to  y ie ld  a n eg a tiv e  co e ffic ie n t, the  d is tr ib u tio n s  5 j  CFj ) 
must have th e  unusual p roperty  th a t the  d iffe re n ce  between 
pm »x (the  average fixed  en try  fee) is  a decreasing
convex function  o f | n j | .  Or, to  put i t  d if fe re n tly , the  average 
‘in te g e r c o n s tra in t e f f e c t ’ (i.e. the average value o f pi j  ) must 
be la rg e r  in le s s  concen tra ted  in d u s tr ie s .
In the absence of any economic reason why the average s iz e  of 
fixed e n try  fees  should be sy stem a tica lly  re la te d  to  the  
d iffe re n c e  between maximum and average fixed en try  fees  (i.e. 
pm«.x_ we must conclude th a t the s iz e  e f f e c t  can be
expected, on average, to  be s tro n g e r than th e  in te g e r  co n s tra in t 
e f fe c t ,  thereby  y ie ld ing  a p o s itiv e  c o rre la tio n  between 
concen tra tion  and p ro f i ta b il i ty .
In conclusion, in th is  sec tio n  has shown th a t p ro f i ta b i l i ty  and 
concen tra tion  a re  c o rre la te d  even in a model w ith both free  
en try  and no co llusion . This is  because w ith p o s itiv e  en try  fees 
and n o n -fra c tio n a l en try , free  en try  is  com patible w ith p o s itiv e  
super-norm al p ro f i t s  being earned by a c tiv e  firm s. These 
p ro f its ,  however, a re  not co rre la ted  w ith concen tra tion  as such, 
but r a th e r  w ith the  s ize  o f en try  fees and th e  d iffe ren ce
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between the f r e e - e n t r y  equil ibrium of  firms with and without  
fr ac t i ona l  entry,  i.e.  fXj. For a p o s i t iv e  correla t ion to e x i s t ,  
i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  that,  on average,  the l a t t e r  i s  not inversely  
rela ted to  the s i z e  of  f ixed entry fees .
n,
max
Fi pmln pmln
45
F ig .  IV. 2 
Size Effect vs Integer Constraint Effect
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APPENDIX I VA
The FOCs IV. 14 and IV. 16 e n ta i l  th a t fo r any given product 
q u a lity  level, q , A V C q)=M C (q), i.e.:
J»<q ,Q)=  -  V « < q , Q ) = 0  I V A . 1
T o ta lly  d if f e re n t ia t in g  IVA.l and IV.15 we ob ta in  resp ec tiv e ly :
d q  I---------------- _ --------------------------------------------------   % VA 2
dQ l*x<c.Q>-o F ^ ( q ) + V ^ ( q ,Q ) - Q V ^ * ( q ,Q )
d q  I _  S q    IVA 3
dQ L , < c . q >-o g ^ ^ ( q ) + F ^ ^ ( q ) + V ^ ^ ( q , Q )
From the SOCs fo r the maximization of W (q ,Q ,n )  -  which are  
assumed to  be s a t i s f ie d  -  i t  can be seen th a t the slope of the 
curve q = g (Q ) defined  im p lic itly  by p ( q ,Q ) = 0  is  s te e p e r than 
the slope of the curve q= q< Q ) defined by W q (q ,Q )= 0  and th a t 
the s ig n  of the slope of both curves equals the sign  of 
F q ( q ) + V q ( q ,Q ) - Q V q Q ( q ,Q ) ;  see  Fig. IVA.l and IVA.2.
T o ta l d if f e re n tia t io n  of IV.14 and IV.16 fo r any given q  
y ie Ids
ËH I = _______n ( n f ^ ( n Q ) - V ^< q,_Q) )__________
dQ lw^ (q,Q,n)=0 n Q f „ C nQ )+f <nQ )+g <q)+V« <q, Q)
d n  I = _  n Q f q (nQ ) + f  CnQ) + g  (q )-V ^  < q , Q)
dQ U„(q,Q,n)=0 Q =f„<nQ )
For any given q , W c*<q,Q ,n>=0 y ie ld s a curve n=fS<Q) th a t is 
s te e p e r  than the curve n= A (Q ) implied by W „ < q ,Q ,n )= 0 ; the 
SOCs g uaran tee  th a t both curves are  downward slop ing  (see Fig. 
1V.A.3).
-  U 2  -
F „< q> + V „< q ,Q ) < Q V ^ ^(q .Q )
» G
F ig .  IV A .1
F = (q )+ V = (q .Q )  > Q V ^* (q .Q )
F ig .  IV A .2
*- Û,
n  f a )
F i g .  I V A .3
Gl
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Turning now to the f r e e - e n tr y  ol igopo ly  case ,  by combining the 
two FOCs IV. 18 and IV.20, we obtain:
X C q .Q )  = _  v < ^ < q ,Q ) + Q f „ C n Q ) = 0
Total  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  IVA.6 and IV.19 y ie lds
2 f o < n Q ) 4 - Q f Q o < n x ) - Q V o o < q ,  Q )
xc<,.Q>-o ( q )  ( q ,  Q ) - Q V q c  ( q ,  Q)dQ
ËSL
dQ
K = ( q ) -V o a (q ,Q )
Sc,q ( q ) + F ^ c  <q) +V^q ( q , Q )
IVA. 6
IVA. 7
IVA. 8
From the SOCs for the maximization of  i t ( q , Q )  i t  fo l lows that  
the curve q = q °  <Q) implied by X < q , Q ) = 0  is s te eper  than the 
curve q--q* CQ) implied by T t^ < q ,Q ) = 0  and that the s ign  of the 
s lopes  o f  both curves  equals  the s ign of  <q )+V^ <q, Q ) -  
Q V ^ o < q , Q ) ;  s e e  Fig.  IVA.4 and Fig. IVA.5.
( q ) + V ^ ( q , Q ) < Q V ^ q ( q , Q )  F ^ ( q ) + V ^ ( q . Q ) > Q V ^ Q ( q , Q )
F i g .  I V A . 4
<) ( â )
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To compare the  we If are-m axim izing so lu tio n  (q® , Q® , n® ) with 
the f re e -e n try  o ligopoly  equilibrium  no tice  th a t
from IVA.l and IVA.6  i t  follow s th a t q= q*  (Q) lie s  everywhere 
below the curve q = g (Q ) (assuming th a t
F q (q )+ V q (q ,Q )< Q V q Q (q ,Q ) ;  the opposite  case is  symm etrical) 
as shown in Fig. IVA.6 .
S im ilarly , i t  is  easy to  e s ta b lish  th a t fo r q®>q®, 
tIq  (q® , Q, n > = 0  lie s  everywhere below <q®, Q, n ) = 0  and th a t 
fo r q®>q®, rc< q ® ,Q ,n > = 0  lie s  everywhere above
W„ <q®, Q, n ) = 0 .  These r e s u l t s  a re  summarized in Fig. 1V(A.7 
which e s ta b lis h e s  the claim made in the te x t (IV.21-23) th a t 
n®>n®, Q®<Q® and th a t  q®<q® ac c o rd in g  as  to  w hether 
F „  (q  )+V ^ ( q ,  Q) ^QV<,a < q , Q) .
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F ig .  IV A .6
n (û )
"nQ(f,0,n) = o
F i g .  IVA. 7
Q
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